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Abstract
This thesis investigates the main determinants of Italian banks' cost efficiency over the
period 1993-96, by employing a Fourier-flexible stochastic cost frontier in order to
measure X-efficiencies and economies of scale. Quality and riskiness of bank outputs
are explicitly accounted for in the cost function and their impact on cost efficiency
levels are evaluated. The results show that mean X-inefficiencies range between 13 and
15 per cent of total costs and they tend to decrease over time for all bank sizes.
Economies of scale appear present and significant, being especially high for popular and
credit co-operative banks. Moreover, the inclusion of risk and output quality factors in
the cost function seems to reduce the level and significance of the scale economy
estimates. The sample is also subjected to a profitability test that allows for the
identification of banks that are both cost and profit efficient. The results suggest that the
most efficient and profitable institutions are more able to control all aspects of costs,
especially labour costs. Finally, the data were pooled to carry out a logistic regression
model in order to examine bank- and market-specific factors that influence Italian
banks' inefficiency. According to these results, inefficiencies appear to be inversely
correlated with capital strength and positively related to the level of non-performing
loans in the balance sheet. The analysis also shows that there is no clear relationship
between assets size and bank efficiency. Finally, from the results it is possible to infer
that quoted banks seem to be on average more efficient than their non-quoted
counterparts.
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Chapter 1
Background, Aims, Methodology
and Structure of the Study
1.1	 Introduction
The structure and organisation of the world banking industry has changed markedly
over the last fifteen years. The transformation of the environment in which banks
operate has had substantial implications for the economic role of banks and their
business activities. Financial innovations, the diffusion of new forms of payment,
technological progress and globalisation have gradually diminished the costs of
information processing and transmission, and also offered new opportunities to extend
the markets in which financial institutions can provide services.
In addition to these developments, a parallel process of deregulation has brought
about a significant increase in competitiveness between banks, which is inducing them
to modify their strategies in key areas such as in the development of new delivery
systems, service quality and pricing.
These kinds of fundamental changes have forced banks to become more
concerned about analysing and controlling their costs and revenues, as well as
measuring the risks taken to produce acceptable returns. In this context, the
maximisation of shareholders wealth and improved productive efficiency have become
much more important strategic targets for bank management. Banks today are
increasingly demand-oriented and are subject to external market tests of their productive
and other efficiencies. Moreover, recent studies [see, for example, Di Battista et al.
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(1996); Molyneux et al. (1996); European Commission (1997); Resti (1997a); Inzerillo
et al. (1999)] on efficiency in Italian banking show that there is substantial room for
reducing costs and improving the way that bank resources are used.
As a consequence, the issue of banks' efficiency and optimal dimension (i.e. size,
business mix and respective strategies) have become more important, not only from a
microeconomic point of view, but also for "the stability of the banking industry and, in
turn, for the effectiveness of the monetary system" [Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987, p.
29)]. Banks play a critical role in determining the money supply and in transmitting the
effects of monetary policy to the economy. At present, even in strongly market-oriented
systems a process of prudential re-regulation and adaptation appears necessary to help
preserve macro stability, especially during a period of strong contemporaneous (banking
structure and conduct rules) deregulation.
1.2	 Aims of the Study
This research aims to carry out an extensive analysis of the Italian banking industry. In
particular, the thesis will investigate the main determinants of Italian bank efficiency
and performance, in addition to evaluating the impact of risk and output quality factors
on the production characteristics of Italian banks.
Such an investigation is important for a number of reasons. As discussed above,
deregulation, increased competition and information technology are among the most
important forces of change in modern banking (see Figure 1.1). At the micro level, these
factors bring about intense pressures on banks, especially as regards their financial
capability, overall performance and the need for appropriate control and analysis of
costs; at the macro level, they influence the functioning of financial and economic
systems as a whole. Heffernan (1996) stresses that modern banks, like any other profit-
maximising business, have to bear two different types of risk: microeconomic risks,
such as competitive threats, and macroeconomic risks, like the effects of recession. In
CUSTOMER DEMAND
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addition, banks are subject to a collection of atypical risks and corresponding prudential
supervisory regulation.
Figure 1.1	 Forces of Change in European Banking
EU DEVELOPMENTS
	
POTENTIAL ENTRANTS
TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCE
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REGULATIONS,'
ACCOUNTING,
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INVOLVEMENT
Source: Arthur Andersen (1993, p. 1).
From the macra perspective, banks can be strongly influenced by the expansions
and contractions that the economy experiences over time. In this respect, banks' loan
losses tend to be cyclical and highly influenced by macro-variables [Morgan Stanley
(1995)]. Broadly speaking, there is evidence that the quality of bank loans and the
default risk can influence banks' costs in a variety of ways [see, for example, Hughes
and Mester (1991); McAllister and McManus (1993); Mester (1996); Berger and Mester
(1997) and Altunbas et al. (1999)].
An important aim of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which risk and output
quality factors affect efficiency and scale economy levels in the Italian banking system.
The Italian banking market is particularly interesting in this respect because, on the one
hand it includes highly capitalised banks, which are also the smallest banks in the
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system (i.e. credit co-operative banks). On the other hand, since 1993 Italian banks have
suffered from a dramatic growth in the level of bad loans accompanied by a decrease in
interest margins: some large and medium sized banks in the south of the country have
incurred significant losses and sometimes have even experienced severe crises.
, Moreover, previous studies on Italian bank efficiency have tended to exclude risk and
quality issues when investigating the cost characteristics of the industry.
Against this background, the main objectives of this thesis are to evaluate the
following questions.
What are the main determinants of
Italian banks' performance, profitability,
and efficiency?
1 To what extent and how does the quality of
banks' assets affect the efficiency levels
estimated for Italian banks?
2 To what extent do risks influence the efficiency
levels of Italian banks?
3 Do the structural features of the Italian banking
market explain the evidence of cost
economies?
4 To what extent and how is Italian banks'
profitability related to cost efficiency?
5 What are the main financial characteristics of
efficient and inefficient banks in Italy?
1.3	 Research Methodology and Data Sources
In this study, data observations for a sample of 1,958 Italian banks for the period 1993
to 1996 are obtained from the Italian database Bilbank of the Associazione Banche
X-EFFICIENCIES
C .
 = I/ 1 + U .
ESTIMATION OF A STOCHASTIC FOURIER
FLEXIBLE COST FUNCTION
ECONOMIES
OF SCALE
OTC 
a OUTPUTS
Chapter 1 • Background, Aims, Methodology and Structure of the Study 	 5
Private Italiane which provides annual income and balance sheet data for a large
number of Italian banks.
Estimates on Italian banks' scale and X-efficiencies are derived using a stochastic
Fourier-flexible cost function (see Figure 1.2). The intermediation approach, which
considers the bank as a mediator between the supply of and demand for funds (and thus
deposits are inputs and interest on deposits is a component of total cost, together with
labour and capital) is used for the purposes of the empirical research.
The same methodological technique is then repeated by taking into account the
asset quality and banks' risk preferences in order to assess their influence on managerial
X-efficiency and scale economy measures. Following Mester (1996), these factors are
included as arguments in the cost function in the following way: quality is proxied by a
variable measuring the non-performing loans to total loans ratio; the level of financial
capital is measured as the average volume of equity capital (for each of the years
considered).
Figure 1.2	 Research Methodology
INTERMEDIATION
APPROACH
PROFITABILITYTEST
MOST (LEAST) EFFICIENT GROUP
= banks that rank in the upper (bottom)
quartile on the X-efficiency levels and rank
in the upper (bottom) half in term of ROA.
I.  Comparison of major sources ofincome and expenses between
most efficient and inefficient banks.
COMPARISON
WITH COST
FUNCTION
WITH RISK
AND OUTPUT
QUALITY
VARIABLES
INCLUDED
LOGISTIC REGRESSION
X-inefficiencies derived from the model
excluding risk and output quality variables
are regressed on a set of independent
variables relevant to the banking business.
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Following Spong et al. (1995) the cost efficiency measures derived from the
Fourier model are also subjected to a profitability test. This is undertaken in order to
identify banks that are both cost and profit efficient. This approach is taken because just
looking at the cost-side may provide inaccurate rankings of efficiency: for example, a
seemingly cost inefficient bank might be offsetting higher expenses with higher
revenues. It follows that banks which will do well on both cost efficiency and
profitability tests will comprise the overall "most efficient" bank category using this
approach, while banks that fare poorly on the two tests will be grouped in the "least
efficient" category.
In this way, a broader and pragmatic concept of efficiency is used: the combined
tests allow the researcher to capture the ability of banks to use their resources efficiently
both in producing banking products and services and in generating profits from these
same products and services. The profitability test will be applied by using banks' returns
on assets (ROAs). Efficient and inefficient banks will then be analysed by comparing
their major sources of income and expenses and their balance sheet components.
The final part of the empirical analysis relates the inefficiency estimates to various
different aspects of the banking business. The analysis considers factors that are at least
partially exogenous and may explain some of the efficiency differences that remain after
controlling for the efficiency concept and measurement method [see, for example,
Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and De Young (1997)]. This set of potential
correlates with bank inefficiency are chosen in such a way that various aspects of
banking business are covered: for instance bank size, market characteristics, geographic
position, capital, performance and retail activities [see Mester (1996); Berger and
Mester (1997) and Altunbas et al. (1999)1.
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1.4	 Structure Plan
The thesis is organised into seven chapters as shown in Figure 1.3.
From the principles laid down in the 1936 Banking Law to the 1994 New Banking
Law and subsequent decrees, Chapter 2 provides a detailed investigation of the most
relevant legislative changes that liberalised the Italian banking market from various
structural constraints. The chapter focuses on important changes that Western European
banking systems experienced over the last two decades, with particular reference to the
Italian banking sector. Specifically, the chapter investigates the rationale for regulation
in banking and describes the impact of the processes of structural deregulation and
supervisory re-regulation in the context of the EU (European Union). As concerns the
specific case of Italy, emphasis is given to the post-war reconstruction period under the
governorship at the Bank of Italy of Donato Menichella (1948-60) — that is when the
structure of the country's financial and banking systems was distinctively shaped. The
last section of the chapter provides an overview of the regulatory changes over the last
ten years that have liberalised the Italian banking system.
Chapter 3 analyses recent developments in the structure of the Italian banking
market and investigates the performance and profitability of Italian banks. As far as the
restructuring process is concerned, the focus is on the size of the banking market, the
number and type of banks, branches, concentration, market share distribution and
regional differences. The chapter also considers the features of the new operating
environment that Italian banks are facing, as well as the characteristics of the Italian
banking system in terms, for instance, of asset quality and labour costs. The
performance of Italian banks is also investigated. The last section of the chapter is
concerned with the way financial innovation and technology have affected Italian bank
payments system over recent years. These non-regulatory changes both impact on bank
cost efficiency and also reflect the scale of change experienced in Italian banking over
recent years.
Chapter 3
The Structure and Performance
of the Italian Banking System
(restructuring; consolidation;
performance; financial innovation)
Chapter 2
The Regulatory Environment
(historical excursus; regulatory issues;
deregulation)
Chapter 5
Methodological
Issues and Data
(functional form;
data sample;
variable definition)
(	 (	
Review of Bank
Efficiency Studies
(microeconomics of the banking
firm; economies of scale and scope
and X-efficiencies; parametric and
non-parametric approaches; main
findings)
Chapter 4
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Figure 1.3	 Structure of the Study
Cost Efficiency in Italian Banking
(calculation of economies of scale and
X-efficiency levels; profitability test and
correlates with inefficiency)
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Limitations
(conclusions; implications for policy; limitations of study)
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the bank efficiency literature. In particular,
the chapter explores the meaning of efficiency in the banking industry and surveys
international and Italian empirical findings on this topic. This analysis requires, first, an
evaluation of the peculiar features of the "banking firm" from a microeconomic point of
view and a related explanation of the nature and the functions of financial
intermediaries. The chapter explains why it is important to model efficiency and bank
profit characteristics, and focuses on the concepts of economies of scale and scope and
X-efficiencies in banking. Explanations on the various existent approaches to measuring
efficiency (i.e. parametric and non-parametric, deterministic and stochastic) are
provided, together with several "new views" on efficiency analysis in banking. In this
context, particular emphasis is given to the criticism that has recently been made
concerning the widespread use of the translog functional form in efficiency analysis.
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Chapter 5 is the main methodological chapter and discusses in detail the
econometric models used for the empirical analysis carried out by the researcher for the
evaluation of economies of scale and X-efficiencies in the Italian banking system. It
also examines the actual variables used in the empirical analysis, the data sources and
provides a detailed description of the data sample. The chapter explains the
characteristics of the model chosen for the cost function, that is the Fourier-flexible
functional form; how the standard cost frontier (Model I) is modified in order to control
for risk and quality factors (Model II); the characteristics of the profitability test for the
identification of Italian banks that are both cost and profit efficient; and, finally,
examines the variables included in the logistic model used for the evaluation of possible
determinants of bank efficiency.
In Chapter 6 the cost efficiency of the Italian banking sector is empirically
analysed for the years 1993 to 1996 using the methodology summarised in the
preceding chapter. Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates for both Model I (the standard
cost frontier specification) and Model II (the standard cost frontier specification
including variables that control for risk and quality factors) are reported and analysed,
followed by the results on the relevant structural tests. Scale economies and X-
efficiency results are evaluated and discussed; most of the results are grouped according
to bank size classes (very big, big, medium, small, and very small), types of bank
(commercial, savings, popular, and credit co-operative), and geographical areas (north-
west, north-east, centre, and south and islands). Findings from the profitability test and
the examination of the potential correlates of the inefficiency conclude the chapter.
Finally, Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter that summarises the main findings
of the thesis and draws some general policy and other conclusions.
Chapter 2
The Regulatory Environment
in the Italian Banking System
2.1	 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the major changes in the bank regulatory
environment at a European level and to focus on their consequences for the specific case
of Italy. This chapter investigates briefly the rationale for regulation in banking and
describes the impact of the processes of structural deregulation and supervisory re-
regulation. This is particularly important when analysing the evolution of Italian banks
over the last three decades: the system has experienced substantial reforms aimed at
improving the efficiency and soundness of its banking market. Finally, regulatory
developments at the EU level are discussed in the context of their influence on Italian
banking sector reforms.
2.2	 The Reasons for Financial Sector Regulation: A Brief
Overview
The financial services industry in all systems is generally one of the most heavily
regulated sectors of the economy. Especially in banking, the perceived riskiness of the
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intermediation process, the importance of banks as suppliers of credit and the special
role of banks in operating the payments system has conspired to induce governments
and national regulators in all countries to limit the activities and business operations of
banks and similar financial institutions by means of specific rules, and to supervise that
the same institutions are conducting their business according to the prescribed
regulations.' In this context, Goodhart et al. (1998) distinguish between regulation (the
establishment of specific rules of behaviour), monitoring (observing whether the rules
are obeyed), and supervision (the more general oversight of financial firms' behaviour).
The main goals of the prudential regulation of the banking sector are to protect
individual investors and to help thereby ensure the stability and soundness of the
financial system. Such regulation is needed because of possible perceived market
failures arising from asymmetric information problems, externalities, and/or problems
of market power [Van Damme (1994)]. Specifically, the mere possibility that failures of
individual financial institutions can propagate (so-called "contagion risk") and become
systemic, combined with customer uncertainty about the condition of banks, can cause
depositors and other creditors to lose confidence which may lead to a run on the
banking system. This can have disastrous consequences for the real economy, and even
large solvent banks can fail. Usually the social costs of such financial distress are higher
than the private costs to shareholders and managers of failing institutions [see Hoenig
(1996) and Goodhart et al. (1998)].2
I Asymmetric information (between banks and their borrowers) has been the foundation of modern
theories of commercial banking that help to explain the special character of banks and the unique
regulatory treatment that banks receive [see, for instance, Nakamura (1991) and Saunders (1994)]. The
corresponding "traditional" theories focus more on the financial intermediary role of banks.
2 Freixas and Rochet (1997) specify the distinction between bank runs, that affect an individual bank, and
bank panics, that concern the whole banking industry and as a consequence the payments system.
Essentially, bank runs can develop into bank panics because of contagion or dominos effects. Moreover,
without regulation, bank runs and bank panics are inherent to the nature of banking and more specifically
to the fractional reserve system. Indeed, bank deposit contracts usually allow their holders to dispose of a
nominal amount at their demand. Therefore, as soon as a fraction of these deposits is used for financing
illiquid and risky loans or investments, there is always the possibility of a liquidity crisis.
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There are several ways in which the stability of the financial system can be
enhanced [Gual and Neven (1993)1: for example, investors can be protected against
potential losses by deposit insurance, the possible bailout of failed banks and by use of
lender of last-resort facilities. Another (not mutually exclusive) policy approach to
increase financial system stability is to organise the banking system so as to reduce risks
and minimise the associated probability of bank failures. Regulators can do this by
ensuring that banks earn a high level of profitability, therefore helping to accumulate
reserves that act as a cushion in case of financial difficulties.
It follows that the objectives of regulation can be classified as both micro (related
to the consumer and producer) and macro (related to systemic interest). However, as
argued by Llewellyn (1986), this does not imply that regulation is necessarily the most
effective or efficient way of ensuring safety of financial institutions. On the contrary,
some forms of regulation may be counterproductive and anticompetitive, thus reducing
the efficiency with which financial markets help to allocate the economy's scarce
resources. For instance, controls on branching and the range of allowable business
restrict banks' capacity to react to changes in market conditions and to adjust their
portfolios. Similarly, regulation keeps out new entrants who, if they could enter, might
force existing firms in the market to be more efficient. Regulation, then, has many costs.
Goodhart et al. (1998) argue that regulators supply regulatory services for which there is
a consumer demand, but there is a cost to regulation and, one way or another, it is the
consumer who pays that cost.
The theory of fegulation contemplates four major failings of regulation: i) the
creation of moral hazard, that is regulation causes people to behave in a counter-
productive way; ii) the risk of agency capture, that is the regulatory process is likely to
be captured by producers and used in their own interests rather than in the interests of
consumers; iii) the creation of compliance costs for producers, that is the costs of
adhering to regulations; and iv) the increase in the costs of entry into and exit from
markets [Howells and Bain (1998)].
One taxonomy is to classify banking regulations according to their influence on
market structure and firm behaviour as shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1	 Classification of the Methods of Banking Regulation
REGULATIONS INFLUENCING
THE STRUCTURE
REGULATIONS INFLUENCING
THE CONDUCT
REGULATIONS INFLUENCING
PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS
• FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION
OF INSTITUTIONS
• ENTRY RESTRICTIONS
• DISCRIMINATORY RULES
AGAINST FOREIGN BANKS
(AND INVESTORS)
• LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS
• REGULATION OF BANKS'
DEPOSIT AND LENDING
RATES
• REGULATIONS OF FEES AND
COMMISSIONS
• CREDIT QUOTAS
• BRANCHING LIMITATIONS
• RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
• MONEY LAUNDERING
• DEPOSIT INSURANCE
• DISCOUNT WINDOW
(LENDER-OF-THE-LAST
RESORT)
• MINIMUM CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
• SOLVENCY RATIOS
• OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
• RESTRICTIONS ON ASSET
CONCENTRATION (LARGE
EXPOSURES)
• INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
Source: Adapted from European Commission (1997, p. 20).
Regulatory tools, or instruments, can be distinguished between those that affect
directly the structure of the industry and those that influence the behaviour of the
industry participants [Gual and Neven (1993)]. Indeed, the theory of industrial
organisation suggests that conduct and structure regulation have potentially affected the
shape and performance of the industry in different ways. As shown in Table 2.1,
structural regulations include rules that functionally separate institutions (such as the
separation between commercial and investment banking), entry requirements and
discriminatory rules regarding foreign banks and investors. These regulations can be
expected to reduce entry and thereby may encourage collusion. In addition they can also
limit the presence of foreign firms, the size of banks, the frequency and type of mergers
and acquisitions and the scope of products that can be offered. On the other hand,
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conduct regulations can take the form of direct restrictions on assets and liabilities
composition (including prudential rules and rules on participation in non-banking
firms), rules relating to information disclosure, limitations on branching, credit ceilings,
and the determination of fees, commissions and rates on assets and liabilities. These
regulations can be expected to provide banks with an incentive to overemphasise
competitive approaches that are not specifically restricted. In short, banks may be
incentivised to engage in regulation-avoidance and/or regulation-reducing activities.
All of these factors explain why the adequacy of financial regulatory policy is a
often controversial issue. The complexity of changes in financial markets has increased
the costs and difficulties of effectively monitoring the activities of large, globally active
institutions that are involved increasingly in a wider range of financial activities.
Moreover, distortions between regulated and unregulated institutions may occur. As
such it follows that both within and (in the case of the EU) across countries there has
been a move to establish a regulatory structure that promotes fair ("level playing field")
competition as well as a sound banking/financial system. Overall, the recent literature
[for example, Van Damme (1994) and Goodhart et al. (1998)11 emphasises the need for a
regulatory approach able to guarantee an efficient functioning of financial markets and
to contribute optimally to the growth of the real economy in the context of general
macroeconomic stability.
Having examined briefly the raison d'être of regulation for financial services
firms, it is important to clarify what is meant by structural deregulation and supervisory
re-regulation in the banking system. In broad terms, the process of deregulation
essentially consists of breaking-down the rules and regulations that in the past have
protected financial institutions, especially banks. The word deregulation suggests a
movement away from regulation and, carried to its logical conclusion, even suggests an
absence of regulation [Sinkey (1992)11. Structural deregulation, more generally, then,
refers to the opening up, or liberalisation, of financial markets and institutions to
compete more freely [Gardener (1991)]. However, this kind of "structural deregulation"
encompasses structure and conduct and not prudential rules.
At present, since financial intermediaries are operating in more risky areas and
financial activities are increasingly taking place outside of the traditional bank
regulatory framework, the risk of bank crises has apparently increased. This fact has
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created the paradoxical situation that even in strongly market-orientated systems, a
process of prudential (supervisory) re-regulation is deemed necessary. As stressed by
Molyneux et al. (1996), while structural deregulation increases the competitive
pressures on banks, supervisory re-regulation may impose additional costs.3
The next section presents a brief overview of the EU financial services legislation
and focuses specifically on the banking sector.
2.3	 The Process of Structural Deregulation in Western
European Banking
Until the 1980s, the European financial sector was mainly nationally oriented with often
marked institutional differences among individual country's banking systems. This was
in part the consequence of the wide variety of regulations that were established to
prevent crises in the banking sector. National governments invariably acted as
protectors of their banks from foreign influences and sometimes were themselves
owners of major banks.
The transformation of the world economy, the processes of internationalisation
and globalisation of the financial markets, and the parallel widening of the objectives of
the former European Community brought about a convergence of national views in the
domain of economic policy, with the following main objectives: liberalising trade and
capital flows and moving towards a largely market-oriented economy. The process of
deregulation carried out by the European Community was aimed at harmonising and
3 The completion of the European internal market is an example of structural deregulation (and
concomitant globalisation), whereas the two complementary measures to the Second Banking Directive
dealing with capital adequacy can be considered examples of supervisory prudential re-regulation.
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integrating the legislation and practices of the Member States. It embodied an extensive
financial liberalisation process aimed at creating a single market for financial services.4
The primary economic objective of structural deregulation was to ensure the
achievement of economic gains from resource allocation through a freer market, rather
than via central government direction [Gardener (1991)].
The benefits of a deregulated market within the EU Member States were
identified by the 1988 Cecchini study that confirmed the importance of deregulating
financial sectors within the overall internal market integration. Cecchini estimated that
up to one-third of the total gains from deregulating all economic sectors during the first
six years after 1992 would come directly and/or indirectly from deregulating financial
services [see Gardener (1997)]. As recently pointed by Berger and Humphrey (1997, p.
22): "Deregulation is typically undertaken to improve the performance of the industry
being deregulated. If efficiency is raised, the improvement in resource allocation will
benefit society and may lead to price reductions and/or service expansion for consumers
if competition is sufficient. However, in many cases, deregulation is initiated less by a
desire to benefit consumers than by a need to improve the competitive viability of the
industry [...] One such example [...] is the harmonisation and unification of banking
markets in Europe — removing restrictions that have limited the ability of banks in one
country from aggressively entering markets in other countries [...]".
In 1977, the EU's First Banking Co-ordination Directive was adopted. This
Directive established the ground rules for dealing with bank authorisation and
supervision, although it did not create a free internal market. The Directive established a
definition of credit institutions, and created a Banking Advisory Committee, whose task
4 The Treaty of Rome (1957) had postulated free internal trade, free movement of services, people and
goods and a common external tariff. Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) states: "The Community shall
have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies
of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it". In 1986, the signing of the
Single European Act (SEA) reaffirmed a solemn commitment to these original objectives of the Common
Market by stating that an "internal market" had to be created by the 1 January 1993 [see, for example,
Molyneux et al. (1996) and European Commission (1997)].
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was to establish and examine liquidity and solvency ratios for a trial period and to
achieve an enhanced degree of co-operation among national bank supervisory
authorities within the EU. Nevertheless, banks willing to operate in other Member
States still needed authorisation from the supervisory bodies of the potential home
country. Therefore, the First Bank Co-ordination Directive left many details open to
interpretation and other Directives were required. In 1983, a Directive on Consolidated
Supervision dealing with the supervision of consolidated accounts and the
harmonisation of rules relating to annual accounts of credit institutions was adopted.
Two other Directives followed in 1986 that dealt with Uniform Format for Bank
Accounts and Consumer Protection.
However, the first major step towards achieving a Single European Market (SEM)
in 1992 was the EU's 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market which
paved the way for the Single European Act (1986). The aim of this White Paper was to
establish guidelines for a single banking licence, home country control and mutual
recognition by liberalising trade and establishment in the banking, insurance and
securities markets. According to the programme, all physical, technical and fiscal
barriers, as well as regulations hindering the free movement of goods, services, people,
and capital had to be removed or lifted by 31 December 1992. One of the main
advantages from the completion of the SEM, related to the expected increase in GDP
brought about through greater trade in banking services, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The principles of the White Paper were incorporated in the 1988 proposals for a
Second Banking Co-ordination Directive (adopted in 1989). In general terms, the
Second Banking Directive provided for: i) the harmonisation of minimum capital
standards for the authorisation and continuation of banking business; ii) supervisory
control of major shareholders and banks' participation in the non-banking sector; iii)
proper accounting and control mechanisms; and iv) standards and own funds, solvency
ratios and deposit protection legislation [Molyneux et al. (1996)11.
Chapter 2 • The Regulatory Environment in the Italian Banking System	 18
Figure 2.1	 How the SEM Increases GDP of the EU
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Source: Molyneux et al. (1996, p. 39).
The 1988 Directive, then, plugged a number of gaps left by the First Banking Co-
ordination Directive of 1977, and introduced the concept of a "single banking licence"
for banks and other financial firms to operate throughout the Union. In other words, this
"single passport" allowed any credit institution authorised to operate in any Member
State to set up branches or to supply cross-border services in all other Member States
without having to obtain further authorisation from each state. An Appendix to the
Directive listed a wide range of services for which a banking licence was valid (Table
2.2).
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Table 2.2
	 The List of Services Credit Institutions are Allowed to Offer
Under the Second Banking Directive
1. Deposit-taking and other forms of borrowing
2. Lending
3. Financial leasing
4. Money transmission services
5. Issuing and administering means of payments
(credit cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts)
6. Guarantees and commitments
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money-market instruments
(b) foreign exchange
(c) financial futures and options
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments
(e) securities
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such issues
9. Money broking
10. Portfolio management and advice
11. Safekeeping of securities
12. Credit reference services
13. Safe custody services
Source: Second Banking Co-ordination Directive (see OJ L 386, 30/12/89).
Essentially, a bank was now able to provide any of the services on the list in all of
the other Member States, provided that it was authorised to do so in its home country.
Moreover, banks could provide services regardless of whether or not the host country
did not allow its domestic credit institutions to provide them. The Directive also stated
that branches established in other Member States should give the host authorities the
same amount of information as that required from the country's domestic institutions
for monitoring liquidity and controlling monetary policies.
It is important to point out that other Directives harmonising regulations on
accounting for foreign branches, deposit insurance, reorganisation and winding-up
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procedures have also been adopted by the Commission. Specifically, the Money
Laundering Directive (effective 1 January 1993), imposing certain obligations on credit
and financial institutions designed to prevent money laundering; the Large Exposure
Directive (effective January 1994), placing limits on the exposures to individual
companies or groups which banks can take on; and the Deposit-Guarantee Schemes
(effective January 1994), setting minimum standards for deposit-guarantee schemes
which would protect depositors in the event of bank failure. All of this legislation was
passed at the EU level in time for the introduction of the single financial market from 1
January 1993.
Moreover, since the application of the principle of home country control could
have encouraged institutions to base their business in the Member State with the lowest
standard of supervision, the Directive included certain provisions to harmonise some
essential supervisory standards. These concerned minimum capital requirements, the
control of majority shareholders and bank participation in the non-bank sector [Dixon
(1993)]. As discussed in section 2.4, along with the structural deregulation process of
financial markets, banking supervision (or prudential regulation) has expanded in most
Western countries over the last two decades. Capital adequacy rules occupy a central
place in this supervisory re-regulation process.
2.4	 Supervisory Re-Regulation in Banking
During the 1980s the perceived riskiness of banking business increased sharply.
Financial institutions rapidly adapted their portfolios and strategies to the new
environment, and periodic bouts of apparent excessive risk-taking, possible
underpricing of risks and perceived overshooting behaviour by banks in adapting their
portfolios to the new environment increased the need for prudential re-regulation.
Strengthened supervision was considered to be an important element in improving the
safety of the system. Capital adequacy convergence also became a central issue in the
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need to help level internationally the "playing fields" on which banks compete
[Gardener and Molyneux (1990) and Molyneux et al. (1996)].
As a consequence, capital adequacy standards became one of the fundamental
components in bank prudential re-regulation. This has taken place in the context of a
gradual shift from direct forms of control, often at the full discretion of regulatory
authorities, to more indirect and objective types of controls.
The European Commission's supervisory approach to financial services was
based on three fundamental principles: minimum essential harmonisation, home and
host country control, and the related concept of "mutual recognition". In particular,
mutual recognition essentially means that the supervisory authorities in one country will
recognise the prudential equivalence of the bank supervisors of the other Member
States.
The Second Banking Directive of the European Commission's programme for an
internal market in banking could not ensure that banks were adequately capitalised to
protect depositors. For this reason, it was linked to two complementary measures,
namely the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives. Moreover, a final provision in
the Banking Directive stated that the concepts of mutual recognition and home country
control could only come into effect if these two Directives were implemented at the
same time. As stressed by Dixon (1993, p. 68), these Directives formed "a vital part of
the harmonisation of prudential standards needed to complete the internal banking
market". Two main reasons could be identified: the crucial role of capital adequacy for
the protection of depositors and investors and for the stability of the whole banking
system; and the need to harmonise capital ratios in order to ensure fair competition after
1992. In other words, capital adequacy was a core target and a fundamental instrument
of banking supervision which, in turn, was concerned primarily with the prudential
soundness of banking business. Gardener (1992) made three important observations on
the relevance of capital adequacy: i) capital adequacy regulation is cyclical and tends to
increase (become more severe or restrictive) when banking risks grow; ii) the main
perceived economic objective of capital adequacy regulation is to help preserve the
stability of the banking system; and, finally, iii) there has been and continues to be a re-
regulation of capital adequacy in particular and supervision in general.
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The provisions contained in the Own Funds Directive and the Solvency Ratio
Directive (both effective on 1 January 1993) were consistent with those of the Basle
agreement on capital adequacy implemented in July 1988, and they were similar in most
important aspects, including the capital definition, the risk-weighting and the minimum
ratio. The Basle (1988) proposals for convergence were the result of a long and
continuing process of co-operation between the bank regulatory authorities in different
countries. This process began in the early 1970s, and became urgent in the 1980s when
the more risky environment and, in particular, the international debt crisis as well as the
different capital adequacy regimes, brought about relevant competitive distortions in the
banking market. All this led to international linkages among the UK, the US and other
industrialised countries' bank supervisory practices. This interconnection was focused
in the Basle Supervisory Committee, which has served as a forum for multilateral
efforts to arrive at a convergence of capital adequacy standards among the leading
industrialised countries [Norton (1992)].
The basic objectives of Basle include: i) to improve capital adequacy standards
globally; ii) to stimulate greater consistency of capital standards; and iii) to encourage
fairer competition. Modern banking systems regulatory frameworks are invariably
modelled on the Basle 1988 international bank capital adequacy system of risk assets
ratios. In the EU, for example, by 1992 banks were required to have a minimum capital
to risk assets ratio of 8 per cent; moreover, the risk assets ratio approach comprised five
categories of risk classes or "risk weight", and off-balance sheet items were also
included in the formula.
By the beginning of 1993 all EU Member States had implemented the Second
Banking Directive and related capital adequacy rules into their domestic banking
legislation. However, significant barriers still remained to the formation of a single
European banking market. A major barrier, of course, was that all countries still had
their own national currencies. As part of the EU's on-going single market programme,
the introduction of a single currency was viewed as a central element in the
harmonisation process. As such, post 1992 substantial emphasis was placed on moving
towards a single currency and European Monetary Union.
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2.5
	 European Monetary Union and the Adoption of the Euro
The significant experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the
sanctioning of the Single European Act (1986) both gave a concrete incentive to the
process towards monetary integration.5 From the late 1980s, the need for a stable
monetary policy in Europe became more and more intense. Particular concern was also
related to the potential economic impact that the possible realisation of a monetary
union might have had on individual countries' economies. In this context, the problems
of achieving a large consensus among participants about the main targets of monetary
policy grew significantly.
In 1989, the Delors Committee completed a report and plan entitled Economic
and Monetary Union in the European Community. On the basis of this report, which
served as a background for the Maastricht Treaty, the monetary union and the economic
union were to be achieved together as a result of a gradual process. The key features of
the monetary union were laid down as follows: a) complete freedom of capital
movements in fully integrated financial markets; b) total and irreversible convertibility
5 In December 1978 a plan to implement a new monetary regime that would include all currencies of the
Community was approved, and began operating in March 1979. The new zone of monetary stability was
the European Monetary System (EMS), and it established a system of fixed parities with permitted
fluctuations within a range of ±2.25%, and ±6% for those countries unable to keep their currencies in a
narrower band. The EMS, whose key feature the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) linked the member
currencies to each other, changed strategies and procedures in the way of conducting monetary policy.
Nevertheless, in Italy with the gradual removal of controls on capital movements and the loss of the
exchange rate as an adjustment instrument, controls on the monetary aggregates became more difficult
and monetary authorities had a major need to adjust interest rates. As a result, Italy experienced a
substantial growth in public debt and an increase in net debt with foreign countries. The main real effect
was a significant growth in consumption and a decrease in investments, which in turn brought about
negative consequences in terms of productivity, employment and prices. During the first ten years the
Italian lira participated within the ERM in wider fluctuation margins of 6% around bilateral central rates
and only since 1990 has it adopted standard margins of 2.25%. However, in September 1992 the Italian
lira was devaluated and had to exit the ERM. On 25 November 1996 the lira rejoined the ERM at the
central rate of 1906.48 lire to the ECU.
Chapter 2 • The Regulatory Environment in the Italian Banking System
	 24
of currencies; and c) irrevocably fixed exchange rates with no fluctuation margin
between members' currencies.
At the Maastricht Summit in December 1991, the Member States adopted
substantial amendments to the original 1957 Treaty of Rome. The main point was the
decision to introduce EMU in the Union and to adopt the Euro as single currency no
later than 1 January 1999.
The first stage began on 1 July 1990 and Member States had to abolish all
remaining capital controls. It required also a higher co-operation among national central
banks and underlined the need of a new Treaty to permit the realisation of an economic
union. The second stage began on 1 January 1994, a few months after the coming into
force of the Maastricht Treaty. 6 As a precursor to the European Central Bank, the EMI
(European Monetary Institute) was created. Within the final stage, exchange rates
between national currencies were to be fixed and a European central bank created. The
transition to the third stage of the monetary union was made on the basis of a series of
"convergence criteria", the objective of which was to establish an economic
environment of sustainable low inflation in all the member countries and thus in the
EMU.
On the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, the essential conditions to participate in the
economic and monetary union are the following:
a) the level of prices must not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points the
inflation rates of the three best-performing Member States;
b) long-term nominal interest rates must not exceed by more than 2 percentage
points those of the Member States that have achieved the best results in terms of
stability of prices, that is with the lowest inflation;
c) the exchange rate must have been held for two years within the narrow band of
fluctuation of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS without a devaluation at
the Member State's own initiative;
6 The Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993. It sanctioned the creation of the European
Union (EU) and set the constitutional foundations of economic and monetary union.
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d) the general government deficit, which includes the consolidated deficit of the
central, state and local governments and the social security funds, must not exceed
3 per cent of GDP;
e) the ratio of public debt to GDP should be no higher than 60 per cent.
Preparation for the adoption of the Euro (see also the 1995 Green Paper on
Introducing a Single Currency) has had a major influence on European banks.
In particular, it has: i) forced banks to translate their accounting records and systems,
monetary instruments and documentation of all kinds; ii) resulted in a re-drafting of
legal rules in contracts; iii) forced banks to incur substantial costs associated with
software conversion and adaptation; iv) led to changes in banks' hardware to accept and
distribute new Euro notes (ATMs and counting machines); and v) increased staff
training costs. In addition, many other potential and actual costs have been identified
[see Molyneux et al. (1996)] from the cost of manufacturing, warehousing and
distributing Euro-denominated notes and coins, to the organisation of efficient
arrangement of cross-border payment and settlement.
The official decision on EMU membership was taken in May 1998. As stressed by
ECB (1999b) the participation of 11 countries in EMU reinforced the significance of the
Euro for the whole European banking sector. The Euro was adopted as a single currency
on 1 January 1999 and will replace national currencies by 1 July 2002. 7 The 11
Euroland countries participating in EMU are the following: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Greece
did not satisfy the conditions while Sweden failed to fulfil the condition with respect to
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) membership and lacked sufficient independence of
its central bank. Denmark and the UK exercised their "opt-outs" from proceeding in
1999.
7 The irrevocably fixed conversion rate between the Euro and the Italian lira is 1,936.27. It is important to
mention that although Euro notes and coins will not appear until 1 January 2002, the new currency can be
used by consumers, retailers, companies of all kinds and public administrations from 1 January 1999 in
the form of "written money" (that is, by means of cheques, travellers' cheques, bank transfers, credit
cards and electronic purses).
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The above provides a brief overview of regulatory developments in EU banking
culminating with the most recent developments — the creation of EMU and the
introduction of a single currency. The following section provides a detailed account of
regulatory developments in the Italian banking system starting with a historical
perspective which illustrates how the regulatory structure evolved and ending on recent
regulatory developments.
2.6	 The Processes of Deregulation and Re-Regulation in Italy
2.6.1	 The 1936 Banking Law
The Italian banking industry was strongly shaped by a Banking Act dating back to 1936,
which approached and solved the banking crisis of the 1930s, assuming as its primary
objective the safeguard of the stability of credit institutions.
The social and economic history of Italy had left it with a shortage of private
capital willing and able to engage in banking. Prior to the 1930s Italy had experienced a
succession of bank failures and financial crises, and the position deteriorated during the
economic crisis of the 1930s. An intense process of reorganisation of banks' property
had preceded the 1936 Banking Law. The newly-established IRI (Istituto per la
Ricostruzione Industriale) in 1931 and its acquisition of the three major Italian banks
implied the transfer of a large part of the banking system to the State. As pointed out by
the Bank of Italy (1994), the Banking Law of 1936 was characterised by its "neutrality",
because the supervisory instruments it provided for could be used to pursue any aim
(stability, efficiency, economic planning, monetary policy).
This legislation was modified and integrated after the end of the Second World
War, when decrees were enacted in order to authorise new institutions for the control of
the banking and exchange markets. Few other changes were made in the succeeding
years and, as a result, the 1936 Banking Act prevailed in Italy for about 50 years.
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The fundamental principles of this regulation can be outlined as follows:
a. Specialisation of banks
b. Separateness between bank and industry
c. Structural controls
d. State dominance within the proprietary structure in the banking sector
The 1936 Banking Law classified ordinary credit institutions (retail banking
institutions financed by the general public's deposits and mainly providing short-term
loans) on the basis of their institutional specialisation (point a.) into national interest
banks, public law banks, savings banks, co-operative banks, ordinary banks, and rural
and artisans' banks. Moreover, lending institutions in Italy were segregated according to
maturity (i.e. temporal specialisation). Banks were also classified into two categories
according to which the credit activity in the short run was carried out by ordinary credit
institutions (Aziende di Credito); whereas the credit activity in the long run, was carried
out by different credit institutions, namely Istituti di Credito Speciale. As a result, there
was a remarkable segmentation of the banking market, stratification of operating areas
and weakening of competitive relations among different bank categories and among
single banks within the same category. It is important to note that such distinctions did
not exist anywhere else in Europe.
With regard to point b. above, the 1936 Act introduced rules that did not allow
banks to invest in the equity capital of industrial companies, thus weakening the
capacity of credit institutions to support industrial development. This was mainly due to
the need to control and restrain risk contagion. Another factor that mostly influenced
Italian banks was the extensive power that the Bank of Italy had to intervene in the
structure of the banking system in the form of controls on branches and credit granting,
mergers and acquisitions and the creation of new banks (point c.). As pointed out by
Schuster (1996), from the point of view of regulation philosophy, one could say that the
banking authorities have applied the classical Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
paradigm, thus strictly regulating the supply structure in order to influence sector
performance. This set-up furthermore reduced the scope of strategic and entrepreneurial
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choices for banks and the industry structure was effectively administered as a variable
external to the market.
Finally, post 1936 the State dominance within the ownership structure of Italian
banks can be considered a consequence of the increased public intervention that
followed economic crises during the 1920s (point d.). Most Italian banks became state-
owned, either directly or under the control of charitable, non-profit-making foundations
that were themselves government-supervised. At the end of the 1980s some 65% of
financial intermediation was controlled by public banks; thus, a market of control for
banking equity barely existed and bank management were highly constrained in making
commercial decisions.
The following section 2.6.2 briefly reviews the banking policies carried out after
the end of the Second World War in Italy and particularly during the governorship of
Donato Menichella (1948-60). Such an excursus is important for three main reasons.
First of all, during the 1950s the Italian economy experienced its most intense growth.
In this context, the banking system was a major conduit for the expansion of credit to
the economy. Secondly, the 1950s represented the first period where banking policies
were conducted in an institutional environment that was subject only to minor
regulatory changes. Lastly, the supervisory system during the 1950s contributed heavily
to the inefficiencies that affected Italian banks for decades.
2.6.2	 Italian Banking Policies in the 1950s and Beyond
Since 1947 the Bank of Italy officially became the national supervisory authority and
obtained the right to employ the control instruments introduced by the 1936 Banking
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Law. 8 Throughout the period of governorship of Donato Menichella (1948-60) the main
objectives of the central bank were to ensure:
• the stability of the financial system, and
• the support of economic activity.
Post 1946 there was an urgency for post-war reconstruction and development of
the domestic economy and this created a need for promoting economic activity by
expanding credit to the economy through the banking system. Credit institutions were
operating in an imperfectly competitive environment where there was little market-
driven resource allocation. In this context, Menichella believed that money and credit
were public goods and he considered their control and supervision as an exclusive task
for the State.
Given this environment, Menichella supported the economy through policies that
encouraged the accumulation and allocation of capital. The authorities targeted three
main areas [Albareto and Trapanese (1998)]: i) encouraging monetary savings by
carrying out a structural policy aimed at widening the geographical configuration of the
system (branch banking) and a monetary policy that could ensure monetary stability; ii)
restraining the cost of credit and giving a wider supply of capital through a monetary
policy that advocated economic growth and the acceptance of banking cartels; and
finally, iii) investing locally through savings and popular banks, and controlling the
8 Article 47 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic reads: "The Republic shall encourage and protect
saving in all its forms; it shall regulate co-ordinate and monitor the exercise of credit". This article is
similar to article 1 of the 1936 Banking Law, which in turn reads: "The taking of savings from the public
in any form and the exercise of credit are function of public interest [...]". It is important to note that there
is no indication of the organ charged with these duties and it is not even clear whether the protection
accorded to savings refers to nominal value or real value.
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interbank market with the aim of avoiding savings flows from the southern regions to
the northern ones.9
On the other hand, the stability of the banking system was pursued through the
adoption of various structural policies and a range of control instruments that influenced
the functioning of single credit institutions. 10 Since monetary savings were scarce,
Menichella tried to create a solid banking system that was able to reach even the most
remote centres of the country. The main objective was to increase the amount of bank
savings without increasing deposit rates. Also, banks were given the task of selecting
only those investments that were actually worthwhile to finance. The Bank of Italy
could intervene through credit limits when banks were unable to give a fair evaluation
of their investments."
One of the most important targets of the banking policies of Menichella was the
sustenance of local economic activities. Given the diffusion in Italy of small and
9 As pointed out by Sutcliffe (1996), the government's pragmatic approach to the economy was based on
a tradition dating back to the later nineteenth century. Its holding companies and controls over banking
encouraged cartels and inefficiencies, but it guaranteed an adequate supply of capital to large companies
and allowed them to build up a strong position in the home market before venturing abroad. The advent of
Italian multinationals like Fiat, Olivetti and Pirelli can be considered one of the products of this policy.
10 These instruments could be distinguished as instruments whose aim was to prevent the occurrence of a
crisis and were thus related to the prevention (ex-ante) of liquidity and solvency problems for the whole
system (i.e. they focused on banking areas like equity capital, credit limits, supervisory issues) and those
instruments whose objective was to solve (ex-post) single pathological cases of crisis (and were thus
concerned with cases of actual crises for single banking firms).
II In such a context, even the so-called "moral suasion", which can be defined as the way by which credit
institutions were following the "suggestions" of the (Governor of the) Bank of Italy, had a pivotal role in
the pursuit of macroeconomic targets during the 1950s. In fact, not only has the banking system played a
fundamental role in the policy of supporting national development, but also in other type of policies such
as those related to inflation control. The importance of moral suasion was probably connected to the
deterrent power that the Bank of Italy was able to apply, given the wide supervisory powers granted by
the 1936 Banking Law. It follows that "special collaborations" occurred between commercial banks and
the central bank in the pursuit of specific macroeconomic targets (i.e. credit rationing, bank interest rates,
and so forth). Overall, the moral suasion was useful to govern the economic process in a context of
stability and was based on the fact that the Governor enjoyed immense political prestige and not only in
the world of banking.
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medium sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in a local environment, it was felt necessary
to build a widely networked banking system so that firms could find the funds needed
for their own activity. Therefore, a redistribution activity was also indispensable for the
following reasons: i) to guarantee the equal distribution of savings; and ii) to allow
excess savings to flow from the richest areas of the country to poorer regions in order to
promote local economic activity. According to Menichella, an increase in the number of
local banks rather than an expansion of large banks was necessary because small banks
had a higher allocative efficiency coming from a better knowledge of local
entrepreneurs and a better savings custody in a local environment (in this context local
banks included: savings banks, popular co-operative banks and rural and artisans'
banks).
The pursuance of these policies, however, had various drawbacks, among which
was the creation of interbank flows from small to big banks and from southern to
northern banks [Albareto and Trapanese (1998)]. In fact, although formally forbidden,
interbank flows were often disguised in banks' accounts. The flows of these funds were
usually from smaller banks operating locally to bigger banks which were often located
outside the region. Interbank flows were also connected to the monetary flows from the
south to the north of the country: that is from the poorest regions to the richest ones, in
the opposite direction as Menichella was aiming. In fact, bigger banks that were usually
borrowing in the interbank market tended to invest funds in the more profitable northern
companies rather than in the south. In this way, the presumably insufficient branching
structure of bigger banks was substituted by the indirect exploitation of very small local
banks whose branches had particularly high bank deposits and savings rates.
The aforementioned factors have had a substantial influence on the present
structure as well as performance of the Italian banking system [for an extensive review
on banking policies in the 1950s, see Albareto and Trapanese (1998)]. For many years
the resulting environment and bank practices in Italy have not provided substantive
incentives to encourage efficient bank behaviour, in relation both to internal
management (by restraining costs) and to the evaluation of the creditworthiness of
customers.
Until the 1970s the entire system experienced a period during which banks
concretely attained the monopoly of financial intermediation in Italy. In this context, the
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banking market was highly fragmented, banks were overspecialised and they were not
allowed to hold stakes in industrial and commercial companies. As a consequence,
Italian banks were thought more as public institutions carrying out social functions,
rather than firms operating in order to maximise their profits. The whole banking
activity was subject to the discretionary power of the authorities; there was no
transparency in the market and massive controls existed on the movements of capital to
and from abroad. In this context, even the central bank was obliged to act as a residual
purchaser of Treasury Bills: that is the Bank of Italy was required to take into its own
portfolio any government security not taken up by the market [see, for example, Costi
(1994) and Pittaluga (1996)].
The prudential supervision of the Italian banking industry, whose purpose was to
ensure stability in the system and to prevent banking crises, dominated structural
control, which in turn aimed at ensuring the sound functioning of the market and a
better allocation of resources. Entry and exit barriers imposed by the authorities on the
banking system had, on the one hand, the positive effect of hindering competition,
especially from abroad, thus giving stability and protection to the banks. On the other
hand, they impeded a more efficient allocation of financial resources in the system.
2.6.3	 The Process of Liberalisation of the Italian Banking System
The Italian financial system began to evolve in the late 1970s when the general
economic conditions finally changed and the awareness of the costs of the previous
policies started to become apparent. Two main determinants can be identified [Pittaluga
(1996)]:
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• the diffusion of a large market of Treasury bills, namely BOT (Buoni Ordinari del
Tesoro) and CCT (Certificati di Credito del Tesoro) 12, and the simultaneous
disintermediation of banks;
• the process of structural deregulation and a detailed re-examination of the
supervisory policies in the banking system.
In particular, new financial products and new financial intermediaries in the
market gradually encouraged banks to improve their efficiency and to become more
market-oriented. In this context, other important factors have also played a significant
role in the process of change of the Italian banking system.
The process of change in Italy began later compared with other European
countries. Bruni (1993) asserts that the process of internal and external financial
deregulation, re-regulation and innovation can be considered to have started only in
1983. Prior to 1983, only a few changes in financial regulation occurred: the gradual
weakening of portfolio constraints (1979 and 1982), whereby banks were obliged to buy
certain categories of bonds issued by public special credit institutions; and the so-called
"divorce" between the central bank and the Treasury in 1981. This latter sanctioned the
Treasury as primarily responsible for financing the public deficit, while the role of the
central bank became to determine the amount of borrowing to be funded with monetary
base. Moreover, in 1983, as a main consequence of the diffusion of financial
12 The burden of a high -public deficit induced the Italian authorities to pursue policies suitable for a
country that was lacking both monetary and financial markets, and characterised by a high liquidity
preference of savers. The government responded to this situation by issuing bonds whose main feature
was their high substitutability with banking deposits. In 1977, the BOTs, short-term debt instruments
issued in 3, 6, and 12-month maturities were issued to finance the deficits of the government. A few years
later, in 1982, the Treasury issued the variable rate medium term CCTs in 7-year maturities. The main
characteristic of CCT was that their yield was determined by fixing a mark-up on short-term rates, namely
the 6-month maturity BOT. In addition, and as far as the funding of the banking system is concerned, the
issue of marketable CDs (Certificates of Deposit) represented another innovation introduced in Italy,
although the authorities required a higher percentage of reserve requirement on them with respect to other
liabilities. On the other hand, firms seeking capital either provided it themselves through retained
earnings or entered into special relationships with investment banks.
Chapter 2 • The Regulatory Environment in the Italian Banking System	 34
innovations and the deregulation process, various restrictions on bank lending were
abolished. '3
The first step towards a bank new regulatory framework in Italy was made in
1985, when Parliament finally approved the First European Economic Community
Directive on Banking, issued eight years before. 14 Before this Directive, the EU enacted
only one structural measure concerning Freedom of Establishment in 1973. This is
shown in Table 2.3 that summarises Italian banking legislation adopted in Italy since
1973. Some legislation was implemented in phases and this is indicated by the shaded
areas in the table (beginning and ending with the process of implementation).
As a consequence of this legislation, the freedom of access to the market was
expanded (first attenuating and then substantially eliminating administrative barriers to
entry and geographical segmentation), while the discretional powers of the central
authorities decreased, although credit controls were removed in 1988 and the limitations
on the opening of new bank branches were formally eliminated in 1990. With Law
287/1990, competitiveness in Italy became an autonomous objective together with
stability and efficiency (which traditionally were assigned to supervisory authorities) on
the protection of free and fair competition within the banking markets. In this context,
the Bank of Italy was assigned the task of preventing conduct harmful to competition,
preventing collusive or exclusionary practices and prohibiting amalgamations that
diminish competition.
13 During the 1970s, given the peculiarities of the Italian financial system, it was very difficult for
monetary authorities to control the money supply. In this context, monetary policy was based on the
quantity of loans available rather than on the actual costs of borrowing. In other words, limits were
introduced to the lending opportunities of credit institutions. In Italy, a credit ceiling was temporarily
reintroduced only once to date (in 1986 and for approximately six months) [see, for details, Pittaluga
(1996)].
14 The pressures for deregulation came also from internal organisations, such as, for instance,
Confindustria, the Italian Employers' Association and ABI, the Italian Bankers' Association. They
maintained that inefficiencies in Italian banking were threatening the long-term viability of Italian
manufacturing, and pointed to the risks of unsystematic ad hoc lending criteria and undisciplined loan-
monitoring procedures. Also, the Bank of Italy tried to bring Italian banking practices into line with the
rest of Europe.
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The 1936 Banking Act was significantly altered by Law No. 218 of 30 July 1990
and its implementing legislation, the "Amato Act". This Act dealt with three main areas
[Bisoni and Ferretti (1993)]: i) restructuring the public sector banks and increasing their
equity capital; ii) encouraging bank mergers; and, finally, iii) regulating the
polyfunctional bank group model [on this last issue, see for details Casu and Girardone
(1998)]. The first point is particularly important because it allowed public sector banks
to convert into joint stock companies, the form of corporation considered more suitable
for the mobilisation of equity capital and, therefore, the most likely to facilitate private
investment in bank shares. However, the Act stated that private investors might not hold
more than 49 per cent of the capital, thus leaving the majority to the public sector.
There is no doubt that one of the aims of these measures was to improve the
efficiency of the system by stimulating banks to cut costs (such as labour and other
administrative costs), thereby increasing the overall profitability of financial
institutions. In this context, the Amato Law provided fiscal incentives for internal
reorganisation (privatisation) and for mergers (concentration) in order to relieve Italian
banks from public constraints and to overcome the traditional segmentation of the
system.
In 1992, the Legislative Decree No. 481 implemented the EU's Second Banking
Directive (effective on 1 January 1993), whose most important aspect was the provision
of a "single banking licence" (as discussed above). Although Member States were not
obliged to remove any restrictions on the operations of their domestic banks by the
Directive, this legislation encouraged deregulation and liberalisation, especially in those
countries where credit institutions could be more discriminated and disadvantaged with
respect to other countries (such as the United Kingdom, in which restrictions on the
range of activities carried out by their banks had been removed before).
Following this Directive, Italy adopted the principle of mutual recognition,
enabling other EU banks to operate in Italy on the basis of the authorisation received
from the competent authority in the banks' home country (see Table 2.2 in section 2.3
for the list of activities covered by mutual recognition). In addition, banks were
permitted to operate as universal banks, which enabled them to undertake activities in a
wider range of businesses, such as financial instruments, factoring, leasing and
merchant banking, that previously could only be carried out through subsidiaries.
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Another important effect of the Second Directive on banking co-ordination in
Italy was the option given to the banks to extend their operations beyond the short term,
both in terms of funding and lending. Medium- and long-term funding was also allowed
through the issuance of bonds; and the granting of medium- and long- term credit was
authorised with the possibility of also operating in subsidised financing.
Moreover, the distinction between ordinary credit institutions and special credit
institutions was abolished and Italian banks are now either:
• banks in corporate form owned directly and indirectly by the private sector or
by public law foundations (controlled by local authorities);
• co-operative banks (comprising popular banks and credit co-operative banks);
• central institutions, which provide centralised management services to other,
usually small-sized banks.
The new regulations allowed banks de facto to carry out directly activities that
before were restricted to special credit institutions. As a consequence, the term
specialisation and the distinction between banks and special credit institutions was
abandoned; all entities operating in the credit segment were recognised under the single
heading of credit institutions.
Several legislative acts as well as rules and provisions necessary for the adoption
of the EU Directive were embodied in the Legislative Decree No. 385/1993. The "New
Banking Law" [otherwise known as Testo Unico delle Leggi in Materia Bancaria e
Creditizia and effective 1st January 1994)] consists of a set of statutory provisions
dealing with many aspects of the banking system, like supervisory authorities, banks'
activities and organisation, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and banking groups,
supervisory powers and crisis procedures. It also includes provisions concerning non-
bank financial intermediaries (previously subject to the Law 197 of 5 July 1991), as
well as rules on disclosure of terms and conditions of contract and consumer credit.
Moreover, confirming the approach formerly adopted by the 1936 Banking Law, the
Testo Unico only lays down general principles, assigning to the credit authorities the
task of issuing secondary legislation specifying the technical details.
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The Testo Unico was enacted pursuant to Italy's 1991 Community Legislation
Implementation Law, which delegated powers to the government not only to transpose
the Second Banking Directive but also to issue a codified law that would co-ordinate
those implementing provisions with the other relevant provisions in force.
Some of the main features of the 1994 Banking Law can be summarised as
follows.
• The supervisory authorities are the Credit Committee (Interministerial Committee
for Credit and Savings) (art. 2); the Minister of the Treasury (art. 3); the Bank of
Italy (art. 4);
• The aims of supervision (art. 5) are: 0 the sound and prudent management of the
persons subject to supervision; ii) the overall stability of the financial system; iii)
the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system; iv) compliance with
the provisions concerning credit and v) the exercise of credit authorities' power
"in harmony with the provisions of the EU" (art. 6). Prudential regulation now
includes capital adequacy and permissible holdings, corporate organisation and
internal controls.
• The law confirms the traditional notion of banking activity (art. 10) as well as the
entrepreneurial nature of this activity (and it restricts it to banks). It allows the
universal bank model. It also confirms the "despecialisation" of the banking
system (i.e. the elimination of the regulatory segmentation that separated the
various product markets which intermediaries were allowed to enter). (See also
the Second Banking Directive provisions above).
• The law covers the organisational structure of banking institutions. In particular,
banks can be constituted in the form of limited companies [societa per azioni or
a societa cooperativa per azioni a responsabilita limitata] (art. 14); banks
constituted as co-operatives may only be in the form of a banca popolare or a
banca di credito cooperativo (see also the next section for more details on this
issue).
• The law regulates banking groups and defines the aims of the supervision on a
consolidated basis. The regulation of banking groups is among the most important
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innovations introduced by the 1994 Banking Law. In particular, it includes
specific rules concerning banking groups (supervision and consolidated balance
sheet data) 15 . According to the Banking Law, a banking group shall be composed
of either of the following: a) an Italian parent bank and the banking, financial, and
instrumental companies it controls 16 ; b) a parent financial company (having its
registered office in Italy) and the banking, financial, and instrumental companies
it controls where the group has a significant banking component.
More specifically, the typical structure of a group is defined as "vertical" and can
be illustrated in Figure 2.2 [Casu and Girardone (1998)]. The definition of vertical
group is related to the presence of a dominant parent company (Bank A in Figure
2.2) which is responsible for the management and the strategies implemented by
all the other companies forming the group 17 . The parent company must be a bank
or a financial company, thus excluding the possibility of an insurance company
leading a banking group.
Figure 2.2
	 Possible Structure of an Italian Banking Group
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Source: Casu and Girardone (1998, p. 4)
15 See, respectively, Capo II/Titolo III and Capo II/Titolo IV of the Decree No. 385/93.
16 Instrumental companies are defined as those which engage exclusively or primarily in activities of an
auxiliary nature with respect to the business of companies belonging to the group, including real estate
management, data processing and other services (see art. 59, 1994 Banking Law).
17 It should be noted that SIM (Societa di Intermediazione Mobiliare) indicates a company which is
authorised to deal in the Italian Stock Exchange (Law No. 1/91).
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Before concluding this chapter, it is relevant for the aims of the present thesis to
clarify briefly important issues concerning the organisational structure of Italian banks,
with particular attention to the actual role of joint-stock companies and co-operative
banks in the context of the New Banking Law and subsequent Decrees.
Z6.4	 Bank Organisational Structure in Italy
The privatisation of state activities usually differs from country to country and depends
on various factors like: the fiscal needs of deficit-burdened governments; political
discomfort with anything associated with market socialism; and the urgency to
rationalise the financial sector in order to raise efficiency and to reduce the distortions
occurring where public and private sectors coexist [Molyneux et al. (1996)]. In this
respect, the motivation for the rapid privatisation programme of the Italian financial
system was driven strongly by the state of budget finances and a number of other
factors. In particular, the low levels of bank profitability, the capacity of the stock
market, and the difficulties of establishing a suitable criterion for the transfer of bank
assets from public into private hands [see, among others, Morgan Stanley (1995) and
Molyneux et al. (1996)1
Italian banks' organisational structures have been particularly influenced by: i)
"the Amato Law" (Law No. 218/90) and subsequent implementation decrees (i.e. Lgt.
Decree No. 356/90) whereby all public banks adopted the joint-stock company form
which in turn became the main legal form for exercising banking activity; and ii) Law
No. 474/1994 and subsequent Directives, whereby some important banks previously
held directly or indirectly by the Italian Treasury were subject to the public offering of
shares representing the majority of votes. The objective of this latter was to create the
conditions for a growing separation between foundations and controlled banks.
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The 1994 Banking Law (art. 14) dedicates several of its Chapters to the
organisational structure of banks. Banks constituted as co-operatives comprise the
following two categories: banche popolari (co-operative banks), and banche di credito
cooperativo (mutual banks, formerly called rural and artisans' banks). Institutions
different from joint-stock companies and co-operative banks and which were created
before 1993 were allowed to continue their banking activities (Legislative Decree
481/1992). While future legislation may consider new types of credit institutions (either
public or private), according to the present law neither public nor private banks can
create institutions that are different from joint-stock companies and/or co-operative
banks.
In 1994 a new privatisation law, the "Dini Directive", was designed to dilute the
ownership of foundations in the savings banks (Casse di Risparmio), allowing banks to
raise outside capital and to pursue mergers. This explains why in the following years
there has been a considerable transfer of banking ownership away from the State and
regional foundations, thus accelerating also the pace of rationalisation within the
banking industry. However, it has been argued [Inzerillo et al. (1999)1 that among the
main reasons for the slow process of consolidation in the savings banks sector is the low
"contestability" of ownership rights, the high share of state-owned banks and the spread
of forms of corporate governance which make any take-overs difficult.
Moreover, privatisation can be more difficult for local banks in comparison with
larger banks. This is because local banks enjoy niche markets that render them less
efficient from the perspective of selection and business conduct. Moreover, in Italy as in
other European countries, a considerable number of public sector savings institutions
are controlled by local or regional councils, which implies the nomination of Board
members and sometimes executives, according to political criteria. These factors could
be significant obstacles to change and, in particular, to privatisation. The fact that
consolidation in Europe, unlike in the US, has not eroded the market share of small
banks could be partly a result of many European savings institutions' being state-
owned.
The more recent "Ciampi Law" (Law No. 461/98) is concerned directly with the
legal status of banking foundations and was designed to give bank foundations the
status of private juridical persons with unlimited independence in management and
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statutory matters. This legislation was hoped to facilitate savings banks transform their
legal status from public institutions to private law foundations.
Overall and as a consequence of the privatisation programme boosted by the
Amato Law, by the end of 1993 over 90 per cent of the banks previously acting as
public foundations had become joint-stock companies. Despite this, only some 30 banks
are publicly listed and more than 50 per cent of the banking system is still in public
hands [see Resti (1998)]. The need for a gradual programme for the reduction of
banking foundations (so as to avoid sudden changes in bank ownership and to ensure
continuity and stability in the system) has also recently been emphasised by the
Governor of the Bank of Italy [Fazio (1999)].
2.7	 Conclusions
As shown throughout this chapter, the processes of structural deregulation and
supervisory re-regulation in Italy have been fuelled by the issuing of important Banking
Directives and Laws at the EU level in an attempt to create a single market for financial
services in Europe. Indeed, the departure from the principles of the 1936 Banking Law
(that is, banks' specialisation; separateness between banks and industry; structural
controls; and state dominance within the proprietary structure in the banking sector) has
represented a fundamental turnaround for the Italian banking system.
The reforms carried out during the 1990s have changed significantly the shape of
the domestic banking system thanks to the progressive liberalisation programme:
branching restrictions have been removed and specialisation requirements have been
abolished. In addition, substantial advances have been made to alter the legal structure
of Italian banks in order to facilitate privatisation and/or to promote a greater market
orientation. The most relevant pieces of reforming legislation impacting Italian banks
have been the following: the Amato Law (dealing with privatisation issues; M&As and
banking groups); the Law implementing the EU Second Banking Directive; and the
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Testo Unico (or "New Banking Law") that reorganised and codified most previous
legislation.
The following chapter focuses on the consequences of these legal changes on the
structure and performance of Italian banks.
Chapter 3
The Italian Banking Market:
Structure and Performance
3.1
	 Introduction
This chapter explores the main changes in the structure and performance features of the
Italian banking market. Section 3.2 investigates recent developments in the structure of
the banking market, including M&A activity, market concentration and the recent
privatisation trend. Section 3.2.1 investigates important competitive developments in the
Italian financial system. Section 3.3 analyses other issues, such as the level of personnel
expenses, non-performing loans and equity capital during the 1990s. The profitability of
Italian banks will also be investigated in section 3.4, and section 3.4.1 explores the
special role of mutual and co-operative banks in the Italian banking system. Section 3.5
is concerned with the way financial innovation and information technology have
affected bank business strategies in recent years, focusing in particular on the
development of new forms of payments media. Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
3.2	 The Present Structure of the Italian Banking System
As noted in the previous chapter, the Italian banking industry was highly specialised for
many years. However, the process of deregulation, together with the consolidation of
Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Performance	 45
activities within individual banks, has brought about the erosion of traditional
differences between institutions.
Table 3.1 displays the structure of the more liberalised Italian banking system. At
present, only the legal status co-operative banks (banche popolari and banche di credito
cooperativo) and different types of shareholder structure provide any kind of distinction
among categories of banks operating in the Italian market.
Table 3.1	 Structure of the Italian Banking System: Number of Banks
Banks 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
%
change
1993-97
Limited company banks accepting
short-term funds a 174 170 163 176 190 +9%
Limited company banks accepting
medium and long-term funds b 46 35 34 33 32 -30%
Co-operative banks (popular banks) 100 95 96 80 69 -31%
Mutual banks (credit co-operative banks) c 671 643 619 591 583 -13%
Central credit and refinancing institutions 5 6 6 6 6 20%
Branches of foreign banks 41 45 52 51 55 34%
Total 1,037 994 970 937 935 -10%
New Registrations (Total) 23 25 53 40 42 83%
Cancellations (Total) 59 68 77 73 44 -25%
a Includes former public law banks, banks of national interest, savings and popular banks that changed
their legal status following the Amato Law, and Monte dei Paschi di Siena, which changed its status from
public law bank to limited company in July 1995.
a Includes former special credit institutions, which were abolished following implementation of the
Second Banking Directive in 1993. Although there are no longer any legal distinctions between a limited
company accepting short-term funds and medium- to long- term funds, the Bank of Italy kept the
distinction in its Annual Reports, to ease comparison with older statistics.
a Includes former rural and artisans' banks.
Source: Adapted from Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
With the process of restructuring and, to a lesser extent, the increase in bank
crises, the number of banks fell from 1,037 in 1993 to 935 by the end of 1997. From
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1990 the total number of banks declined by a fifth: the largest decline was in the mutual
bank sector whose numbers fell from 671 in 1993 to 583 in 1997. Compared with the
number of institutions in other industrialised countries within Europe, Italy is still a
country with a relatively large number of banks, as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2	 International Comparison: Number of Banks
Countries 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Belgium 133 148 146 143 136
Canadaa 2,721 2,644 2,553 2,497 2,413
France 630 627 613 547 519
Germany 3,893 3,730 3,617 3,509 3,409
Italy 1,037 994 970 937 935
Japan 5,619 5,287 4,929 4,635 4,266
Netherlands 130 128 127 126 127
Sweden 111 107 109 125 125
Switzerland 421 395 384 372 362
United Kingdom 578 591 565 561 553
United Statesb 25,749 24,720 23,958 23,123 22,331
'Deposit-taking institutions only.
b Includes commercial banks, thrift institutions (savings banks, savings and loan associations, co-
operative and industrial banks) and credit unions.
Source: BIS, Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries, Basle, several issues and
Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Figure 3.1 shows that, with the exception of Belgium, there has been a contraction
in the number of credit institutions throughout Europe during the 1990s.
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Figure 3.1	 Variation in the Number of Banks (% Change 1990-1997)a
20%
B
-40%
a B = Belgium; C = Canada; F = France; D = Germany; I = Italy; J = Japan; NL = Netherlands; S=
Sweden; CH = Switzerland; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States.
Source: Bank for International Settlement, Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries,
Basle, several issues and Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
With regard to the number of branches (Table 3.3), by comparing the 1997 data
with those of 1993 (when legal restrictions on opening new branches in Italy were
eliminated), more thati-3,000 new branches have been opened, with an annual increase
of nearly 3.5%. Between 1990 and 1997 the total number of branches across the country
increased by over 40% (in 1990 the total number of branches was 17,721). Moreover, as
displayed in the table below, the incorporation of the Second Banking Directive into
Italian law also appears to have influenced the growth in the number of foreign bank
branches of EU banks with more than 60% increase between 1993 and 1997 (from 50
branches of foreign banks in 1993 to 82 in 1997).
t.,...Fer.f.•••nn•••,K10,111/....t"t*M.
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino
Banca di Roma
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL)
Banca Commerciale Italiana (COMIT)
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincie Lombarde
(CARIPLO)
Credito Italian°
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
Banco di NapoliI	
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
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Table 3.3	 Structure	 of	 the	 Italian	 Banking	 System:	 Number	 of
Branches'
0/0
Banks 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 change
1993-97
Limited company banks accepting
short-term funds 15,826 16,535 16,621 17,524 18,026 +14%
Limited company banks accepting
medium and long-term funds 124 119 95 86 98 -21%
Co-operative banks (popular banks) 3,896 4,045 4,239 4,163 4,357 +12%
Mutual banks (credit co-operative banks) 2,226 2,343 2,379 2,530 2,659 +19%
Central credit and refinancing institutions 11 8 28 28 28 +155%
Branches of foreign banks 50 70 78 75 82 +64%
Total 22,133 23,120 23,440 24,406 25,250 +14%
a See notes a, b and c to Table 3.1.
Source: Adapted from Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
In 1996, the eight largest Italian banks in assets size were (see also Table A3.1 in
the Appendix):
With average assets of nearly billions 223,000 lira at the end-1996, Italy's largest
bank, the Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino ranked 52'd worldwide (BankScope
ranking) and 29 th in Europe [The Banker (1997)] in terms of total assets. Table 3.4
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shows the European ranking of Italy's top banks. It can be seen that no Italian banks
ranked in the top 20 European banks. Italy's eighth largest bank, Banco di Napoli, has a
particularly low ranking (79 th) following its very poor performance in 1996 (see Table
A3.1 in the Appendix which shows some characteristics, including number of personnel
and branches and world ranking, of these major Italian banks in 1996).
Table 3.4	 Main Banks in Italy: European Ranking (1996)
Banks
Assets
annual %
change
Top 500
European
ranking
Tier I capital
annual %
change
Top 500
European
ranking
CARIPLO 3.4 36 -2.9 25
San Paolo 2.8 29 3.4 29
Torino
BNL 1.1 42 2.1 30
Banca di Roma 1.7 32 2.0 31
COMIT 10.6 37 0.3 35
Monte dei Paschi 4.7 48 1.1 40
Credito Italian° 7.4 40 10.1 46
Banco di Napoli -15.0 79 -12.0 171
Source: Adapted from The Banker, Top European Banks Listing (1997, p. 40), September.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the restructuring activities in the form of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) that have been undertaken in the Italian market between 1990 and
1997. M&A activity rose on average from 27 deals per year in the early 1990s to 39
over the 1994-97 period. In addition, there has been a considerable increase in
operations involving the acquisition of majority stakes, especially for banks based in the
central and northern regions of the country. As in other European countries, the M&A
trend became more intense in recent years as a consequence of growing competitive
pressures [see, for example, Focarelli et al. (1999)].
The largest number of mergers occurred in 1995 (73 including credit co-operative
banks) and in contrast to previous years consolidation did not involve only those banks
experiencing distress. On the contrary, there was an increase in M&As involving sound
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and profitable banks: this phenomenon was linked to changes in the strategic rationale
of banks that wished to improve operational efficiency and strengthen their branch
networks [Bank of Italy (1995)].
Figure 3.2	 Merger and Acquisition Activities
1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995 1996	 1997
—dr—M&A (all banks)
—0— M&A and acquisitions of majority of capital (all banks)
- - • - -M&A (Credit Cooperative banks only)
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Although the M&As that were announced during 1997 and in the first quarter of
1998 involved primarily the largest Italian banks, these banks are still relatively small
compared with their European counterparts. The Bank of Italy (1997) noted that this
fact reflected Italy's lower ratio of gross financial assets to GDP and the comparative
size of the economy. Including those operations carried out in the first quarter of 1998,
the share of each country's five largest banking groups in the total banking assets of the
fifteen members of the EU was estimated at 11% for Germany, 10% for France, 8% for
the UK and 4% for Italy. The issue of domestic market concentration will be analysed
later in this chapter.
With particular regard to the evolution of Italian banking groups, in 1997 there
were 89 (68 in 1990) Italian banking groups — of which 23 were "large" groups (that is
Other Groups
39%
Banco di Napoll_Z
Monte del
Paschi Siena
7%
Credito Italian°
9%
San Paolo13% CARIPLO
10%
COMIT
9%
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groups including more than 10 subsidiaries according to the official definition of the
Bank of Italy). This growth can be viewed as part of the industry rationalisation and
restructuring process that had been undertaken in recent years, as well as one of the
responses of the Italian authorities to the challenge of increased competition within the
Single European Market (SEM). The creation of banking groups has usually been
motivated by the following: i) the possibility of exploiting scale and scope economies;
ii) the capacity of the group to isolate risk from its different activities; iii) organisational
flexibility; and iv) the facilitation of alliances with other businesses [Casu and
Girardone (1998)].
The process towards consolidation in the industry is also reflected in the evolution
of the consolidated total assets of the seven leading banking groups, as shown in Figure
3.3. It is important to note that 85% of total assets is concentrated within the first 20
groups. (Table A3.2 in the Appendix shows that with respect to the total, the first 7
major groups controlled more than 60% of total loans, 50% of equity capital and 45% of
branches. These groups also controlled 56% of total deposits.
Figure 3.3	 Total Assets Share for the 7 Major Italian Banking Groups
(1996)a
° "Other Groups" includes a total of 43 banking groups (see also Table A3.2 in the Appendix to this
chapter).
Source: BankScope and author's calculations.
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As a consequence of the changes in the Banking Law allowing the formation of
holding companies, 87 of the 935 banks operating in 1997 were owned by banking
groups. These major groups also owned 142 auxiliary companies and 311 financial
companies.
Table 3.5 illustrates the structure and dimension of the leading financial
conglomerates at year-end 1997 in terms of number and characteristics of the companies
forming the groups. It is possible to observe that the banking component (that is the
share of banking activities controlled by banking groups) is usually relatively high
among resident institutions. As pointed out by the Bank of Italy (1997), this share
reached 87% in 1997.
Table 3.5 Structure of Leading Italian Banking Groups
Resident
Institutions
Non-Resident
Institutions
Group Banks Financial SIMa Leasing Factoring Others Banks Others Total
COMIT 3 1 1 1 2 6 10 35 59
San Paolo di Torino 2 3 3 2 1 9 5 29 54
Monte dei Paschi 5 1 1 1 8 6 24 46
BNL 5 1 2 4 2 7 8 10 39
CR di Roma 4
..
3 2 1 - 21 3 4 38
IMl 2 2 3 1 1 7 3 19 38
Credito Italiano 7 2 4 1 2 9 4 5 34
CARIPLO 9 1 2 1 1 10 3 3 30
Ambroveneto 2 1 4 3 2 8 1 21
Banco di Napoli 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 12
Banco di Sicilia 3 1 - 3 1 8
Banco Sardegna 2 1 4 7
a SIMs (Societa di Intermediazione Mobiliare) indicates a company which is authorised to deal in the
Italian Stock Exchange (Law No. 1/91).
Source: Associazione Nazionale Banche Private, Struttura e dimensione dei gruppi bancari (1997).
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In order to evaluate possible trends in terms of the market structure in Italian
banking, basic concentration indicators for EU countries and the US have been
calculated using international data from BankScope (details on the sample used are
given in Table A3.3 in the Appendix). Figure 3.4 shows the 5-firm concentration ratios
across a range of banking markets in 1996. One can see that there is a lower level of
concentration in France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the US [see also De
Bandt (1998)]. This means that with the exception of the UK, small countries such as,
for instance, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Sweden tend to have considerably higher
degrees of market concentration. Similar patterns can be found in the levels of
concentration calculated in terms of total loans, deposits, securities and off-balance
sheet activities (see Figure A3.1 in the Appendix). Overall, while the Italian banking
market has experienced substantial M&A activity, this does not appear to have resulted
in a highly concentrated banking market — at least compared with many other European
banking systems.
Figure 3.4 Market Concentration in European and US Banking
(1996)"
Total Assets - 1996
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Source: BankScope and author's calculations.
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The increase in the number of mergers involving major Italian banks during recent
years has been accompanied by the privatisation (partial or total) of state-controlled
banking firms (see also the last section of Chapter 2). In many European countries the
privatisation process, together with the political willingness to liberalise the banking
systems in line with EU legislation, has represented a substantial impulse to the process
of reshaping the structure of domestic banking markets, and has increased the
contestability of bank ownership. The implications of a process of privatisation is
important because it allows banks to become more market-oriented and helps them
acquire greater flexibility in pursuing the strategies of their boards without state
intervention.
However, the privatisation issue needs more accurate specifications. Although the
term privatisation is generally used to cover sales of shares of all public institutions, in
Italy not all public institutions are government-owned, although they can be deeply
influenced by the government (such as in case of foundations regulated by special
statutes). In other words, in Italy all the former public law banks' have now assumed
the legal status of limited companies; however, these are still owned by public law
foundations that have only disposed of small portions of their stakes in the banks.
Table 3.6 displays the main privatisations carried out in Italy over the period
1993-96.
1 Until the implementation of Law 218/1990, public law banks included: i) Public Law Credit Institutions
(Istituti di Credito di Diritto Pubblico, namely Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro, Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, and Banco di Sardegna; ii)
Savings banks and Pawnbrokers (Casse di Risparmio and Banche del Monte); and iii) Public Law Special
Credit Institutions and Units (lstituti di Credito e Sezioni di Credito Speciale di natura pubblica) [see, for
details, Costi (1994)].
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Table 3.6	 Main Privatisations in the Italian Banking Sector
Number Remaining Comple Gross
of Method % public -tion proceeds
Company Period emplo- of sale sold holding date of (billions
yees (%) sale of lire)
IMI 7.96- 883 Auction 6.93 1.13 8.7.96 501
(3rd tranche) 12.97 (1995)
'MI 1.95- 917 Auction 19.03 8.07 1.7.95 1,200
(ed tranche) 5.96 (1993)
NI 1.93- 917 Publ. Offer 33.00 27.82 1.2.94 2,180
4.95 (1993)
Comit 1.93- 17,997 Publ. Offer 54.00 2.02 1.3.94 2,891
4.95 (1993)
Credito ltaliano 1.93- 15,824 Publ. Offer 67.00 1.99 8.12.93 1,829
4.95 (1993)
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
The Bank of Italy (1997) notes that when taking into account all the M&As that
have been implemented, banks and groups controlled by the state, local authorities and
foundations account for approximately 25% of the total assets of the banking system,
compared with 68% at the end of 1992.
3.2.1	 Further Competitive Developments
Following the stages of banking sector development of banks as outlined by Rybczynski
(1988), Italy is characterised by the bank-oriented rather than the market-based stage,
because capital markets are still underdeveloped compared with other industrialised
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countries. 2 Traditionally, Italian security markets have been less developed compared
with those of the UK and US despite: i) the development of a large bond market during
the 1980s as a result of persistently high government deficits; and ii) the significantly
high potential for securities markets, flowing from particularly high savings volumes
[for instance, see Steinherr (1992); Canals (1993) and Howells and Bain (1998)]. With
respect to point ii), Italian savings products have until recently been unsophisticated and
only a small proportion of Italian savings has been professionally managed.
As pointed out by Pittaluga (1996), the inefficiency of capital markets in Italy
depends on both supply and demand factors. As concerns supply factors, the focus is on
the main features of the productive system: in Italy there is only a relatively small
number of large firms and existing small and medium firms are generally owned by
families, which rarely demand risky capital to finance their business. Another supply
factor is represented by the fiscal legislation, which makes equity market financing of
business more costly and less convenient compared with bank financing. In particular,
the structure of Italian enterprises is characterised by: a relatively high leverage; low
capital mobility; low monitoring mechanism (i.e. signalling) from capital markets on the
quality of corporate investments; low preference for quotation of risky capital; a high
preference for short-term debts; and a high fragmentation of credit lines [see, for
instance, Zadra (1998)].
In the past, the demand factors that have hindered capital market development in
Italy have related to the high liquidity preference of savers and the relative
underdevelopment of institutional investors. This, however, has begun to change. Over
the past few years the Italian financial system has been characterised by a considerable
process of disintermediation as shown, for instance, in Figure 3.5: credit institution
liabilities declined sharply relative to total Italian financial activities. This latter includes
the financial claims held by the private sector and in particular liquid assets, medium
2 The distinction between market-based and bank-based financial systems depends on whether firms
generally obtain most of their finance from the issue of loans or securities. On this classification system,
Germany and Japan are regarded as bank-based, while the UK and the US are regarded as market-based
systems, with other developed European countries banking systems somewhere in between these two
extremes, but these generally tending towards bank finance.
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and long term securities (including repos), shares of investment trusts, and other
financial activities (shares are not included).
Figure 3.5
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Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
The positive performance of financial markets and the contraction in new issues
of government securities have helped to sustain a net flow of savings to institutional
investors (including investment funds, portfolio management services, insurance
companies, pension funds and securities firms), which reached record levels in 1997
[Bank of Italy (1997)]. Indeed, the increasing diversification of financial assets is quite
recent in European financial markets and stems mostly from the following factors
[Inzerillo et al. (1999)]: i) the reduction in actual and expected inflation, which has
induced households to retain a higher share of long term assets in their portfolios and to
accept a higher level of market risk; ii) the restructuring of state pension schemes,
which has induced individuals to shift to the private sector; iii) advances in technology
and the globalisation of financial markets, which has encouraged the development of a
number of personalised products as a response to new customer needs; and, finally iv)
r	 Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Performance 	 58
technological innovations that have allowed a relevant reduction in transaction costs,
thereby increasing profit possibilities related to portfolio renewals.
Table 3.7 details net fund-raising by institutional investors between 1994 and
1997. The table shows that over the whole period, investment funds recorded the
highest growth (+505%), followed by portfolio management services and insurance
companies (+152% and +106%, respectively). 3 The growth in institutional investors
funds compares with the decline in total bank deposits (-5% over the four years) shown
in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7	 Institutional Investors:	 Net Fund-Raising and %
Composition
1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
	
L.bn	 %	 L.bn	 "Yo	 L.bn	 c/0	 L.bn	 °A
Investment Funds	 23,667 26.4 -10,490 -42.6 	 58,226 42.5 143,377 52.5
Portfolio Mgt Services
	 32,875 36.7
	 2,019	 8.2	 50,457 36.9	 82,970 30.4
Insurance Companies	 21,355 23.9	 28,334	 115	 29,772 21.7	 43,960 16.1
Pension Funds	 11,108 12.4	 4,372	 17.7	 -2,118	 -1.5	 2,339	 0.9
Securities Firms (SIM)
	 467	 0.5	 400	 1.6	 550	 0.4	 400	 0.1
Total
	 89,472 100	 24,635	 100 136,887 100 273,046 100
Total Bank Deposits
	 923,371	 — 935,199	 — 912,740	 — 882,278	 —
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
Over the last few years, therefore, there has been a decline in the level of
traditional intermediation activity. Moreover, there has been a gradual reduction in the
spread between lending and borrowing rates fostered by the downturn in the economy
especially during 1993 and 1994. Indeed, the achievement of more competitive
3 It is important to note that in 1995 insurance companies benefited from the fact that they were relatively
unaffected by financial market turbulence compared with investment funds and other institutional
investors.
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conditions in the output market has brought about situations of crises. 4 For example,
over the 1993-96 period the main banks in the south of Italy experienced such a drastic
reduction in their net interest income that they were no longer able to cover the
excessively high operating expenses and loan losses. As a consequence, many banks
had to reduce their size and/or were acquired by more healthy (northern) banks.
In such a context, the reduction of bank interest margins has often been offset by
the growing importance of non-interest income derived from securities trading and other
services. (Figures 3.6 and 3.7, below). It has been argued [Inzerillo et al. (1999)1 that
the growing importance of non-interest income in virtually all banking systems in
Europe confirms the commitment on the part of banks to become key providers of non-
traditional financial services.
Figure 3.6	 Interest Margin and Intermediation Margin
(% of Total Assets)
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Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
4 This is a consequence of the fact that when in a market where competitive conditions prevail and there
is freedom of entry for new firms, we have excess capacity when there exists at least one firm attaining a
lower level of profits than the "normal" one, i.e. the minimum required in order to stay on the market
[Inzerillo et al. (1999)].
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•Trading Income M Net Commission Income 1:10ther Income
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations
Increasing competition in the banking sector has forced many banks to offer their
customers a wider range of higher quality services. To a certain extent, the increasing
focus on non-interest income can be illustrated by the growth of the Italian derivatives
markets in recent years. Interest-rate and currency swaps, financial futures, options for
debt instruments, and forward-rate agreements are among the most common derivative
instruments that provide a source of non-interest income as well as a means of covering
risks in times of market instability.
By using derivatives, a bank can actually gain from operations off the balance
sheet. In Italy, the growth of derivative markets between 1994-97 is shown in Table 3.8.
In notional value terms, the Italian derivatives market has expanded nearly threefold
over 1994 to 1997.
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Table 3.8 Italian Market for Financial Derivatives Instruments'
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 1994 1995 1996 1997
Securities and Interest Rates Instrum. 826,892 935,000 1,623,551 2,598,359
Futures 27,799 34,179 86,663 231,995
Call Options 25,168 47,365 92,156 120,762
Put Options 31,963 55,307 142,879 130,070
Interest Rate Swaps 445,117 632,668 1,011,417 1,618,246
Forward Rate Agreement 292,317 162,108 284,728 479,517
Currency, Gold and Other Metals
Instruments 149,533 194,770 191,268 235,706
Currency Swaps 86,671 122,889 98,939 108,145
Domestic Currency Swaps 32,058 31,217 27,985 37,520
Call Options 12.007 15,453 28,414 38,279
Put Options 17,535 24,386 34,220 49,337
Total 976,425 1,129,770 1,814,819 2,834,065
'Notional amounts at end year in billions of Ii
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several
re.
issues.
To summarise, the process of globalisation and increased integration between
different economic systems has strengthened the securitisation process. Changes in the
financial preferences of Italian consumers and the process of disintermediation in
banking have also accelerated, thereby creating a shift of financial resources to
institutional investors. In this context, the urgency for banks to reconfirm their central
role in the financial system has increased sharply. Italian credit institutions have and are
continuing to invest resources in order to be able to face the growing demand for new
products and services, which in the past were traditionally associated with investment
banks, brokerage houses and insurance companies.
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3.3	 Italian Banks' Productivity: Staff Costs
Recent studies of Italian banking [see, for instance, Di Battista et al. (1996)] have
pointed to the need for an internal reorganisation of domestic credit institutions and, in
particular, of their labour force. These studies maintain that despite recent
developments, the Italian banking market is characterised by an extreme rigidity of the
productive factors employed, especially in terms of their labour force.
As shown in Table 3.9, over 1993-97 the number of staff employed in the Italian
banking sector decreased by only 5% (a decline of approximately 1.3% per annum).
Moreover, as recently remarked by Inzerillo et al. (1999), Italian banks still have too
high a proportion of staff costs to gross income (approximately 43%) compared with
Germany, France and Spain (38% is an average indicator for these three countries).
Inzerillo et al. (1999) argue that wider forms of profit sharing explain the high unit staff
costs present in the Italian banking system (and in other Continental European
countries) compared with banks operating in Anglo-Saxon countries where salary levels
tend to be kept stable while staff numbers are more varied.
Table 3.9 Banks' Staff Numbers and Costs in ltalya
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
TOTAL ASSETS
PER EMPLOYEE
STAFF COSTS
PER EMPLOYEE
PERSONNEL EXPENSES	 Current	 Constant	 Current	 Constant
Prices	 Prices	 Prices	 Prices
(base 1995)	 (base 1995)
1993 339,949 34,769 6,618 7,246 103.6 113.5
1994 338,488 36,070 6,980 7,341 108.3 113.9
1995 337,456 37,133 7,133 7,133 111.4 111,4
1996 327,048 38,617 7,665 7,370 118.3 113.8
1997b 322,055 38,333 8,316 7,837 118.2 111.4
'Millions of lire.
b Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
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The contraction in the number of bank personnel is shown in Figure 3.8. It is
apparent that despite the growth in the number of branches, there has been a parallel
decrease (in absolute terms) in the number of employees.
Figure 3.8	 Italian Branch and Staff Numbers
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Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Looking at the average number of personnel per bank branch over the period
1993-96, Table 3.10 shows that there has been a slight reduction for all bank sizes,
geographical areas and bank types.5
5 Data are drawn from the Bilbank sample that will be employed for the empirical analysis on the
calculation of efficiency levels of Italian banks. The sample comprises an unbalanced panel of 1,958 bank
observations distributed in the following way: 545 banks in 1993; 523 in 1994; 466 in 1995 and 424 in
1996. See, for details Chapter 5, section 5.6.
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Table 3.10	 Average Number of Personnel per Bank Branch'
1993 1994 1995 1996
BY BANK SIZEb
Very Big 23 22 21 20
Big 18 17 17 15
Medium 15 14 13 13
Small 15 15 14 13
Very Small 10 10 9 9
BY REGION
North-west 13 12 11 11
North-east 12 11 10 10
Centre 12 12 11 11
South and Islands 10 10 9 9
BY BANK TYPE
Commercial 17 16 16 16
Savings 14 13 13 12
Popular 13 12 12 11
Credit Co-op. 9 9 9 8
a The sample is composed by 1,958 bank observations distributed in the following way: 545 banks in
1993; 523 in 1994; 466 in 1995 and 424 in 1996. Details can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.6.
b The Bank of Italy categorises banks according to five size groups: very big, big, medium, small and very
small.
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
The Bank of Italy (1997) reckons that the aim of lower and more flexible costs in
Italy is also being achieved by "re-engineering" production processes and outsourcing
the activities most easily decentralised, such as the management of Information
Technology (IT) systems and buildings, staff training and legal advice.
Staff costs in Italian banking contribute to over 60% of total operating costs and
average labour cost is amongst the highest in Europe: roughly one-quarter higher than in
France, one-third higher than in Germany and twice as much again as Britain. It is
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generally agreed that the Italian banking sector employs 15%-30% excess staff
[Salomon Brothers (1996)1.6
The policy implemented in Italy of gradual cost cutting was possible especially
because of the slight increase in labour productivity (see, for example, the trend of total
assets per employee in Table 3.9), however, as shown in Table 3.11, the ratio of staff
costs/operating expenses for Italy over 1990-95 was always the highest compared with
that of the other major banking systems.
Table 3.11	 Staff Costs/Operating Expenses (%): International
Comparison
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
France 53.89 53.33 53.11 54.95 54.12 54.20
Germany 63.79 63.43 63.22 61.43 60.88 60.38
Italy 65.84 65.45 64.32 63.37 65.21 63.93
Spain 62.39 60.65 60.75 61.95 60.85 61.39
United Kingdom 56.89 55.35 54.64 55.16 56.04 55.80
United States 44.68 42.52 41.78 41.64 42.04 42.36
Source: OECD, Bank Profitability (1997), and author's calculations.
Summarising, despite the slight reduction in the number of staff employed in the
Italian banking sector during the 1993-97 period, Italian banks still appear to have
relatively high staff costs compared with their European counterparts.
6 Salomon Brothers (1996) forecast that between 50,000 to 100,000 jobs would have to be cut in a fully
liberalised and competitive Italian market, but this would require first of all political willingness because
a reduction of personnel implies costs in the region of Lit. 60-70 million per employee (a minimum two-
year compensation package). In addition, this cost would exceed the industry earnings' capacity,
representing over 2% of reported equity and be almost impossible without the support of the unions.
Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Performance	 66
3.3.1	 Asset Quality and Equity Capital
During the 1990s, the deregulation process, technological innovation, the diversification
of customer portfolios, changes in economic policies and the economic recession
brought about an important transformation in banks' activities. In particular, over the
last few years there has been a worsening in the quality of Italian banks' lending
activities.
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in 1991 were equal to about 5% of total loans,
whereas in 1997 this percentage had almost doubled (Table 3.12). Specifically, the level
of NPLs in Italy showed a dramatic upward trend over 1991-96 and started to diminish
(only slightly) in 1997. It is important to mention that these figures might be misleading
because banks in the south of Italy are generally far worse off, from an asset quality
point of view, than their northern counterparts. In fact, the NPLs to total loans ratio
reaches over 25% among southern Italian banks. During 1997 there appears to be some
evidence of improvement, however loan losses are still relatively high.
Table 3.12 shows Bank of Italy data that distinguish between all banks and banks
accepting short-term funds (as with the former Italian banking Law). One of the features
of these latter banks is that they usually lend to small and medium-sized enterprises.
From Table 3.12 it appears that banks accepting short-term funds have always had
comparatively higher NPLs.
11
Yo_
10 —
9
8 —
7
6
5
4
3
Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Performance 67
Table 3.12	 Italian Banks' Asset Quality'
Banks accepting short-term funds Total Banks
Years Total loans Total
NPLs
NPLs /
Net loans
1991=100
Total loans Total
NPLs
NPLs /
Net loans
1991=100
1991 750,940 39,502 100 947,310 46,472 100
1992 884,918 46,659 100.2 1,070,264 54,448 103.7
1993 933,703 62,771 127.5 1,165,854 73,046 123.2
1994 957,510 80,532 125.1 • 1,195,448 94,054 125.6
1995 1,027,871 98,669 114.1 1,261,643 114,050 114.9
1996 1,058,197 109,936 108.2 1,283,269 127,868 110.2
1997 1,138,441 106,000 89.6 1,364,213 124,899 91.9
"Banks accepting short-term funds" do not include medium- and long- term credit institutions (as with
the former Italian Banking Law).
b Unless otherwise stated, data are in billions of lire.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Figure 3.9	 Italian Banks' NPLs/Net Loans
1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
El Total Banks	 1:IBanks accepting short-term funds
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Petformance 	 68
The growth of bad debts has stimulated a wide debate among researchers. 7 Recent
studies [see, for instance, Morelli and Pittaluga (1998)] have shown that the acceleration
of NPLs in Italy has primarily been determined by cyclical factors and not by a
worsening of the screening and monitoring activities of banks. In particular, the growth
in NPLs has been fuelled by the size and extent of the economic recession that affected
the country especially during the early 1990s, and mainly in the southern regions.
Table 3.13 reports the ratio of NPLs-to-total loans for different bank sizes and
type, while Figure 3.10 shows how non-performing loans differ for banks based in
various geographical regions of Italy (the Bilbank sample is detailed in Chapter 5,
section 5.6).
Table 3.13	 Italian Banks' NPLs/Total Loans (by Bank Size and Bank
Type)a
1993 1994 1995 1996
BY BANK SIZEb
Very big 2.94% 3.78% 4.38% 5.65%
Big 3.75% 4.56% 4.92% 4.89%
Medium 3.95% 5.13% 4.91% 5.48%
Small 4.46% 5.65% 5.35% 5.53%
Very Small 5.50% 6.00% 5.69% 5.50%
BY BANK TYPE
Commercial 4.72% 5.83% 5.59% 5.30%
Savings 4.55% 5.53% 5.35% 5.52%
Popular 5.57% 6.19% 5.85% 5.52%
Credit Co-op. 5.40% 5.83% 5.54% 5.38%
a The sample is composed by 1,958 bank observations distributed in the following way: 545 banks in
1993; 523 in 1994; 466 in 1995 and 424 in 1996. Details can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.6.b The Bank of Italy categorises banks according to five size groups: very big, big, medium, small and very
small.
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
7 As it will be discussed in the following chapter, bad debts are a common cause of bank failure in that
they are likely to have repercussions on the relationship between banks and enterprises, on their
respective balance sheets and, broadly, on supervisory policies. When a failing bank reports large loan
losses, this often comes as a shock to shareholders, depositors, regulators and bank analysts because the
bank concerned had not set aside adequate provisions against possible loan defaults.
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It is important to recall that the manufacturing industry of southern Italy is
characterised by a strong presence of small firms [see, for details, Ferri and Messori
(1998)]. One might expect to find a wide range of small and medium sized local banks
able to engage in long-term relationships with such customers. 8 This should enable
banks to better select and monitor their customers, thereby reducing their credit risk. In
practice, a significant number of large sized banking groups have recently entered the
market in order to save local banks facing structural crises. These "rescues" have also
brought about the process of acquisition of local southern banks by medium to medium
and large banks from the centre and, especially, the north of Italy. The latter, therefore,
had to bear high operating and fixed costs related to the acquisition of banks in crises.
Figure 3.10	 Banks' NPLs/Total Loans (by Geographical Region)
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
UNORTH-W EST CINORTH-EAST C10ENTRE MOUTH
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
8 Nonetheless, as stressed by Generale and Gobbi (1999), in the south of Italy the benefits deriving from
long term customer relationships are usually offset by the adverse local economic conditions.
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One of the most relevant issues as to the underlying reasons for the increase of
bank NPLs in Italy seems to be related to the low allocative and operating efficiency of
a relatively segmented loan market, unable to signal with efficient prices (rates of
interest) the quality of borrowers and thus to allocate saving flows [see, for instance,
Zadra (1998)].9
The relationship between margins, capitalisation and growth has become one of
the primary concerns for banks seeking to make the right strategic choices in order to
optimise their risk management. Table 3.14 shows the equity-to-assets ratio by banks'
size, and geographical areas. Figure 3.11 shows graphically the differences in the level
of capitalisation by bank type.
As discussed earlier in section 3.2.2, very small co-operative banks show the
highest equity to assets ratios (around 10% as an average for the four years). Moreover,
in the south, despite the high level of NPLs, the level of bank capitalisation appears to
be relatively low.
9 The joint effects of a profound transformation in the operating environment (i.e. deregulation,
despecialisation, liberalisation and European integration) and the slowdown in productivity have been
amplified by the particular financial structure of domestic enterprises. This situation can be explained in
the following way. Traditionally in Italy the weaknesses of the capital market have been offset by bank
credit as the main financing instrument. As discussed in the previous chapter, the system has also been
highly segmented (i.e. regulations distinguishing between short and long term debt) for decades, thus
increasing risk assessment costs. With regard to the domestic industrial system, Italy is characterised by a
high number of small and medium sized firms and by a low number of large firms, thus limiting share
quotations. Moreover, the high corporate income taxes tend to encourage a high financial leverage.
Finally, in Italy banks are often small in size (i.e. local co-operative banks) compared with the enterprises
they finance so these latter are forced to finance themselves using more than one bank. This peculiarity of
the Italian market structure has two main effects: on the one hand it allows banks to partially ensure
themselves against the risk of default from the borrower (by the sharing of the risk with other banks). On
the other hand, it forces banks to virtually "underprice" their loans [see Zadra (1998)1.
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Table 3.14	 Italian Banks' Equity/Total Assets (by Bank Size and
Geographical Region)a
1993 1994 1995 1996
BY BANK SIZE!'
Very big 5.3% 5.5% 5.4% 5.6%
Big 6.2% 6.2% 5.7% 5.5%
Medium 7.3% 7.8% 7.6% 7.5%
Small 8.7% 9.5% 9.2% 9.0%
Very small 9.2% 10.2% 10.2% 10.0%
BY REGION
North-west 6.1% 6.5% 6.2% 6.1%
North-east 8.4% 8.6% 8.2% 7.8%
Centre 6.4% 6.2% 6.0% 6.3%
South 5.3% 5.6% 5.4% 5.4%
The sample is composed by 1,958 bank observations distributed in the following way: 545 banks in
1993; 523 in 1994; 466 in 1995 and 424 in 1996. Details can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.6.
b The Bank of Italy categorises banks according to five size groups: very big, big, medium, small and very
small.
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
Figure 3.11	 Banks' Equity Levels (by Bank Type)"
1993
	
1994
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1996
OCOMMERCIAL DSAVINGS •POPULAR CICREDIT COOP.
The sample is composed by 1,958 bank observations distributed in the following way: 545 banks in
1993; 523 in 1994; 466 in 1995 and 424 in 1996. Details can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.6.
b Percentage of total assets.
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
Chapter 3 • The Italian Banking Market: Structure and Performance	 72
3.4	 Profitability of Italian Banks
The strategy of expansion followed by leading Italian banks, the substantial growth in
bad loans, the poor state of many of the banks acquired and the long lead-time before
the consolidation process produces the results expected, has brought about a
considerable shrinking of interest and intermediation margins in Italian banking.
Figure 3.12 charts the general trends in performance of Italian banks for the
period 1991-97. Data on income, expenses, provisions and profits (as a percentage of
average balance sheet totals) are displayed in the chart, from which it is possible to
observe that bank income and profits have declined during the 1990s despite the
increase in non-interest income as a percentage of total assets.
Banks' profits are heavily influenced by the interest rate environment as well as
cyclical factors, in addition to banks' own actions. Deregulation and increased
competition have also influenced banks' interest income. The Bank of Italy (1995)
reckoned that the strategy of expansion of the banks during the early 1990s contributed
to the decline in profit margins. Other factors that have also tended to shrink profit
margins include the pattern of the demand for funds and increasing competition in the
Italian banking market over recent years.
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Figure 3.12	 Italian Banks' Income, Expenses and Profits (% of Total
Assets)
---Net Interest Income
- - * - -Operating Expenses
— 40 — Non-Interest Income
—411	 Net Profit
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
••n
Trends in Italian bank incomes and costs are shown in Table 3.15. The table
shows substantial differences in performance between banks across the regions of Italy.
In particular, banks based in the north tend to have higher income and positive profits;
and they also have lower expenses, especially in terms of overall staff costs.
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Table 3.15
	
Italian Banks' Profit and Loss Accounts by Geographical
Region (% of Total Assets in 1996-97)
NORTH-
WEST
NORTH-
EAST
CENTRE SOUTH +
ISLANDS
1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997
Net Interest income (a) 2.36 2.02 3.15 2.79 2.35 2.14 2.81 2.83
Non-interest income (b) 1.09 1.13 1.22 1.28 0.92 0.95 0.79 0.92
securities and foreign ex trading 0.40 0.25 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.35 0.38
services 0.34 0.50 0.42 0.53 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.23
Gross income (c=a+b) 3.45 3.15 4.37 4.07 3.27 3.09 3.60 3.75
Operating expenses (d) 2.24 2.16 2.69 2.57 2.21 2.17 3.02 2.89
staff costs 1.43 1.34 1.67 1.55 1.45 1.40 2.02 1.86
Net income (e=c-d) 1.21 0.99 1.68 1.50 1.06 0.92 0.58 0.86
Value adjustments,
readjustments and allocations to
provisions (f)
0.63 0.44 0.59 0.41 0.62 1.31 1.31 0.73
Profit before tax (g=e-f) 0.58 0.55 1.09 1.09 0.44 -0.39 -0.74 0.14
Tax (h) 0.31 0.27 0.55 0.50 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.17
Net profit (g-h) 0.27 0.28 0.54 0.59 0.20 -0.62 -0.95 -0.03
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
The trend in cost-to-income ratios for the Italian banking sector between 1993 and
1997 is shown in Figure 3.13. The average value of cost-to-income ratio is 66.6%,
hitting a peak of 68% in 1997. The upward trend in the cost-to-income ratio can be
explained by several factors. In particular, among the most important factors can be
found the adverse effects of the business cycle, the creation of banking groups (that
temporarily inflates banks' cost structures), and the substantial increase in branch
numbers during the 1990s.
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Figure 3.13	 Italian Banks' Cost/Income Ratio and Branches
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
Figure 3.14 compares the cost-to-income ratios for banks in various other
European countries and the US for 1995. Italian banks, on average, had the highest cost
ratios.
As discussed above, profitability in the Italian banking sector has followed a
downward trend since the beginning of the 1990s. Figure 3.15 displays the ROA of the
sector over the period 1992-97. It shows that co-operative banks have been the most
profitable types of banking institutions. The figure also shows that since 1994 the least
profitable banks have been the largest banking institutions.
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Figure 3.14	 Cost/Income Ratio: International Comparison with Selected
Countries (1995)
US
UK
SPAIN
ITALY
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FRANCE
Source: OECD, Bank Profitability (1997) and author's calculations.
Figure 3.15	 Italian Banks' ROA"'e
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'Ratio calculated as Net Income/Total Assets.
b The Bank of Italy categorises banks according to five size groups: very big, big, medium, small and very
small.
'The groups of joint-stock and co-operative banks are defined in Table 3.1.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
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The relatively low level of profitability for Italy's largest banks is (to a certain
extent) confirmed in Table 3.16 that illustrates return on equity (ROE) for the banking
sector. Overall, joint-stock companies posted poor returns between 1994-97 with the
(mainly small) credit co-operative banks being the most profitable. It should be noted
that both reported values of ROA and ROE for the top banks and the average for the
system, overall could have been largely affected by the financial crisis of Banco di
Napoli, which suffered substantial losses over the period, especially in 1994-95.
Nevertheless, returns in Italian banking during the latter half of the 1990s have
remained relatively low.
Table 3.16	 Italian Banks' ROE (by Bank Size and Bank Type)a
1994 1995 1996 1997b
Very big, big and medium- sized banks 0.4 -0.3 2.4 -
Small and very small banks 3.4 6.3 7.0 5.2
Limited Company Banks raising short-term funds -0.5 -0.3 2.2 -0.5
Limited Company Banks raising
medium- and long- term funds 2.4 0.8 2.3 2.0
Co-operative banks (popular banks) 3.4 5.4 7.4 6.6
Mutual banks (credit co-operative banks) 9.5 14.0 13.8 10.5
All banks 1.2 1.6 3.8 1.6
a See also notes a, b, and c to Table 3.1 for details on different size and type categories.
b Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Finally, the differences in bank performance across the regions of Italy are still
marked. Table 3.17 shows the substantial fall in performance of southern banks during
1995-96 although this seems to have been slightly reversed by 1997. The table also
shows the differences in the amount of supervisory capital set aside by banks across the
regions. At present, the minimum solvency ratio is 8% (as in the BIS rules) for banking
groups and banks not belonging to banking groups, and 7% for individual banks
belonging to banking groups.
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Table 3.17	 Selected Performance Indicators for Italian Banks by
Geographical Regiona
1995 1996 1997
Centre and
North
South Centre and
North
South Centre and
North
South
Net income 27,971 2,071 30,769 1,760 27,914 2,494
Charges for loan losses 10,347 5,436 8,902 2,394 11,889 2,249
ROE (%) 4.8 -33.2 5.4 -12.5 1.7 0.3
Allocations to supervisory capital 5,518 -4,791 6,931 -2,534 846 -91
Supervisory capital 177,854 17,732 186,185 16,476 194,214 18,023
Solvency ratio (%) 13.4 11.5 13.2 10.6 12.5 14.6
'Amounts in billions of lire unless otherwise stated.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
3.4.1	 The Role and Performance of Co-operative Banks
Previous sections have noted that co-operative and mutual banks have been among the
most profitable institutions operating in the Italian market. Today, there are still many
banks in Italy that are classified as very small (banche minori) in the form of co-
operative (banche popolari) and mutual (banche di credito cooperativo) bank
ownership (see Table 3.1 in section 3.2). During the 1990s these banks have even
increased their market share, as illustrated in Table 3.18 below (see Chapter 2 for the
legal status of co-operative banks).
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Table 3.18	 Market Share of Italian Co-operative and Mutual Banks
Popular
(Co-operative) Banks
Credit Co-operative
(Mutual) Banks
Loans Deposits Loans Deposits
1992 10.5 15.8 0.30 0.64
1993 10.6 16.0 0.32 0.67
1994 11.2 16.4 0.36 0.68
1995 12.7 17.0 0.38 0.70
1996 12.8 16.9 0.42 0.79
1997 13.6 16.3 0.48 0.78
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
Given that Italy has a large number of small banks, this is of particular interest for
the empirical analysis on efficiency that follows later in this thesis because if the Italian
banking market is characterised by substantial scale economies, one might expect that
these small local co-operative banks would eventually be driven out of the market. The
empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 6 investigates this issue in detail, but first it is
important to recall briefly what is "special" about these banks.
Table 3.19 provides an insight into the income characteristics of popular and co-
operative banks. It can be seen that the majority of their income comes from net interest
sources.
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Table 3.19
	 Profit and Loss Accounts of Main Italian Popular and Credit
Co-operative Banks (% of Total Assets)
1995 1996 1997a
POP CC ALL POP CC ALL POP CC ALL
Net Interest income (a) 3.44 4.27 2.69 3.23 4.08 2.54 2.78 3.45 2.26
Non-interest income (b) 1.07 0.94 0.86 1.24 1.29 1.04 1.33 1.26 1.09
Gross income (c=a+b) 4.51 5.21 3.56 4.47 5.37 3.58 4.11 4.71 3.35
Operating expenses (d) 2.86 3.38 2.42 2.80 3.36 2.39 2.66 3.22 2.31
staff costs 1.75 1.95 1.54 1.74 1.91 1.54 1.62 1.82 1.44
Net income (e=c-d) 1.65 1.82 1.14 1.66 2.00 1.19 1.45 1.49 1.05
Value adjustments, readj.
and allocations to
provisions (f)
0.76 0.30 0.78 0.62 0.32 0.69 0.57 0.25 0.72
Loan losses 0.63 0.28 0.68 0.49 0.31 0.49 0.42 0.26 0.59
Profit before tax (g=e-f) 0.89 1.52 0.36 1.04 1.67 0.50 0.88 1.24 0.32
Tax (h) 0.53 0.07 0.33 0.55 0.15 0.32 0.42 0.03 0.29
Net profit (g-h) 0.36 1.45 0.03 0.49 1.52 0.18 0.46 1.21 0.04
'Provisional.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues and author's calculations.
Personnel expenses-to-total operating costs ratio and cost-to-income ratios are
displayed in Table 3.20. On average credit co-operative banks also have lower cost
ratios than other bank types.
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Table 3.20	 Italian Banks' Personnel Expenses and Cost/Income Ratios
BANKS 1992	 1993
	 1994 1995 1996 1997
PERSONNEL EXPENSES/TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
Popular 62.27% 60.62% 62.15% 61.11% 61.05% 61.94%
Credit co-op 60.00% 58.14% 59.34% 57.72% 56.68% 56.71%
All banks 63.97% 62.80% 64.78% 63.65% 64.38% 62.57%
COST/INCOME RATIO
Popular 61.85% 57.93% 64.97% 63.36% 62.76% 64.65%
Credit co-op 59.08% 56.05% 65.10% 64.97% 62.64% 68.35%
All banks 65.68% 60.79% 68.56% 68.08% 66.89% 68.80%
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
There are several interpretations as to the likely reasons for the higher level of
performance of very small mutual and co-operative banks in Italy [see, for instance, the
recent studies by Cannari and Signorini (1997); Pittaluga (1998); Generale and Gobbi
(1999)]. Most theories emphasise the importance of factors such as banks' localisation,
their reputation, as well as the special relationship (usually long-term) that these banks
have with retail and small business customers. Other theories refer to the expense
preference and peer monitoring literature to demonstrate that the corporate governance
of these banks has a fundamental role in explaining their better performance as opposed
to banks with national branch networks.
With regard to the credit relationships between local banks and small businesses,
it has been argued [see, for example, Pittaluga (1998)] that the local nature and,
particularly, mutual ownership can give banks a comparative advantage with respect to
large banks in screening and monitoring borrowers and hence in enforcing debt
contracts, thereby allowing them to overcome the problems of asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders. Similarly, co-operative and mutual banks are usually not subject
to take-overs because their control is in the hands of directors, which in turn are elected
by the Board. This is often seen as being a more suitable structure than joint-stock
companies in order to maintain long-term customer relationships. Moreover, within co-
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operative banks members have more incentives to control one another (peer monitoring)
and managers have less opportunity to overspend in order to maximise their own utility
(expense-preference). 10
So far most of the analysis presented in this chapter has focused on the financial
characteristics of various bank types in the Italian market. Typically, attention has been
paid to the accounting ratios and market structure information. While this provides an
insight into the structure and performance characteristics of the market, an additional
viewpoint is to consider the innovative capacity of the banking system. This is carried
out in the following section.
3.5	 Financial Innovation: the Use of New Payment
Technologies
An important reflection of the innovative capability of Italian banks relates to
developments in the domestic payments system. The process of change began in the late
1980s and was characterised by substantial co-operation, both at the national and
international levels. As emphasised by Inzerillo et al. (1999), among technological
innovations, changes in the payment system have had a major role in helping to reduce
the degree of monopoly linked to geographical localisation.
Important technological applications include the development of ATMs
(Automatic Teller Machines) and EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer at Point-Of-Sale)
systems. With the widespread diffusion of ATMs, the number of operating hours
10 According to the expense preference approach, originally developed by Berle and Means (1932) and
Coase (1937), the presence in an enterprise of individuals (such as shareholders, managers and lenders)
with different preferences may result in a conflict of interest and in the pursuit of objectives different
from profit maximisation. In such a context, it is possible that managers, while engaging in the objective
of maximising their own utility, obtain a size greater than is optimal, resulting in increased expenses —
such as personnel expenses — which result in distortions of the resource allocation process [see also
Williamson (1963).
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offered to bank customers has increased, while the development of EFTPOS permits the
executions of on-premises commercial operations without the need for cash.
Table 3.21 shows the relative importance of cashless payment instruments as a
percentage of total volume of cashless transactions for a select group of industrialised
countries from 1988 to 1997.
Table 3.21 Relative Importance of Cashless Payment Instruments:
International Comparison'
1988 1989 1990 1991	 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
CHEQUES
Belgium 31.1 27.7 23.8 21.6	 18.8 14.0 11.7 10.6 9.4 8.0
France 57.3 55.2 54.4 52.2	 50.6 49.1 47.4 45.6 43.6 41.7
Germany 9.8 9.6 9.9 9.6	 8.8 8.1 7.9 7.0 6.4 5.7
Italy 45.8 45.0 44.2 41.6	 40.0 37.2 34.0 32.8 30.5 28.0
Netherlands 17.7 15.9 15.2 14.3	 12.3 11.1 8.5 5.9 4.2 3.0
UK 56.0 54.0 51.0 48.5	 45.4 43.0 40.2 36.7 33.1 30.5
US 83.5 83.6 81.9 81.6	 80.5 79.6 78.1 76.5 74.8 73.2
CARDS
Belgium 7.9 9.1 11.0 13.3	 15.6 17.1 18.0 19.7 21.3 23.4
France 10.5 12.4 13.1 14.5	 15.0 15.7 16.2 17.6 18.3 19.5
Germany 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.8	 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.2 4.1
Italy 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.1	 3.7 4.1 5.2 6.6 8.6 11.2
Netherlands 0.3 1.0 1.6 1.8	 2.6 3.1 6.1 11.3 15.1 18.2
UK 11.0 12.0 14.0 16.4	 18.8 21.0 23.3 25.9 28.9 31.1
US 14.7 14.4 15.9 16.0	 16.8 17.5 18.7 20.1 21.5 23.0
CREDIT TRANSFERS
Belgium 54.0 56.0 57.6 57.0	 56.9 60.0 60.9 60.2 59.5 58.0
France 15.3 15.2 15.0 15.2	 15.4 15.4 15.7 15.6 15.7 15.7
Germany 52.9 51.6 51.6 51.3	 49.8 45.6 48.7 48.8 49.2 48.2
Italy 39.8 39.8 40.0 40.9	 42.1 44.6 46.8 45.9 42.6 41.6
Netherlands 65.1 63.5 62.1 61.3	 61.3 61.3 59.8 56.6 54.0 51.7
UK 22.0 22.0 21.0 20.9	 20.6 20.4 20.1 19.7 19.9 19.6
US 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6	 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5
DIRECT DEBITS
Belgium 7.0 6.9 7.6 8.2	 8.8 8.9 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.8
France 8.8 9.1 9.4 9.3	 10.2 10.6 11.2 11.3 11.8 12.1
Germany 36.6 37.6 37.0 37.3	 39.3 43.7 40.3 40.6 40.2 42.0
Italy 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.8	 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.4 7.3 8.6
Netherlands 16.8 19.6 21.1 22.6	 23.9 24.4 25.6 26.3 26.8 27.1
UK 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.2	 15.1 15.6 16.5 17.7 18.1 18.7
US 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8	 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3
'Percentage of total volume of cashless transactions.
Source: Bank for International Settlement, Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries,
Basle, several issues.
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From Table 3.21 it is possible to see that automated forms of payments have
gradually replaced cheques although they still account for 28% of non-cash payments in
the Italian system. Credit transfers are the most important form of non-cash payment in
Italy accounting for 42% of total payments. The table also illustrates that despite
substantial growth, both card and direct debit payments are still relatively
underdeveloped.
As shown in Table 3.22, in Italy the use of electronic transfers has increased
sharply over the last decade. The total number of ATMs grew by 17,709 units over the
period 1989-97, and the corresponding population per machine decreased by 5,040.
With regard to the number of Point of Sale (POS) terminals, the growth has been more
significant (+271,286 units from 1989 to 1997); accordingly, the population per
terminal decreased from 5,550 in 1989 to 204 in 1997.
Table 3.22
	 Growth of ATMs and POS Terminals in Italy
ATMs	 POS
Number	 Approx.	 Population	 Number	 Approx.	 Population
Years	 of	 annual	 per	 of	 annual	 per
ATMs	 `)/0	 machine	 POS	 %	 terminal
changes	 (millions)	 changes	 (millions)
1989 7,791 7,295 10,240a 5,550
1990 9,770 25.4 5,893 22,185b 116.6 2,595
1991 11,571 18.4 4,996 45,711 106.0 1,265
1992 13,917 20.3 4,153 62,251 36.2 929
1993 15,227 9.4 3,756 77,206 24.0 741
1994 19,818 30.1 2,886 113,023 46.4 506
1995 21,670 9.3 2,644 153,752 36.0 373
1996 24,223 11.8 2,370 214,705 39.6 267
1997 25,500 5.3 2,255 281,526 31.1 204
a Based on a sample of credit institutions that account for about 75% of current account bank deposits.
b Based on a sample of credit institutions that account for about 80% of current account bank deposits.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Years Total
Approx.
annual
ok
change
1990 10,975
1991 13,880 26.5%
1992 15,970 15.1%
1993 17,019 6.6%
1994 18,482 8.6%
1995 20,515 11.0%
1996 22,913 11.7%
1997 26,145 14.1%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
6,422
4,553
8,948
4,932
10,606
5,364
11,295
5,724
12,396
6,086
13,824
6,691
15,270
7,643
17,317
8,828
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10,000 -
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0 Debit Cards
OCredit Cards
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While card payments still account only for 11.2% of cashless payments in 1997,
there has been a substantial increase in their use during the 1990s. The number of credit
and debit cards rose in total by almost 140% between 1990 and 1997: credit cards
increased by 43%, while debit cards connected with the bancomatll increased by nearly
170%, as shown in Figure 3.16.
Figure 3.16	 Growth of Credit and Debit Cards in Italy
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
More sophisticated cards, such as the "smart card" that functions as a "virtual"
pocket computer, have so far not been introduced because of their high cost compared
with traditional cards. Although operators are relying on the power of technology to
II Bancomat is an interbank system of ATMs distributed all over the country, which allows the owners of
the bancomat card (debit card) to withdraw cash in any of the automatic machines set up by the banks
using this system.
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reduce their costs, and currently various trial programmes are being run by the main
banks.
As shown in Table 3.23, between 1990 and 1997 the total number of payments
made via the banking system rose sharply (+113.2%) and the value of these payments
increased by approximately 23%. On the other hand, the number of cheques as a total
(personal cheques and bankers draft) decreased over the period by nearly 25%, as did
their total value (-5%).
Table 3.23	 Italian Banks' Payment Instrumentsa
NUMBER (thousands) VALUE (billions of lire)
Years
Personal
cheques
and
bankers'
drafts
Annual
%
change
Payment
and
collection
orders
Annual
change
Personal
cheques
bankers'
drafts
Annual
change
Payment
and
collection
orders
Annual
0/0
change
1990 654, 714 - 295,949 - 1,786,842 - 4,654,861 -
(68.9) (31.1) (27.7) (72.3)
1991 647,486 -1.1 406,594 37.4 1,838,635 2.9 4,592,627 -1.3
(61.4) (38.6) (28.6) (71.4)
1992 633,456 -2.2 420,934 3.5 1,886,591 2.6 4,829,332 5.2
(60.1) (39.9) (28.3) (71.7)
1993 582,726 -8.0 427,568 1.6 1,799,811 -4.6 4,868,328 0.8
(57.7) (42.3) (27.0) (73)
1994 529,758 -9.1 447,441 4.6 1,732,755 -3.7 4,975,193 2.2
(54.2) (45.8) (25.8) (74.2)
1995 521,883 -1.5 483,390 8.0 1,788,640 3.2 5,314,710 6.8
(51.9) (48.1) (25.2) (74.8)
1996 497,517 -4.7 526,758 9.0 1,651,873 -7.6 4,974,252 -6.4
(48.6) (51.4) (24.9) (75.1)
1997 493,583 -0.8 631,005 19.8 1,700,427 2.9 5,731,629 15.2
(43.9) (56.1) (22.9) (77.1)
a Percentage compositions in brackets.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, several issues.
Before concluding this chapter, it is relevant to emphasise the importance that new
forms of banking, such as telephone and on-line PC banking, have achieved over the
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last decade. Recently, the European Central Bank [ECB (1999b)] published an
extensive report on the use of IT in all EU banking markets. Overall, there seems to be a
consensus that although these new ways of doing banking are presently used by a
relatively low number of retail customers (especially in the case of on-line PC banking),
different delivery systems are being developed rapidly in most banking systems. In Italy
at the moment there is little data available on these new forms of banking. However, it
is acknowledged that Internet banking is expected to have the highest future growth
potential of all the automated channels (i.e. "remote banking"). In addition, investment
in new banking technologies is expected to bring about significant reductions in the
costs of processing various banking transactions and will lower overall operating costs.
3.6	 Conclusions
This chapter provides an overview of structural and performance features of the Italian
banking sector during the 1990s. The analysis has illustrated at an exploratory level the
main strengths and weaknesses of the Italian banking industry. With a large number of
institutions, an increasing number of branches and relatively high personnel costs, the
sector is still amongst the most fragmented in Europe. However, the growth in the
number of banking groups (+23.6% over 1990-97), the decline in mutual banks (-13%
over 1993-97), and the government commitment towards the privatisation programme,
has increased pressure for a more efficient use of real and financial resources within the
system. Moreover, Italian banks have already improved their product offerings,
developed securities business and established investment fund management companies
able to compete with non-bank financial intermediaries. In the meantime, technological
change has opened up new ways for participants in financial markets to carry out
transactions in a more efficient and faster manner. Despite these developments,
important structural factors still hinder the process of modernisation and restructuring of
the system. Among these factors is the considerable decline in net income derived from
traditional banking activities, the significant increase in loan losses, and the rigidity of
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the labour element within total banking costs. Lastly, the magnitude of the profit
reduction and the persistence of poor profitability for some banks (especially for banks
based in certain geographical areas of the country and for specific bank types), seems to
suggest that the problems of Italian banks also stem from inefficient management
behaviour.
Chapter 4
Efficiency Analysis in Banking:
Theoretical Issues
and Selected Literature
4.1	 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to explain the rationale for examining cost
efficiency in banking. Section 4.2 outlines the microeconomics of the banking firm and
examines the debate about the input and output definition in banking. Section 4.3 covers
relevant theoretical issues relating to economies of scale, scope and X-efficiency, while
section 4.4 reviews the different methodologies used to estimate cost economies in
banking. Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 report select findings of US, European and Italian
empirical research on bank efficiency. The final section 4.5.6 investigates the
importance of including risk and output quality factors as arguments in the cost
function. In addition, this section also reviews the literature relating to the calculation of
potential correlates with estimated inefficiency measures. Section 4.6 is the conclusion.
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4.2
	
The Microeconomics of Bank Production: Defining Inputs
and Outputs
By definition, commercial banks are institutions whose operations consist mainly of
granting loans and receiving deposits from the non-bank sector. Moreover, according to
contemporary banking theory, the process of resource allocation is improved by
financial intermediaries through the following functions that banks perform [Freixas
and Rochet (1997)]: 1) offering access to a payment system; 2) transforming assets; 3)
managing risk; and 4) processing information and monitoring borrowers. In this sense,
banks are typically multi-product firms in that their activities include at least the
supplying of deposits, loans and securities, which in turn can be divided into various
classes and provided in geographically different markets. Moreover, many banking
services are jointly produced so that certain kinds of costs are jointly related in the
production of a variety of services.
While the multi-product nature of the banking firm is widely recognised, there is
still no agreement as to the explicit definition and measurement of banking inputs and
outputs. Usually, each definition carries with it a particular set of banking concepts,
relating to the production characteristics of the industry. In other words, when
evaluating bank efficiency, the way output is defined and measured may influence
considerably the results obtained [Berger and Humphrey (1997)].
Two main approaches are generally used to measure the flow of services provided
by financial institutions. In the "production" approach [see, for example, Bauer et al.
(1993); Favero and Papi (1995); Berger et al. (1997); Resti (1997a)], banks are treated
as firms that employ capital and labour to produce different types of deposit and loan
accounts. Hence, their outputs are measured by the number of deposits and loan
accounts or by the number of transactions performed on each type of product, whereas
total costs are the operating costs used to produce these products. The underlying
rationale is that depositors receive a service and banks employ resources to provide it:
deposits are treated as outputs because in accepting deposits banks provide customers
with value-added outputs in the form of clearing, record-keeping and security services.
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It follows that only physical inputs, such as labour and capital and their costs should be
included in the analysis.
Under the alternative "intermediation" approach [see, for example, Kaparakis et
al. (1994); Mester (1993 and 1996); Allen and Rai (1996); Molyneux et al. (1996);
Berger and Mester (1997)], banks are considered as intermediaries between liability
holders and those who receive bank funds, rather than producers of loan and deposit
account services. As a consequence, the values of loans and other assets are defined as
bank outputs, while deposits and other liabilities (capital and labour) are inputs to the
production process. It follows that operating costs and financial expenses (interest on
deposits) are the relevant components of total costs. Originally, this was the view of
Sealey and Lindley (1977) who developed a model consistent with the neoclassical
theory of the firm within which they analysed the role of production and costs for
depository financial institutions. Sealey and Lindley (1977) reckoned that the individual
banking firm's decision-making process focused on the production of earning assets
where "loanable funds" borrowed from depositors and serviced by the firm are inputs
together with labour and capital.
Other approaches have also been used to define bank inputs and outputs. Some
studies use the so-called value-added approach, where each category of assets or
liabilities may be identified as an important output, intermediate product or input,
according to whether they generate or destroy value [Berger and Humphrey (1990 and
1992a)]. In particular, Berger and Humphrey (1992a) found that deposits and loans
should be considered as-important outputs since they generate the largest share of value
added.
Other efficiency studies employ the user-cost approach, which determines
whether a final product is an input or an output on the basis of its net contribution to
bank revenue. This means that a transaction is defined as an output if the financial
return (asset) exceeds the opportunity cost of the funds, or else if the financial cost
(liability) is less than the opportunity cost of those funds [Berger and Humphrey
(1990)].
Another way to resolve the problem of output definition is to apply a dual
approach according to which deposits can behave both as inputs and outputs. Hancock
(1985) adopted this mixed solution which implies that demand deposits are outputs and
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time deposits are inputs to the production process. Similarly, Berger and Humphrey
(1991) and Bauer et al. (1993) considered the interest paid on deposits as part of total
costs while the rate paid is included as an input price.
Other researchers, such as Hughes and Mester (1991), empirically tested whether
deposits should be treated as an input or output and found that they should be treated as
inputs. 1 In an Italian study, Favero and Papi (1995) treated deposits first as inputs and
then as outputs and, by comparing the results, they found that in this latter case average
efficiency levels were higher.
The choice between the different input and output definitions cannot be a matter
of indifference for researchers analysing the production characteristics of banking firms
for several reasons. As argued by Forestieri (1993), banks that have, for instance, a large
share of retail deposits and banks operating at the wholesale level are necessarily
affected in different ways by this choice since interest costs may be more important for
the former. Berger et al. (1997) maintain that under most circumstances, the
intermediation approach is to be preferred for bank analyses because it is more inclusive
and it captures the essence of a bank as a financial intermediary. Despite this, they
reckon that in analyses at the branch level, the production approach may be more
appropriate because branches act primarily as producers of depositor services on behalf
of the bank which then invests the funds in various assets.
As discussed later in this chapter, many efficiency studies in banking adopt a cost
function approach. The cost function implies that the minimum cost of producing bank
output in a given period of time is a function of the quantity of bank output produced
during that period. It follows that the actual measurement of output is a controversial
'The test formulated by Hughes and Mester (1991) involved the estimation of a translog variable cost
function (VC) in which labour (P 1 ), capital (P2) and other borrowed money (P3) were treated as inputs,
while uninsured deposits (U D) and insured deposits (ID) were entered as levels. Given that
VC = f(Q,,S,K,P,, P2 , P3 , D), where Q, are the outputs, S is the average volume of non-performing
loans and K is the financial capital, the sign of the first derivative of VC with respect to Up and ID will
indicate whether deposits should be treated as inputs or outputs in the following way. If UD and ID are
outputs, then these derivatives should be positive because the outputs can significantly be increased only
if expenditures on inputs are increased. If UD and ID are inputs, then these derivatives should be negative
because by increasing the use of some input, the expenditure on other inputs should decrease.
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matter as well. This is because financial services firms' output cannot be measured
simply by physical quantities because banks provide a wide array of services from low-
risk assets to the running of investment portfolios and off-balance sheet activities.
Usually, for multi-product financial firms two possible ways of measuring output
can be identified: i) a scalar measure aggregating different products; or ii) a
disaggregated vector of outputs. As Forestieri (1993) emphasises, the main
disadvantage of approach i) is that it allows a clearer definition and easier measurement
of economies of scale, but it does not capture information on the relevant scope
economies. In the latter case and in order for this approach to be feasible it is required
that the number of products is small because of both the difficulties accounted with the
estimation of the multi-product cost function, and the limitations on the quality of
accounting cost data. For example, studies choosing the production approach use
numbers of accounts as proxies for numbers of transactions, since numbers of
transactions are often difficult to obtain [see for example Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and
Ferrier et al. (1993)]. On the other hand, Resti (1997a, p. 224) observes that inputs and
outputs should always be flow variables but, "since data on physical quantities [such as
the number of checks cashed, or loans issued] are not always available, one can resort to
stock variables such as the average amount of deposits and loans, since they
continuously require [and therefore are a proxy for] the production of payment and
liquidity services, and the monitoring of credit decisions".
To summarise, at present the definition and measurement of inputs and outputs in
banking still represents- a controversial matter. The problem of output definition will be
further examined in Chapter 5 where the features of the intermediation approach — the
output definition used in the empirical analysis — are discussed.
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4.3	 Cost Efficiency in Banking: Defining Economies of Scale,
Economies of Scope and X-efficiencies
The study of bank efficiency is considered important for a number of contemporaneous
policy issues. From the point of view of business strategy, it is clearly important for
management to know and understand the factors determining cost efficiency in order to
understand the firms' own profit maximising and/or growth conditions. Berger and
Humphrey (1997) emphasise that the information obtained by separating those
production units that by some standard perform well from those that perform poorly can
be used either: i) to inform government policy by assessing the effects of deregulation,
mergers, or market structure on efficiency; ii) to address research issues by describing
the efficiency of an industry, ranking its firms, or checking how measured efficiency
may be related to the different efficiency technique employed; or iii) to improve
managerial performance by identifying best practices and worst practices associated
with high and low measured efficiency, respectively, and encouraging the former
practices while discouraging the latter.
Berger and Mester (1997) observe that for the purposes of public policy research
and managerial performance, once the conceptual and measurement issues have been
controlled for, it is important to explain the remaining differences in efficiency across
banks. They argue that in a perfectly competitive or contestable market, efficient firms
should drive out inefficient ones, so that there would be only a residual level of
inefficiency across firms remaining at a given time. Therefore, an empirical finding of
substantial inefficiencies raises the question as to whether inefficiencies will continue in
a deregulated and more competitive context. Moreover, for antitrust and merger analysis
it is important to know: i) the effects of market concentration and past mergers on
banking efficiency; ii) whether one type of organisational form is more efficient than
another; and iii) whether inefficiency manifests itself in the form of poor production
decisions, risk management decisions, or both.
From a public policy perspective, concern about the economic efficiency of banks
is also rationalised on the grounds that the efficiency of individual banks may affect
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"the stability of the banking industry and, in turn, the effectiveness of the monetary
system" [Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987, P. 29)].
In practice, the possibility of a systemic risk is often suggested as a main
motivation for regulation, and regulation in its turn can and does affect the efficiency
with which banks produce financial services. 2 Therefore, this concern about banks'
efficiency can also be explained by the fact that banks have always performed a special
role in the economic system compared with other financial intermediaries and
commercial firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, a fundamental question that arises in the
study of banking is what distinguishes financial institutions, and especially banks, from
commercial firms. That is why, for example, the failure of a large bank may have more
serious effects on the economy than the failure of a large car producer [Saunders
(1994)].
Various studies of mergers, agency problems, corporate governance, branching
strategies, foreign ownership, etc. offer support for a number of explanations of banks'
inefficiency. As will be discussed later in the following sections, one should distinguish
between cost advantages resulting from the scale and scope of production and other
important aspects of efficiency, such as X-efficiency and its decomposition into, for
example, allocative and technical efficiency.
2 The regulatory policies of the banking authorities are primarily concerned about bank "safety and
soundness". Therefore, they influence bank's risk (variability of return) and return (profitability) position
"by permitting banks to hold only a limited amount of fixed assets and requiring them to have both
adequate liquidity and adequate capital" [Sinkey (1992, p. 40)]. In particular, capital adequacy is among
the most important factors affecting the riskiness (variability) of overall measures of bank performance
such as return on assets (RCA) and return on equity (ROE = RCA x EM). It is to note that EM represents
the Equity Multiplier, which is the reciprocal of the capital-to-assets ratio and is often referred to as
financial leverage (i.e. the use of deposit financing by a bank).
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4.3.1	 Economies of Scale
Economies of scale occur when a firm is able to reduce costs per unit of output as the
firm gets bigger. Economies of scale are based on the shape of the average cost curve,
which shows average costs at each level of output [Molyneux et al. (1996)]. In other
words, scale economies occur when the average cost of production in the long run
declines as output increases [(Sinkey (1992)]. In order to isolate the effect of scale on
costs, all other factors (such as technological improvements) have to be held constant.
Potential sources of cost economies in banking are usually based on the following
considerations [Forestieri (1993)]:
• Information Technology [Revell (1984); Humphrey (1985); Hunter and Timme
(1986); Evanoff et al. (1990); Landi (1990)]. As the firm's size increases, IT
allows for a greater efficiency because of: i) imperfect divisibility of investments;
ii) high professional skills necessary to integrate complex technologies; iii) a more
flexible production process which may reduce scale barriers; iv) a more general
effect on efficiency associated with technological innovation.
• Specialised labour [Bell and Murphy (1968); Clark (1988); Muldur (1991)]. A
larger bank in terms of size is able to employ more technical and managerial
labour, thereby achieving a more efficient organisational form, while favouring
expansion into innovative business.
• Information [Arrow (1965); Williamson (1975); Berger et al. (1987); Shaffer
(1991); Humphrey (1991)]. Financial intermediaries have a fundamental role in
mitigating the asymmetric distribution of information between borrowers and
lenders. Therefore, as they grow in size and intensify their diversification, they
can lower delegation costs.
• Strategic and organisational flexibility [Muldur (1990); Berger et al. (1987);
Gilbert and Steinherr (1989); Litan (1987); Berger et al. (1998)]. The
consequences of increased size may be: i) improved flexibility and greater cost
minimisation; ii) fixed costs can be managed more efficiently; iii) the
diversification of assets and liabilities can reduce income variability. On the other
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hand, drawbacks which are likely to be incurred as the firm grows larger include
an increase in organisational complexity and wider diversification may actually
aggravate risk since it may result in an entry into a business area in which the
financial institution has no experience.
. Demand side benefits [Herring and Santomero (1990)]. If consumers have a
"package-acquisition behaviour", demand side benefits may favour output
diversification, thereby benefiting consumers through cost savings or in terms of
the perception of a quality advantage from entertaining a global relationship.
Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) divide the causes of increasing returns to scale into
the following four categories: 0 indivisibility, or unavoidable excess capacity of some
inputs: for example, the cost of inventing a new technique is indivisible with respect to
the level of output produced by using the technique. That is, a bank may have excess
capacity of some inputs for most of the year, so that an increase in all outputs may not
require a proportionate increase in all inputs for the entire year; ii) the inverse
relationship between the productivity of some inputs and their cost per unit of
productivity: that is, many inputs cost less when they are purchased on a larger scale;
iii) specialisation of the production process: greater specialisation and reduction in per
unit cost is possible with increases in size; and iv) a statistical property of large
numbers: as a firm expands sales, the appropriate quantity of inventory to be maintained
need not be increased proportionately, because the demand of goods is spread across a
greater number of customers. In this sense, larger banks should incur lower costs of
holding cash balances than do small banks.
A bank is said to be producing at constant returns to scale if, for a given mix of
products, a proportionate increase in all its outputs would increase its costs in the same
proportion; this is also the point where the average cost of production is minimised. A
bank is operating with scale economies if a proportionate increase in its outputs would
lead to a less than proportionate increase in cost — the bank could produce more
efficiently by increasing its output level. On the other hand, scale diseconomies arise
when a proportionate increase in bank outputs would lead to a more than proportionate
increase in costs — the bank could produce more efficiently by reducing its output level.
These alternative relationships between costs and output are shown in Figure 4.1. It
Rising costs diseconomies of scale)
U-shaped cost curve
	 Constant costs
Declining costs
(economies of scale)
Source: Sinkey (1992, p. 306).
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should be noted that the U-shaped cost curve represents a cost function exhibiting all
three of these cost characteristics.
Figure 4.1	 Economies of Scale and the Shape of Average Cost Curves
Average Cost
While the concept of economies of scale in a single product firm applies to the
behaviour of total costs as output increases (and economies of scale exist if total costs
increase less proportionately than output), for multi-product firms the concept of
average cost is more complicated. Average cost is defined only for single-product firms,
unless all products are aggregated into a single index [Sinkey (1992)1. Thus, in order to
measure scale economies for financial services firms, it is necessary to refer to another
notion of cost, the Ray Average Cost (RAC) which was introduced by Baumol et al. in
1982. It requires that firms expand all outputs at the same rate while mixing inputs
optimally. In this case, economies of scale occur if the RAC of composite output
decreases. As pointed out by Baumol et al. (1988), the term RAC refers to the geometry
of the construct and it is essential that an arbitrary unit output along the ray is chosen. In
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this way, the average cost of a composite good can be defined as: RAC = C(tylt ,
where y° is the unit bundle for a particular mixture of outputs (the arbitrary bundle
assigned the value 1) and t is the number of units in the bundle y=t y°.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the concept of RAC for a multi-product firm in a three-
dimensional diagram [Baumol et al. (1988)1. The ray average cost of producing the
output vector Q # 0, denoted RAC(Q) is as TC(Q)1Ein=1 Qi . Ray average cost is said to
be increasing (decreasing) at Q if RAC(tQ) is an increasing (decreasing) function of a
scalar t, at t = 1. Ray average cost is said to be minimised at Q if RAC(Q)< RAC(ta
for all positive t # 1. It is important to note that the unit output along the ray is arbitrary.
Geometrically, the concept of RAC is illustrated in Figure 4.2, which also shows the
behaviour of total cost (TC) along the ray OR.
Figure 4.2	 Economies of Scale for Multi-Product Firms:
The Concept of RAC
Source: Adapted from Baumol et al. (1988, p. 50).
Chapter 4 • Efficiency Analysis in Banking: Theoretical Issues and Selected Literature 	 100
It is possible to see that RAC and TC intersect at the unit output level Q° and RAC
reaches its minimum at the output Q = Q m at which the ray OT is tangent to the total
cost surface in the hyperplane erected on OR. Therefore, if e is the elasticity of RAC(tq)
with respect to t at the output point Q, then, at Q scale economies over the entire
product set (SCALE) = 1/(1+e). It follows that it is possible to interpret SCALE as a
measure of the percentage change of decline or increase of RAC with respect to output.
Thus, returns to scale at the output point Q are increasing, decreasing or locally constant
(SCALE>l, SCALE<1, SCALE=1, respectively) as the elasticity of RAC at Q is
negative, positive or zero, respectively.
Economies of scale can also relate to overall and product- specific scale
economies whilst holding the other factors constant. Overall economies of scale relate
to cost savings resulting from an increase in all of a firm's output and can be detected
by declining average costs as the firm increases production while keeping the product
mix constant. If average costs rise with output, diseconomies of scale are present. More
specifically, economies of scale are measured by the ratio of the percentage change in
costs relative to the percentage change in output: when the scale economies ratio is less
than one, scale economies exist, as average cost is falling. When the ratio is equal to
one, no scale economies exist, as average cost is constant and, finally, when the ratio is
greater than one, decreasing return to scale exist as average cost is rising.
Product- specific economies of scale refer to economies that arise from an
increase in the production of individual products. For instance, they can be measured to
determine whether the output of certain products should be increased, although it is
difficult to change the output of one product while holding constant the output of other
products.
Freixas and Rochet (1997) argue that the reason why borrowers do not engage in
asset transformation is because there are economies in the intermediation process. These
economies are brought about by the transaction costs associated with linking savers to
borrowers. These include monetary transaction costs as well as search, monitoring and
auditing costs. Moreover, if associated with a rational risk spreading, scale economies
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may result in lower loan rates, and may diminish the problems of information
asymmetries and moral hazard with lenders (i.e. the so-called scale economies in the
monitoring activity)
Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) point out that scale economies do not continue
indefinitely with the expansion of size. As the scale of operation increases, there comes
a point at which limitations to efficient management set in and long run marginal costs
tend to rise. This fact explains why many firms may find it necessary to decentralise
operations in order to avoid the costs of organisational rigidity that largeness entails.
Therefore, the firm (bank) may decide to decentralise functions by dividing its
operations into separate branches to the point at which no cost gains are available from
large-scale operations.
Finally, it is useful to mention that it is possible to distinguish between branch and
firm level scale economies. In particular, a number of studies separate scale economies
at the single branch office or plant level from those for all offices together [Benston et
al. (1982) and Humphrey (1985)1. The importance of these approaches, comes from the
fact that banks can expand their operations or output by either increasing services to
existing branch networks in a given market, or adding new branches, which attract new
accounts and deposits, in new market areas [Molyneux et a/. (1996)].
4.3.2	 Economies of Scope
Economies of scope refers to the case where the joint production of two (or more)
products by a single firm is less costly than the sum of their separate production by two
(or more) firms. For banks, this means that cost savings are available through the joint
production of financial services.
Considering two goods, Q 1 and Q2 , economies of scope exist when the total costs
(TC) of producing the two goods jointly is less than the combined cost of producing the
same amounts of each good separately. That is:
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TC(Q1,Q2) < TC 1 (Qi ) + TC2(Q2)
	
(4.1)
Conversely, there are said to be diseconomies of scope if joint production is more
costly than independent production.
Following Baumol et al. (1988) the concept of economies of scope can be
explained geometrically in Figure 4.3. The figure illustrates that the scope economies
concept involves a comparison of TC(Q 1* ,0)+ TC(0,Q; ), the sum of the height of the
cost surface over the corresponding points on the axes, with TC(Q: ,Q;), the height of
the cost surface at point (, Q; ), which is the vector sum of (Q: ,0) and (0, Q;). If
TC(Q:, Q *2 ) lies below the hyperplane OAB which goes through the origin and points
TC(Q: ,0) and TC(0,Q; ), then the condition for scope economies is satisfied. Thus in
Figure 4.3 the height of D, the point on plane OAB above (Q: ,Q;) must equal
TC(Q: ,0)+TC(0,Q;) since the hyperplane is described by TC = aQ, + bQ 2 for some
constants a, b. Therefore, TC(Q: ,0)= aa* and TC(0,Q;)= bQ; , and TCO: ,Q;) must
be less than aQ: + bQ; for scope economies to hold.
Given for example only two outputs Q 1 and Q2, the degree of overall economies of
scope can be measured as follows:
TC,(Q, ,0) + TC2 (0, Q2 ) —TC(Q1 , Q2) SCOPE —
TC(Q1, Q2 )
(4.2)
where SCOPE > 0 indicates overall economies of scope and SCOPE <0 indicates
diseconomies of scope.
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Figure 4.3	 The Concept of Economies of Scope
TC (Q1 . , Q2*)
TC (Q 1 . ,0) ///
•
TC (0, Q2..)
••••42
•
(0, Q2.)
	pp. Q2
(Q1 • , 0) (Q1 * , Q2.*)
Source: Adapted from Baumol et al. (1988, p. 72).
Global economies of scope are achieved when for a given product mix, the total
costs from joint production of all products in the product mix are less than the sum of
the costs of producing each product independently. On the other hand, product- specific
economies of scope refer to economies that arise from the joint production of a
particular product with other products. If by adding a particular product to a given
product mix, the efficiency of production is improved, then there exist product- specific
economies of scope. Such economies may result from joint production efficiencies with
one or more products.
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In order to determine which product pairs result in joint production efficiencies,
cost complementarities between all pairs of products can also be computed. By
definition, if the marginal cost of producing one product declines when it is produced
jointly with another product, then a cost complementarity exists. In this context, Sinkey
(1992), for instance, attributes the existence of economies of scope to interproduct or
cost complementarities, which are defined as to the extent to which the cost of
producing a particular financial service or product (e.g. deposits) may vary with the
output levels of other products or services (e.g. loans). Nonetheless, the cost
complementarities estimates reported by various authors have been extensively
criticised for example by Berger et al. (1987) on the grounds that the conditions under
which these imply scope economies are restrictive, especially when a translog cost
function is specified.
Berger et al. (1987) developed two new scale and product mix measures —
expansion path scale economies and expansion path subadditivity — which compare the
cost effectiveness of firms that differ in both scale and product mix simultaneously. The
expansion path measure examines competitive challenges from firms currently
represented in the data, as opposed to the standard ray scale and scope economy
measures, which examine competition from firms that all have the same product mix or
firms that all specialise completely. Mester (1994) stressed the fact that not only are
there a number of potential sources of scope economies (one is the sharing of inputs to
produce several outputs) but, above all, there is an interconnection between scale and
scope economies.
	 -
In addition, Berger et al. (1987, p. 503) point out that "costs may be saved or
revenues improved by supplying joint output" due to the following: i) spreading fixed
costs: if excess capacity exists, fixed or quasi fixed costs may be spread over an
expanded product mix; ii) information economies: once information on customer's
deposits and loans is gathered, it may be reused on other types of loans and services; iii)
risk reduction: not only do banks carry out asset diversification and asset liability
maturity matching, but they may also be willing to incur additional operating and
interest costs in order to reduce risk; and iv) customer cost economies: if demand
deposits, savings accounts, and loan services are situated jointly, it may be possible to
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reduce customer-incurred banking costs even if bank-incurred costs are increased, to the
extent that revenues are raised.
Molyneux et al. (1996) identify two groups of potential economies of scope.
Firms can realise internal scope economies through joint production and marketing,
whereas consumers can realise external scope economies through joint consumption
that arises when consumers save time and expenses by finding different products and
services at a single location.
The main problems in estimating economies of scope are generally linked to the
techniques adopted for their evaluation, the insufficiency of data on firms that
specialise, and the risk of using data that are not on the efficient frontier, thus confusing
scope economies and X-efficiencies. Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) attempted to
deal with these difficulties by introducing the concept of "optimal scope economies",
based on the profit function, which examines whether it is optimal from a profitability
standpoint, to produce all the products as opposed to specialising in one or more of
them. The concept of optimal scope economies differs from standard scope economies
because this latter compares the costs of joint versus specialised production of an
observed output bundle without determining whether that bundle is optimal from the
point of view of profit maximisation.
As far as the multi-product banking industry is concerned, the presence of
significant economies of scope raises a twofold problem of public policy and business
strategy [Forestieri (1993)]. More specifically, when economies of scope are prevalent
in banking markets, there will be a trend toward concentration of the market in a few
large well-diversified financial institutions. Moreover, the presence of economies of
scope also represents an indispensable factor for the decision-makers in terms of
strategies concerning the specialisation or diversification of financial firms. In addition,
regulators may face the trade-off between the cost advantages potentially enjoyed by
consumers and the possible negative consequences for the consumers of a process of
concentration in the industry.
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4.3.3	 X-Efficiencies
Over the last decade many researchers, especially in the US, have focused their
attentions on modelling technical and allocative efficiencies of individual firms as
opposed to scale and scope economies. This is because the rapid changes in the banking
market and the effects of deregulation have increased the importance of differences in
managerial ability to control costs or maximise revenues. The concept of X-inefficiency
was first introduced by Leibenstein (1966) who noted that, for a number of different
reasons, people and organisations generally work neither as hard nor as effectively as
they could.
Some fifteen years later, Leibenstein (1980, p. 27) stated that: "X-efficiency is not
the same as what is frequently referred to as technical efficiency, since X-efficiency
may arise for reasons outside the knowledge or the capability of managers attempting to
do the managing. It may arise for reasons entirely outside the firm, or for reasons having
to do with choices made by employees who are not themselves managers [...] By X-
inefficiencies we have in mind decisions and processes of implementation, that are non-
optimal, and which are an inherent part of organisational life. The basic point of the
theory that has been developed around the concept of X-efficiency is that firms do not
minimise costs and, indirectly, do not maximise profits".
Considering the two components of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency,
X-efficiency relates to Whether a firm is using its inputs, like labour and capital, in a
cost-effective manner — that is, for a given level and mix of outputs, the bank is
producing in the cheapest way possible. Otherwise, the bank is either wasting some of
the inputs it has purchased, or it is using the wrong combination of inputs to produce its
outputs. The allocative (or price) component refers to the ability to combine inputs and
outputs in optimal proportions given the prevailing prices. In other words, an
allocatively inefficient bank is operating on its production possibility frontier: that is,
given the inputs it has chosen, it is producing as much output as possible, but the bank
could lower its costs of producing that output by selecting a different input mix. In
contrast, the technical (or physical) component refers to the ability to avoid waste by
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producing as much output as input usage allows, or by using as little input as output
production allows. It follows that a bank that is technically inefficient is said to be
operating within its "production possibility frontier", which delinates the maximum
amount of output that can be produced with a given amount of inputs [Lovell (1993)
and Mester (1994)]. It is obvious that a bank can be both technically and allocatively
inefficient.'
The literature on frontier production, cost functions and the calculation of
efficiency measures began with Farrell (1957). He suggested that technical efficiency
could usefully be analysed in terms of realised deviations from an idealised, frontier
isoquant. Farrell (1957, p. 254) investigated a firm employing two factors of production,
x1 and x2 , to produce an output flow y, under conditions of constant returns to scale. In
Figure 4.4, the isoquant SS' represents the various combinations of the two factors that a
perfectly efficient firm might use to produce unit output ( y =1). The isocost AA' is
obtained from the expression C = wi z, + w2 x2 where {vtil , w2 } is the vector of
exogenous prices of factor inputs x i
 and x2.
In Figure 4.4 the point Q represents a technical efficient firm using the two factors
to produce output in the same ratio as P though it can be seen that it produces the same
output as P using only a fraction OQI0P as much of each factor. It could also be
thought of as producing OPIOQ times as much output from the same inputs. The
technical inefficiency of the firm P can be defined as OQI0P. This ratio takes the
value unity (or 100 per cent) for a perfectly efficient firm, and will become indefinitely
small if the amounts of input per unit of output become indefinitely large. Moreover, so
3 See also a recent study by Coelli et al. (1998). It is noteworthy that Berger Hancock and Humphrey
(1993) in their first attempt to apply a profit function for calculating X-efficiencies also devised and
implemented a new method of decomposing total X-inefficiency into allocative and technical
components. They define allocative efficiency as the loss of profits from choosing a poor production plan,
and model this as the effect of basing decisions on shadow prices instead of actual prices. On the other
hand, technical inefficiencies are defined as the loss of profits from failing to meet this production plan.
Other relevant studies on output allocative and technical efficiency are Aly et al. (1990) and English et al.
(1993).
Chapter 4 • Efficiency Analysis in Banking: Theoretical Issues and Selected Literature 	 108
long as SS' has a negative slope, an increase in the input per unit output of one factor
will, ceteris paribus, imply lower technical efficiency.
However, the point Q represents a technical efficient firm and not an allocatively
efficient one because the conditions for cost minimisation are not observed. Therefore,
the optimal method of production is now point Q' (where the technical rate of
substitution equals the factor price ratio). The costs of producing at Q' will only be a
fraction ORIOQ of those at Q. This ratio can be defined as the price (or allocative)
efficiency of Q.
Figure 4.4	 Farrell Measure of Technical Efficiency
Xi
Source: Adapted from Farrell (1957, p. 254).
Further, if the observed firm were to change the proportions of its inputs until they
were the same as those represented by Q', while keeping its technical efficiency
constant, its costs would be reduced by a factor ORIOQ , so long as factor prices did
not change. It is therefore reasonable to let this ratio measure also the price efficiency of
the observed firm P. This argument is not entirely conclusive as it is impossible to say
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what will happen to the technical efficiency of a firm as it changes the proportions of its
inputs, but with this qualification it seems the best operational measure available. It also
has the desirable property of giving the same price efficiency to firms using the factors
in the same proportions. If the observed firm were perfectly efficient, both technically
and in respect of prices, its costs would be a fraction OR/OP of what they in fact are. It
is convenient to call this ratio the overall efficiency of the firm, and one may note that it
is equal to the product of the technical and price efficiencies [Farrell (1957, p. 254)] and
that it is an absolute measure and not a relative one of global efficiency.
By the mid-eighties, Humphrey (1987) added a new dimension to the existing
literature on bank costs with his notion of cost dispersion. Humphrey noted that the
observed variation in costs among banks could be divided into two components: i) scale
or cost economies across different-sized banks and ii) cost differences between
similarly-sized banks. He concentrated on the second type of variation and reported that
the difference in average cost between banks with the highest costs and banks with the
lowest costs was two to four times greater than the observed variation in average costs
across bank size classes. The study reported the considerable cost dispersion that exists
across similar size banks. Dispersion was greatest for the smallest classes of banks, and
fell as banking groups became larger. Given these results, Humphrey concluded that
"the existence of bank scale economies (or diseconomies) should have little competitive
impact relative to those competitive effects which already exist as a result of large
differences in cost levels" [Humphrey (1987, p. 24)]. In other words, Humphrey (1987)
attempted to provide arexplanation of X-efficiencies in US banking by examining the
dispersion in average costs of banks within similar-sized banks. It should be noted that
bank average cost (defined as total operating and interest expenses per dollar of assets)
was computed for over 13,000 US banks in 1980, 1982 and 1984. (Data on these
institutions were collected from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Report of
Income and Dividends).
According to more recent studies, scale and scope economies in banking appear to
be small compared with the level of X-efficiencies. Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993)
emphasise that while scale and scope efficiencies account for nearly 5% of bank costs,
average X-inefficiencies account for approximately 20% of costs (as a result of the
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application of parametric approaches) and may range from less than 10% to over 50%
(in non-parametric approaches). In short, banking X-efficiencies may be over 400
percent more significant than corresponding scale and scope efficiencies. As shown in
Chapter 2, reducing X-inefficiencies is among the core objectives in the process of
European banking sector harmonisation. Moreover, as Leibenstein (1980, p. 33)
stressed, "starting with high degrees of X-inefficiencies, competition creates pressures
to reduce X-inefficiency [...]".
To summarise, X-inefficiencies represent the differences in managerial ability to
control costs or maximise revenues. However, managerial inability is not the only
source of X-inefficiency. Resti (1997a) suggests that observable production plans and
cost levels usually do not follow from perfectly rational and efficient decisions; such
factors as errors, lags between the choice of the plan and its implementation, inertia in
human behaviour and distorted communications and uncertainty might cause X-
inefficiencies to drive real data away from the optimum.
Finally, it is of interest to point out that it is also possible that bank management
may have goals that differ from those of the bank's shareholders [for instance, Mester
(1994)]. On the one hand, shareholders want to maximise the stock market value of the
bank, and thereby its long-run profits; on the other hand, a bank's managers might be
interested in something other than cost minimisation. For instance, managers may desire
a larger staff because they think that it gives them more prestige within the banking
community. Therefore, a bank might use an inefficient combination of inputs (in this
case more labour than-necessary) to produce its services. Such a situation is known as
expense preference behaviour on the part of managers [see, for instance, Cebenoyan et
al. (1993) on the agency-related inefficiency problems in the US thrift industry].
Despite the large volume of research on modelling X-inefficiencies since its
introduction in the 1960s, up until recently, there has been relatively little research on
the European banking market. Moreover, there is still no consensus as to the best
method for evaluating X-inefficiencies. The next section focuses on the different
techniques currently available to calculate cost efficiency in banking. The main
literature is reviewed in section 4.5.
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4.4	 Different Approaches to Measuring Efficiency
Over the last twenty years, a number of different methodologies and techniques have
evolved for estimating cost efficiency in banking. This section examines these main
approaches focusing on the most recent developments.
4.4.1	 Parametric v. Non-Parametric and Deterministic v.
Stochastic
Efficiency analysis has developed over the last twenty years mainly along two separate
streams. On the one hand, econometric studies have aimed at improving the standard
OLS estimates with the addition of an asymmetric structure for the residuals in order to
account for the distance between empirical observations and the theoretical efficient
frontier. On the other hand, linear programming algorithms have also been used for the
evaluation of the relative efficiency of multi-product/multi-input firms [see, for
example, Resti (1997a)].
As shown in Figure 4.5, these methodologies (that have been applied to many
areas besides banking), fall roughly into four interrelated categories: parametric, non-
parametric, deterministic and stochastic. Both the parametric and non-parametric
techniques can be either deterministic or stochastic. Equally, deterministic and
stochastic frontiers can be either parametric or non-parametric [for example, Simar
(1997)].
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Figure 4.5
	 Types of Frontiers
PARAMETRIC4 t
DETERMINISTIC	 STOCHASTIC4 t
NON-PARAMETRIC
Parametric models are characterised by the fact that an explicit functional form
that presupposes the shape of the frontier for the production function, cost function or
profit function is assumed. For example, parametric frontiers have often been specified
in the form of: Constant Elasticity of Substitution or CES [Arrow et al. (1961)] models;
Cobb Douglas [Aigner and Chu (1968)]; Leontief [Diewert (1971)]; transcendental
logarithmic (translog) [Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973)].4.5
In contrast, with non-parametric models no functional form (other than linear
interpolation between certain data points) is specified or estimated. With these methods,
the best-practice banks are actually positioned on the frontier while the other banks are
less efficient relative icr them. These techniques include Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) [Chamer, Cooper and Rhodes (1978)] and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH)
approach [Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984)].
4 Other functional forms have also been specified in the literature. Examples are: the Box—Cox
transformations of the translog model [Clark (1984); Lanciotti and Raganelli (1988)1; Mester's (1992)
estimation of a hybrid translog function [see also Molyneux et al. (1996)]; and the estimation of a Fuss
normalised quadratic variable profit function by Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993).
5
It should be noted that the Fourier-flexible is often referred to as semi-nonparametric because it
combines a standard translog form with the non-parametric Fourier form [see Gallant (1981, 1982 and
1984)].
Stochastic I
Deterministic I
0
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As mentioned above, both parametric and non-parametric frontiers may be
specified in a deterministic or stochastic context. Figure 4.5 shows the differences
between stochastic and deterministic frontiers: the former assumes that e i (the error
term) is a two-component error term, the latter does not capture all the reality because
the error term is one sided and no statistical noise can be inferred from the estimation.
The deterministic and stochastic parametric frontiers are employed in the
literature to estimate parameters to be used to estimate economies of scale and scope.
Moreover, the employment of the stochastic frontier allows for the measurement of X-
efficiency levels. However, recent studies on scale and scope efficiency derived from
deterministic frontiers have been criticised on the grounds that they should be estimated
only on the X-efficient frontier where "they are properly defined" [Berger, Hunter and
Timme (1993, p. 227)].
Figure 4.6
	 Deterministic v. Stochastic Frontiers (In Terms of Ei)
tti
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At present the best-known parametric technique for deriving efficiency measures
is probably the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) (also known in the literature as
Econometric Frontier Approach, EFA). Other parametric techniques include: i) the
Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), which assumes that deviations from predicted costs
within the lowest average-cost quartile of banks in a size class represent a random error,
while deviations in predicted costs between the highest and the lowest quartiles
represent inefficiency [Berger and Humphrey (1991 and 1992a), Bauer et al. (1993);
Berger (1993)]; and ii) the Distribution Free Approach (DFA); which assumes that the
efficiency differences are stable over time, while random error averages out over time
[Berger (1993); Berger and Humphrey (1992b)]. DFA may be used when panel data are
available because some distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier can be
relaxed (see the next section for more details).
Non-parametric techniques have also started to be widely applied to banking data.
However, Kaparakis et al. (1994, p. 877) observed that, "non-parametric versions [of
stochastic frontiers] remain in their embryonic stage and uncertainty surrounds the
statistical properties of the obtained estimates. Parametric versions, on the other hand,
are better developed and have an extensive track record".
The most common non-parametric methodologies applied for the derivation of
productive efficiency levels in banking are DEA and the FDH approach. These
methodologies are usually deterministic and this is often considered as a critical
drawback. This is because while imposing less structure on the frontier, the non-
parametric approach does not allow for random error. Only recently have stochastic
non-parametric models been applied to estimate X-efficiencies in the banking industry
[see, for instance, a simulated analysis with stochastic DEA by Resti (1997b)].
DEA dominates the non-parametric methodologies. It is called data envelopment
analysis because the data on best practice banks literally 'envelop' the data for the rest
of the banks in the sample. The DEA frontier is formed as a linear combination that
connects a set of best-practice observations yielding a convex production possibility set.
As discussed above, the DEA is a linear programming technique which generally
assumes that there are no random fluctuations, so that all deviations from the estimated
frontier represent inefficiency [Rangan et al. (1988); Ferrier and Lovell (1990);
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990)]. As a consequence, the estimates of inefficiency derived
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from non-parametric studies are usually higher (in the order of 20 to 50 percent)
compared, for example, with stochastic frontier estimates.
The other main non-parametric approach is the FDH methodology, which can be
defined as a special case of the DEA model where the hypothesis of convexity of the
production possibility set is dropped. Since the FDH frontier is either congruent with or
interior to the DEA frontier, it typically generates larger estimates of average efficiency
than DEA [Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) and Tulkens (1993)].
It is difficult to determine which of the two major approaches (parametric and
non-parametric) dominates the other since the true level of efficiency is unknown. At
present most studies use either stochastic parametric frontiers or deterministic non-
parametric models to measure cost efficiency in banking. Several studies employ them
both despite the fact that they have quite distinct methodological assumptions [see, for
example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990); Bauer et al. (1993); Berger and Mester (1997);
Resti (1997a); Casu and Girardone (1998)].
4.4.2	 Efficiency Analysis and the Use of Panel Data
Another important issue in efficiency analysis concerns the choice of the model when
data are available for several periods. The aim of this section is to give a brief overview
of panel data analysis ind to highlight the most important advantages of employing
panel models in calculating efficiencies over time.
Panel data models refer to the pooling of observations of a number of firms i over
t time periods. In other words, for each variable used the data concerns i banks, and for
each bank there are t observations equal to the length of the period under study [see, for
instance, Battese and Coelli (1988); Kumbhalcar (1990); Cornwell et al. (1990); Greene
(1993a); Baltagi (1995); Coelli et al. (1998)].
It is common to distinguish between fixed and random effect panel data. The fixed
effect model generally assumes that differences across units can be captured in
differences in the constant term. Therefore, as pointed out for example by Greene
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(1993a), this is a reasonable approach when the differences between units can be viewed
as parametric shift of the regression function. Otherwise, it might be more appropriated
to view individual specific constant term as randomly distributed across cross-sectional
units (random effect model). The component that represents the random disturbance
characterising the ith observation is assumed to be constant through time. It should be
noted that the random effect model typically requires the independence between the
exogenous variables and the individual noise (in the present context, the level of
inefficiency).
Several important advantages associated with the use of panel-data in production
analysis are as follows [see Greene (1993a) and Baltagi (1995)]:
• Panel data give more informative data and more variability than time series and
cross-sections because they have more observations. Thus, the estimated
parameters tend to be more efficient since there are greater degrees of freedom
and less collinearity among the variables.
• The use of panel data allows for a control on individual heterogeneity of the firms
under study. In fact, when specifying a model it is possible to omit important
variables for various reasons, such as difficulties in measurement.
• By repeating the observations on the same banks over time, it is possible to obtain
further information that "compensates" the elimination of omitted variables when
these variables are time-invariant.6
• The econometrits of panel data allows for taking into account possible
unobserved effects, which are constant with time, but are different among banks
(and which would produce distorted cross-sections).
• Panel data permit the simultaneous investigation of both technical change and
technical efficiency change over time, given that technical change is defined by an
6 These variables can therefore be included in the model as individual effects. If it is assumed that the
individual effects are fixed, it is possible to obtain estimates for the parameters that are not distorted. If it
is assumed that the individual effects are random, it is possible to achieve consistent estimates by using
further hypotheses on the correlation structure between random effects and the regressors [Greene
(1993a)].
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appropriate parametric model and the technical efficiency effects in the frontier
model are stochastic and have the specified distribution [Kumbhakar (1990);
Hancock (1991); and Coelli et al. (1998)]. Moreover, technical efficiency is better
studied and modelled with panels than purely cross-section or time-series data
[see also, Baltagi and Griffin (1988); Cornwell et al. (1990); Kumbhakar (1990,
1991, 1993); Baltagi (1995)].
The use of panel data for measuring production relationships dates back to
Mundlak (1961). Some twenty years later, Pitt and Lee (1981) suggested the use of
panel data for the estimation of a stochastic frontier and thus for measuring the
efficiency of firms. Specifically, Pitt and Lee (1981) specified the panel-data version of
the Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) half-normal model.
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) defined systematically the link between the literature
on stochastic frontier functional forms and panel data. Specifically, they focused on the
advantages offered by panel data for the estimation of firm efficiency. These advantages
relate to: i) the relaxation of a priori assumptions on the distribution of u; and ii) the
possibility of obtaining a consistent estimator a i for the individual inefficiencies.
In other words, the availability of panel data enables even the use of a standard
model of fixed and/or random effects without the need to make any distributional
assumption for the inefficiency term, as in the case of DFA. 7 As observed earlier, the
DFA can be used when panel data are available because some distributional
assumptions of the stoelfastic frontier can be relaxed. It follows that if the distribution of
u is known a priori, then it is not possible to benefit from one of the advantages derived
from the panel estimation listed above: that is the relaxation of the assumptions on f(ui).
On the other hand, it becomes possible to carry out maximum likelihood estimations.
7 There are, however, various limitations associated with the use of panel data. It has been argued [Berger
and Mester (1997)] that the reasonableness of the assumptions about the error term components may
depend crucially on the length of the period studied. For example, if too short a period is chosen, the
random errors might not average out, in which case random error would be attributed to inefficiency. If
too long a period is chosen the firm's core efficiency becomes less meaningful because of changes in
management and other events (e.g. it might not be constant over the time period).
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4.4.3	 New Views on Bank Efficiency Analysis
McAllister and McManus (1993) were among the first to suggest that most of the
previous empirical literature on bank X-efficiency might be biased because of problems
related to the statistical techniques used. Meanwhile, Berger, Hunter and Timme
(1993a, p. 227) reckoned that the translog was: "insufficiently flexible to describe an
industry with increasing returns to scale up to some point and constant returns
thereafter, and seems to have difficulties when firms tend to change product mix
significantly as they change scale."
Traditionally, the translog cost function had usually been employed in the bank
cost literature on the grounds that it has two important advantages [Forestieri (1993)]: 1)
it allows for a U-shaped average cost curve or, at least for a cost curve not uniform for
all sizes; and 2) it dispenses from the ancillary hypothesis of an input elasticity equal to
1, typical of the Cobb-Douglas form, and from the constraints typical of the CES model.
The Fourier-flexible functional form, instead, combines the stability of the
translog specification near the average of the sample data with the flexibility of the
Fourier specification for observations far from the averages [see, for instance, Mitchell
and Onvural (1996); Berger and De Young (1997); Berger et al. (1997); Berger and
Humphrey (1997); Berger and Mester (11997) and Altunbas et al. (1999)].
Figure 4.7 shows the shape of cost functions that may be derived from the Fourier
and U-shaped translog models.
Cost
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Figure 4.7	 Translog and Fourier-Flexible Functional Forms
Output
Source: Adapted from McAllister and McManus (1993, p. 396).
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) studied scale and scope economies for US large
banks, and they statistically rejected the translog in favour of the Fourier-flexible
functional form, in which trigonometric terms are added to the ordinary translog. Both
McAllister and McManus (1993) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) showed that some of
the differences in results on scale economies across studies might be due to the ill-fit of
the translog function across a wide range of bank sizes. Also Berger and Humphrey
(1997) argued that since the parametric approach imposes functional forms that restrict
the shape of the frontier, the solution lies in adding more flexibility to the parametric
approaches by using a Fourier approximation, which technically represents the
unknown cost function using a Fourier series.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) have also pointed out the limitations of the non-
parametric approach and they suggest that such approach should consider using a
resampling technique, such as bootstrapping, in order to accommodate random error in
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the efficiency estimates. This technique, [Simar (1992); Simar and Wilson (1995)]
appears to be a way of obtaining an empirical approximation to the underlying sampling
distribution of DEA and FDH efficiency estimates.
However, these are not the only criticisms of previous research. In an important
recent study, Bauer et al. (1997) argued that it is not necessary to have a consensus on
what is the single best frontier approach for measuring efficiency for the efficiencies to
be useful for regulatory analysis. Bauer et al. (1997, p. 3) propose a set of "consistency
conditions" that efficiency measures derived from various approaches should meet to be
most useful for regulators or other decision-makers. These consistency conditions note
that:
(1) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have
comparable means, standard deviations and other distributional properties;
(2) the different approaches should rank the institutions in approximately the same
order;
(3) the different approaches should identify mostly the same institutions as "best
practice" and as "worst practice";
(4) all of the useful approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over time;
(5) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should be reasonably
consistent with competitive conditions in the market;
(6) the measured efficiency from all of the useful approaches should be reasonably
consistent with the- standard non-frontier performance measures, such as return on
assets or cost/revenue ratio.
Consistency conditions (1), (2) and (3) may be thought of as measuring the degree
to which different approaches are mutually consistent, while conditions (4), (5) and (6)
may be thought of as measuring the degree to which the efficiency generated by the
different approaches are consistent with reality or are believable. The former are more
helpful in determining whether the different approaches will give the same answers to
regulatory policy questions or other queries, and the latter are more helpful in
determining whether these answers are likely to be correct [Bauer et al. (1997, p. 3)].
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Finally, it is important to note another criticism of bank cost studies — ignoring the
profit side of the banks' operations. Recently, studies employing profit functions or
investigating both banks' cost and profit efficiency have gradually acquired greater
importance. The rationale for these studies is that banks that show the highest
inefficiency and incur the highest costs might be able to generate more profits than the
more cost-efficient banks. Of the 130 studies on financial institutions' efficiency studies
reviewed by Berger and Humphrey (1997) only nine analysed profit efficiency although
there have been some recent additions to the list, such as Rogers (1998); De Young and
Hasan (1998); Dietsch and Weill (1998) and Maudos et al. (1998).
4.5	 Selected Literature Review on Cost Economies in Banking
4.5.1	 Studies on Bank Costs in the US
Most early studies modelling cost efficiency have been undertaken on US banking. The
earliest US research relied on banks' balance sheets and income statement data to
calculate financial ratios relating to bank costs and their output. These studies can be
..
broadly classified into two groups: (1) studies that measured output in terms of earning
assets [Alhadeff (1954) and Horvitz (1963)]; and (2) studies that used total assets to
measure output [Schweiger and McGee (1961) and Gramley (1962)].
Alhadeff (1954) was one of the first researchers to focus on the cost differences
between banks of various sizes in the state of California. The years studied were 1938-
50; output was measured as the ratio of loans and investments to total assets to reflect
the used capacity to total capacity of the bank. Alhadeff s study found that branch banks
could produce greater output per dollar resources compared with unit banks
(represented, in turn, by the four largest branch bank organisations). Alhadeff also
found increasing returns to scale for the smallest and largest banks in his sample and
Chapter 4 • Efficiency Analysis in Banking: Theoretical Issues and Selected Literature 	 122
constant returns to scale for medium- sized banks. Later Horvitz (1963) produced
similar results from a study on Kansas City banks for 1959, with average costs fairly
constant for mid- sized banks and cost economies among larger banks. Horvitz also
concluded that scale economies in banking were not high and that although small banks
could not compete directly with large banks, they could survive in the market because at
least for small loans they seemed to be cost efficient producers.
Studies by Schweiger and McGee (1961) and Gramley (1962) used total assets
(and not only earning assets) to measure bank output. Schweiger and McGee (1961)
found lower costs for large banks and concluded that these latter banks had a distinct
cost advantage per unit of assets over small and medium- sized banks. In 1962,
Gramley's findings suggested that larger banks could experience cost advantages
(mainly from labour saving methods of operation) and small banks' costs were higher
because they simply did not work as hard to control costs.
Subsequently, the empirical research in US banking can be divided into two main
stages: (1) the cost studies dating back to the mid- 1960s and early 1970s, employing
the Cobb-Douglas cost function (which can only be used to model linear relationships);
and (2) the cost studies of the 1980s and early 1990s, which relied on the deterministic
translog cost function (also with approximations such as Box-Cox) which allowed for
the estimation of U-shaped average cost curves.
In 1965 two important studies by Benston (1965a,b) heralded a "new generation"
in the US cost literature in banking: he employed a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas cost
function to calculate aciale economies using bank data obtained from the Functional
Cost Analysis (FCA) programme of the Federal Reserve System. The results showed
only slight economies of scale and suggested that bank size does not in itself provide a
cost advantage. Benston also concluded that merging five banks into one unit bank
would increase the costs significantly and that only banks with three or fewer branches
actually experienced cost benefits.
Greenbaum (1967) using a similar approach to Benston found that banks with less
than $10 million in assets were inefficient, and concluded that without regulation these
banks would possibly disappear from the market. In 1967 Bell and Murphy tried to find
out whether large banks could gain from greater economies of scale: they concluded
that large banks tended to have lower costs because they used less-skilled labour. Both
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Greenbaum (1967) and Bell and Murphy (1967) were cautious in reporting their results
because they were expecting possible changes in the banking industry brought about by
technological process.
Many studies during the 1970s attempted to extend the previous literature by
taking into account technology and other trends in modern banking [for example,
Murphy (1972); Daniel, Longbrake and Murphy (1973); Kalish and Gilbert (1973);
Mullineaux (1975) and Mullineaux (1978)]. From these studies, mainly based on Cobb-
Douglas cost function estimations, there appeared to be a consensus about the existence
of economies of scale in banking, although these were not large enough to prevent small
and medium- sized banks benefiting from viable competition. Moreover, several of
these studies found the presence of U-shaped cost curves. Mullineuax (1978) for
instance was the first to apply a combined translog,/Cobb-Douglas profit function
(although the Cobb-Douglas functional form could not be rejected).
Although widely used in the applied economics literature, the Cobb-Douglas cost
function was soon replaced in bank cost studies by other functional forms because of
the critical restrictions that were necessarily imposed on inputs and outputs, and because
it only allowed the estimation of linear functions. However, the primary uncertainty
expressed in the translog cost function literature was the location of the bottom of the
average cost U-shaped curve — e.g. the scale efficient point or optimal bank size [see
Humphrey (1990) and Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993)].
The translog deterministic functional form began to be used in virtually all
studies, in order to allow for multiple product outputs and the jointness in cost. As
shown later in this chapter, the use of the translog cost function yielded conflicting
results compared with those derived from the Cobb-Douglas studies, namely that
economies of scale seemed to be high for small to medium-sized banks, whereas
diseconomies of scale appeared significant for larger banks. A review of US selected
studies on scale and scope economies using the translog cost function can be found in
Table A4.1 in the Appendix to this chapter.
One of the first studies to fit a translog cost function to banking data was Benston
et al. (1983). This study also aimed to evaluate tests for jointness in the production of
bank services. The results showed that scale economies prevailed for all sizes of branch
offices except the largest, while their test on cost complementarities gave indecisive
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results. These results contrasted with those of Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) and
Gilligan et al. (1984) who performed tests for the possible existence of scope economies
and found evidence of scope economies (although without reporting the estimates)
between demand and time deposits as well as between securities and loans. Similarly,
Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) reported evidence of jointness in bank production, and
found that large banks did not appear to have cost advantages, in terms of scope
economies, compared with small banks. Thus, again, no consensus was reached as to
the issue on the jointness in producing bank services.8
In general, a summary of the main findings of the US cost studies undertaken
during the 1980s is as follows. When the production approach was utilised, for banks
smaller than $1 billion in total deposits most studies concluded that the optimum size of
a bank was relatively small [Benston et al. (1982); Clark (1984); Kolari and Zardkoohi
(1987)], and diseconomies appeared at all unit banks with deposits above $50 million
[Gilligan and Smirlock (1984)], $100 million [Gilligan et al. (1984)], and $200 million
[Benston et al. (1983)].
For those studies on scale economies for banks smaller than $1 billion in assets
size, when the intermediation approach was used, Berger et al. (1987) found that branch
banks showed slight economies of scale at the branch level and slight diseconomies at
the level of the banking firm, whereas unit state banks showed significant diseconomies
of scale for large banks. Moreover, this study concluded that there were diseconomies
of scope in banking. Studies that examined the cost features of a wider range of sizes
typically found average- costs to be minimised between about $75 million and $300
8 One of the main limitations of the translog cost function is its indeterminacy whenever one or more
products are produced. The more products are specified and the more differentiated the behaviour of a
financial firm, the more it becomes necessary to include in the sector analysis the assumption that one or
more outputs equal zero for at least some firms [Forestieri (1993)1. The Box-Cox transformation of the
translog function [Clark (1984)1 or the hybrid translog [Kolari and Zardhooki (1987)] seemed able to
solve the problem. A different solution often adopted for the calculation of economies of scope is the
assignment of low but positive values (usually the minimum value observed in the sample) to the level of
production of each service [for example, Benston et al. (1983); Kim (1986); Mester (1987); Cossutta et
al. (1988)].
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million assets size range [Berger et al. (1987); Ferrier and Lovell (1990); Berger and
Humphrey (1991)].
When large US banks were included in the samples (>$1 billion assets), usually
the minimum average cost point was found between $2 billion and $10 billion in assets
size, and evidence of scope economies typically was not found [Hunter and Timme
(1986); Shaffer and David (1986); Kim (1986); Hunter and Timme and Yang (1990);
Noulas, Ray and Miller (1990)]. Hunter and Timme (1986), in particular, examined the
nature of technical change in the banking industry and reported that it produced
significant cost reductions for large banks. Conversely, diseconomies of scale were
found by Noulas, Ray and Miller (1990) for banks with relatively large assets size
(between $3 and $6 billion assets). These authors also concluded that the translog cost
function was not a reliable function for assessing scope effects because of estimation
error.
Overall, these results suggest that in US banking increasing returns to scale are
typically found for only relatively small banks. Therefore, no consensus existed as to
the optimal size of banks. Moreover, no clear evidence of economies of scope was
found.
4.5.2	 European and Italian Literature on Economies of Scale and
.r.,
Scope
Cost studies on European banking date back to the late 1970s when the issue of
concentration in banking started to become a matter of interest both from a public policy
and banking sector perspective. This period was also characterised by a process of
internationalisation of the economy and by the very first attempts to deregulate the
sector. It follows that most empirical work focused on national markets and cross-
country European cost studies have been undertaken only relatively recently thanks also
to the increasing availability of bank financial information. In addition, the importance
of the European financial sectors "in achieving the overall economic gains sought by
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deregulation and 'free market solutions' in resource allocations within European
economic systems" has increased the need for a greater empirical research into
European banking efficiency [Molyneux et al. (1996, p. 256)].
In the 1970s the most active researchers in this field were French and Italian [for
example Levy-Garboua and Levy-Garboua (1975) and Levy-Garboua and Renard
(1977); Ruozi (1968) and Ciocca et al. (1974)]. In these studies the influence of the
earlier US literature developed by Benston (1965a,b) and Bell and Murphy (1967) is
apparent. The earliest European studies employ Cobb-Douglas cost functions to
evaluate the cost characteristics of their banking sectors. From these early European
cost studies, evidence of scale economies was generally found for small and medium-
sized banks; although evidence of cost complementarities was often observed across a
wide range of bank sizes, scope economies were more elusive.
In 1975, a study by Maes on Belgian banks suggested that significant
diseconomies of scale existed for large banks. This result was then confirmed by a later
study [Pacolet (1986)], which also demonstrated the existence of U-shaped cost
functions for several bank types and in particular for commercial and saving banks.
Revell (1987 and 1989) surveyed the empirical research on banking efficiency in
the context of an apparent movement towards bigger banks in Europe. Although both of
these studies focused primarily on Spanish banks, Revell explored the extensive US
literature and considered its relevance to the European banking sector. He concluded
that scale economies existed under some conditions and in certain parts of banks'
operations, but they were not so important as the arguments used in favour of mergers
seemed to assume. Revell believed that mergers were generally far from being a quick
and sure way of increasing efficiency; he noted that whenever scale economies could be
proved to exist, the authorities should encourage more sharing of facilities and a kind of
consortium approach among banks.
In Spain economies of scale were found by Fanjul and Maravall (1985), who also
found constant returns to scale when the number of branches were included in the
estimation. Evidence on scale and scope economies was also found for medium-sized
Spanish savings banks, although not for large institutions [see for example Rodriguez,
Alvarez and Gomez (1993)].
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In the early 1990s, further studies on the French banking system, included the
work of Dietsch (1990 and 1993) and Martin and Sassenou (1992). Overall, their results
did not suggest any definite evidence of scale or scope economies in French banking.
Little evidence on scale and scope economies has also been found for Swiss banks
[Sheldon and Haegler (1993); Sheldon (1994)]. As to German banks, in contrast to Lang
and Welzel (1996) who found no evidence of scale and scope economies, the recent
study by Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (1999) found substantial economies of scale
for the German banking system.
In the UK, cost economy studies have focused on the building society sector, the
findings tend to be conflicting because of the variety of methodologies used; evidence
on economies of scale, for instance, was not found by Gough (1979) and Barnes and
Dodds (1983), who both estimated linear cost functions. Other studies found evidence
of economies of scale for societies with asset size less than £100 million [Cooper
(1980)], £280 million [Hardwick (1989)], £5,500 million [Hardwick (1990)], and in the
£120-500 million range [Drake (1992)]. Moreover, little evidence on scope economies
has been observed in the building society sector [Hardwick (1990); Drake (1992);
McKillop and Glass (1994)]. In particular, Drake (1995) extended his earlier (1992)
analysis on the UK building societies and respecified the translog cost function by
including an extra parameter for expense preference behaviour. The results of this study
found little evidence of economies of scale and scope. McKillop and Glass (1994)
employed a hybrid translog cost function to obtain econometric measures of overall and
augmented economies-of scale, product-specific scale economies and economies of
scope. The data were obtained from the 1991 annual returns for a sample of 89 building
societies, grouped into three categories - national, regional and local - depending on
their consolidated asset size and number of branches. Scale and scope estimates were
then calculated for each category of societies as well as the whole industry. Overall,
McKillop and Glass (1994) found evidence of significant augmented economies of scale
for both national and local societies, but only constant return to scale for those societies
that are regionally based.
Gathon and Grosjean (1991) and Pallage (1991) employed a translog cost function
to analyse scale and scope economies in the Belgian banking market. Gathon and
Grosjean (1991) found decreasing returns to scale for the four largest Belgian banks and
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increasing returns to scale for all other banks. Pallage (1991) found economies of scale
for small institutions and diseconomies of scale when size increases, thus confirming
the results achieved in 1986 by Pacolet. However, evidence of economies of scope was
found only for the largest banks. In Ireland, Glass and McKillop (1992) used the data
from one of the largest banks, Allied Irish Bank, for the period 1972-1988, to estimate a
hybrid translog model. They investigated the process of natural and non-natural
technical change, overall scale economies, product-specific scale economies and scope
economies and found that there was no evidence of economies of scale, with
diseconomies holding for the period as a whole and the majority of the subperiods
considered. Moreover, the bank was found to exhibit neither economies nor
diseconomies of scope over the production of its two outputs. However, evidence of
significant technical change was found.
In Italy, as in most other European countries, sophisticated econometric
techniques started to be used in the late 1980s. The utilisation of the Cobb-Douglas cost
function was soon replaced by the more appropriate translog functional form, whereby
U-shaped cost curves could be estimated and a more precise measurement of banking
output was facilitated.
Table 4.1 provides details on various Italian bank efficiency studies. The table
shows that the approach to modelling efficiency in the Italian banking system varies
considerably. In general terms, studies dating back to the 1980s and early 1990s tend to
find evidence of increasing returns to scale at the branch level. This means that average
costs were found to— be decreasing until a "critical" branch size was achieved.
Diseconomies were mainly due to the increase in the number of branches [see, for
instance, Parigi (1989); Baldini and Landi (1990); Landi (1990); Cardani et al. (1991)].
Baldini and Landi (1990) and Landi (1990) found that the level of economies of scale at
the firm level was higher for the smallest banks in their sample. Cossutta et al. (1988)
concluded that evidence on scale economies at the branch level could be found for all
bank sizes (and especially for large banks) whereas economies of scale at the firm level
were found only for the largest banks.
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Conigliani et al. (1991) found evidence of economies of scale in Italian banking
across a wide range of bank sizes. However, when branches vary with outputs evidence
of scale economies was found only for small banks. Also, Parigi et al. (1992) obtained
strong evidence of scale economies in the Italian banking industry within a panel of data
where changes in banking and monetary regulation, as well as other heterogeneous
factors (such as the territorial location of banks), were taken into consideration. In
particular, the authors pointed out that before structural change in the sector, scale
economies could not be completely exploited, especially because of intense controls
aimed at diminishing the degree of competition in the Italian banking market.
Furthermore, both studies found little evidence of scope economies.
More recently, another empirical study by Di Battista et al. (1996) found evidence
of significant economies of scale in the Italian banking system. What is more
interesting, they found, in contrast to previous findings [for example, Conigliani et al.
(1991); Baldini and Landi (1990) and Landi (1990)] that economies of scale were
substantial even when the number of branches were included in the estimation.
Another study by Casu and Girardone (1998) investigated the cost efficiency of
Italian banking groups by evaluating the cost characteristics of bank parent companies
and bank subsidiaries that form part of these groups in 1995. Their results suggested
that bank groups have been unable to exploit fully scale economies reductions, although
bank conglomerates were found able to gain from greater scope benefits compared with
the single banks forming- the group.
As far as cross-country European cost studies are concerned, Altunbas and
Molyneux (1993) tried to verify the existence of scale and scope economies in France,
Germany, Italy and Spain. Using a translog cost function methodology, they found
significant differences in cost characteristics across European banking markets, together
with strong evidence of scale and scope economies at the branch level in France,
Germany and Italy. These cost savings seemed to occur primarily through the increased
average size of banks' branches (rather than the growth in the size of the overall
banking firm).
Molyneux et al. (1996) applied a hybrid translog model to measure scale and
scope economies in France, Germany, Italy and Spain: their results seem to differ
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significantly for the four examined countries. In particular, firm-level scale economies
were found for all sizes of banks in Spain, whereas those countries which exhibited
diseconomies (Germany) and constant return to scale (Italy and France) also exhibited
relevant scale economies at the branch level. Economies of scope at the firm level were
found only in France across all output ranges, and diseconomies were reported in Spain.
Italian banks were characterised by strong scope economies at the branch level, and the
smallest German, French and Spanish banks exhibited strong diseconomies. In another
cross-country analysis published by the European Commission (1997), there appeared
to be a trend in the German, French, Italian and Spanish banking systems to benefit
from greater economies of scale in the run-up to the implementation of the single
market legislation. In the case of Germany and France, these systems appeared to
benefit from increasing economies up until 1994, whereas for Italy and Spain the cost
characteristics of the banking industry appeared to have reverted back to constant and/or
diseconomies of scale post-1991/92. Evidence of scope economies was found for the
largest banks across virtually all European banking markets. There also appeared to be
an increase in the level of scope economies for smaller banks in France Germany, Italy
and Spain comparing the pre- and post-integration period.
In a recent study undertaken on a sample of large banks in Italy, France and
Germany, Inzerillo et al. (1999) found that returns to scale tend to increase with bank
size.
vv.
4.5.3 X-Efficiency Findings by Measurement Method
As discussed earlier in this chapter, in recent years researchers have tended to focus on
modelling banks' X-efficiency levels. This has mainly been the result of two main
factors: firstly, X-efficiency differences across banks are relatively large and appear to
dominate both scale and scope efficiencies and secondly, leading researchers found that
scope efficiencies had often been confounded with X-efficiency differences [Berger,
Hunter and Timme (1993)].
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Berger and Humphrey (1997) recently surveyed 130 such studies. These studies
apply frontier efficiency analysis to banks/financial institutions in 21 countries and
cover four types of financial institutions — banks, savings and loans (S&Ls), credit
unions, and insurance firms. The survey is the first major attempt to make some
tentative comparisons of average efficiency levels both across measurement techniques
and across countries. The Berger and Humphrey survey found that of the 60 parametric
applications, 24 used the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), 20 the Distribution Free
Approach (DFA) and 16 the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA). Moreover, out of 69 non-
parametric applications, 62 were DEA and only 5 FDH, thus confirming an unequivocal
predominance of DEA among this group.
Overall, efficiency estimates derived from parametric frontier models (SFA, TFA
and DFA) are similar to those obtained from non-parametric (DEA and FDH) studies,
although these latter usually produce slightly higher mean inefficiency levels and appear
to exhibit greater dispersion than the results of the parametric models. Specifically,
average efficiency levels in US banking over the last ten years were found to be in the
order of 84 per cent for the parametric models (with a standard deviation of 0.06 and a
range between 0.61-0.95). For studies on non-US banks average efficiency levels were
found to average 0.76 with a standard deviation of 0.12. Estimates obtained from non-
parametric models applied to US banking markets, have mean efficiency levels of 72%
(standard deviation equals 0.17 and range 0.31-0.97), whereas for the non-US banking
studies the overall mean efficiency was 75 per cent with a standard deviation of 0.14.
Over the last decade, the number of studies comparing the results derived from the
application of multiple approaches (usually two efficiency methods) to a single set of
data has increased [for example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990); Giokas (1991); Bauer et al.
(1993); Ferrier et al. (1994); DeBorger et al. (1995); Berger and Mester (1997);
Eisenbeis et al. (1996); Resti (1997a); Casu and Girardone (1998)]. Such investigations
are particularly important because, as highlighted by Bauer et al. (1997, p. 1), in order
to make informed policy decisions about financial institutions "regulators need to have
fairly accurate information about the likely effects of their decisions on the performance
of the institutions they regulate/supervise". Researchers seem to be more concerned at
this time (compared with the past) about the degree of consistency among results
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derived from the application of different methodologies and techniques to the same
dataset.
Meanwhile, cross-country studies in Europe have also recently increased in
importance as a result of the harmonisation process that contributed to the creation of a
more integrated and harmonised EU banking market [see, for example, Berg et al.
(1993); Fetcher and Pestieau (1993); Bergendhal (1995); Ruthenberg and Elias (1996);
Pastor et al. (1997); European Commission (1997); Inzerillo et al. (1999)]. These
studies are important because they provide useful information about the relative
•
efficiency and competitiveness of banks in different countries.
However, the majority of studies typically focus on national banking markets.
This is explained by the fact that there are still many difficulties in performing and
interpreting cross-country analyses. This is because of factors like different regulatory
and economic environments across countries [Berger and Humphrey (1997)] and
because it is important that all banks in the sample have access to the same frontier, as
pointed out by Mester (1996).
As mentioned earlier, the objective of profit maximisation requires that goods and
services be produced at minimum cost but also that the maximum volume of revenues
are generated. A partial review of the profit efficiency studies can be found in Berger
and Humphrey (1997) who surveyed nine such studies. Other relevant work includes
Berger and Mester (1997) who used the concept of alternative profit efficiency (defined
as when banks have market power to set prices) and standard profit efficiency (defined
as when they behave as. price takers) and, in line with most other studies, they found
that profit efficiency is lower than cost efficiency; see also Maudos et al. (1998) for a
cross-country study. Overall, the handful of studies that examine profit efficiency
typically find that profit efficiency is lower than cost efficiency in banking markets.
Table A4.2 in the Appendix, reviews some of the most relevant US and European
studies employing stochastic cost frontiers [see also, the extensive surveys of Bauer
(1990); Kaparakis et al. (1994); Berger and Humphrey (1997)].
As concerns the specific case of the Italian banking system, Table 4.1 above also
reviews several Italian studies on efficiency in banking over the last decade. Overall,
bank inefficiency levels appear to range between 15 and 20 per cent on average. For
example, Altunbas et al. (1994) used a stochastic frontier analysis approach to explore
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possible inefficiency in the Italian credit co-operative sector between 1990 and 1992;
their results suggest that inefficiency levels in this sector seem to be quite low compared
with other studies. They argue that this might imply limited potential to improve
substantially cost efficiencies through greater product diversification along the universal
banking model lines. The European Commission (1997) cross-country EU study found
that X-efficiency levels for most European banking markets covered in aggregate were
around 20%. In particular, for the Italian banking market X-inefficiencies were found to
be around 16% as an average for the period 1987-94. Resti (1997a) used both linear
programming and stochastic cost frontier methodologies to examine cost efficiency in
the Italian market. He found that the gap between the best and the worst banks in his
sample was quite high; his study found that that northern-based Italian banks were more
efficient than their southern counterparts and there appeared to be a direct relationship
between productive efficiency and banks' asset quality. Resti also found that the
efficiency of Italian banks did not increase over the period 1988-92.
Casu and Girardone (1998) compared the X-efficiency levels for bank groups
with those of bank parent companies and subsidiaries forming part of the groups using
both the econometric estimation and the linear programming method; they found that
the two methodologies lead to a similar conclusion. Bank groups were found to be more
X-inefficient than bank parent companies and subsidiaries forming part of the groups.
Finally, in their cross-country study on Italian, French and German banking
markets Inzerillo et al. (1999) found that the largest banks in their sample were
apparently more efficient than their smaller counterparts. Moreover, they found
evidence of a trend towards the reduction in the number of less efficient banks.
4.5.4	 Risk and Quality Factors, Banks' Costs and Efficiency
Correlates
Over the last several years, the interest of researchers has also focused on the issue of
banks' problem loans [Hughes and Mester (1991); Clark (1996); Mester (1996); Berger
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and Mester (1997); Resti (1997a); Berger and De Young (1997)]. This is of a particular
concern because in theory, when comparing the efficiency of banks, output quality
should be the same [Berger and Mester (1997)]. Nonetheless, there are in reality
unmeasured differences in quality because the banking data do not completely take
account of the heterogeneity in bank output.
A large proportion of NPLs may signal that a bank has used fewer resources than
usual in the initial credit evaluation and monitoring of its loans. In other words, banks
scrimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be found to
be efficient when compared to banks spending more resources in order to ensure their
loans are of higher quality [Mester (1996)].9
Moreover, as Berger and De Young (1997) emphasise, banks which are cost
inefficient may have problems of loan performance for various reasons: i) because they
have a poor senior management and thus they have problems in monitoring both their
costs and their loan customers; ii) for events exogenous to the bank, such as regional
economic downturns, which increase those expenses associated with NPLs (e.g.
monitoring, negotiating workout arrangements, seizing and disposing of collateral, and
so forth).
As stressed by Berger and Mester (1997) NPLs and loan losses would be
exogenous if caused by negative economic shocks ("bad luck"), but they could be
endogenous, either because management is inefficient in managing their loan portfolio
("bad management") or because managers have made a conscious decision to reduce
short-run expenses by -cutting back on loan origination and monitoring resources
("skimping"). However, Berger and Mester (1997, p. 909) also note that: "Even if the
level of NPLs does reflect bank choice to some extent, it could still be appropriate to
include it in the cost and profit functions if it is thought to reflect a less frequent
decision on the part of the bank (e.g. credit policy) than production decisions [...]".
Another important aspect of efficiency measurement is the way financial capital is
treated. As McAllister and McManus (1993) have noted, it is the nature of a financial
9 Moreover, it seems that all research on the causes of bank failures found that failing institutions have
large proportions of NPLs prior to failure and that asset quality is a statistically significant predictor of
insolvency [see, for example, Whalen (1991)].
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intermediary that requires that it hold capital sufficient to reduce the probability (to a
minimal level) that it will default on its debt, although this financial capital is more
costly than other sources of finance.
Since the insolvency risk of financial institutions depends on the availability of
financial capital to absorb portfolio risk and losses, it should be considered when
studying efficiency. As pointed out by Mester (1996, p. 1026), omitting the price and
level of capital "makes sense on theoretical grounds only if it is assumed either that
financial capital is not used to fund loans, or that its price is the same across all banks
(or is perfectly correlated with another input price for all banks) and that banks use the
cost-minimizing level of capital, none of which seems plausible". In fact, the problem is
very much concerned with banks' risk preferences.1°
Only a handful of studies have included financial capital in the calculation of bank
efficiency [Hughes and Mester (1991); Hancock (1985); Clark (1996); Altunbas et al.
(1999)]. Whether it is appropriate econometrically to include NPLs and loan losses in
the bank's cost and profit functions depends on the extent to which these variables are
exogenous.
To date, the risk and quality of banks' output has usually been measured by
including them as arguments in the cost function in the following way: quality can be
proxied by a variable measuring the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans,
whereas the level of financial capital (the funding source for loans) can be measured as
the average volume of equity capital for each of the years considered, like in Mester
(1996). Table 4.2 revie.ws the bank efficiency studies that have considered risk and
quality factors in the cost frontier specification. Overall, these studies found that
controlling for risk and quality factors has some influence on bank cost efficiency
levels.
I° Hughes and Mester (1993) find that US banks are risk-averse and they tend not to choose the cost
minimising level of capital. This can be explained by the fact that a risk-averse bank might choose to fund
its loans with a higher ratio of financial capital-to-deposits (i.e. with less debt) than a risk-neutral bank.
As pointed out by Mester (1996), since financial capital is typically more expensive than deposits, it
would be possible to conclude wrongly that the risk-averse bank was producing its output in an
allocatively inefficient manner. Actually, though, it is banks' risk preferences that differ.
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Another way of accounting for the influence of risk and quality factors on bank
efficiency involves undertaking a correlation analysis between banks' inefficiency
levels derived from the estimation process, and independent variables explaining also
banks' risk and output quality factors. Recently, this methodology has been applied for
instance by Cebenoyan et al. (1993); Mester (1993 and 1996) and Altunbas et al.
(1999). The regressions are usually linear, but Mester (1996) and Altunbas et al. (1999)
use the logistic functional form rather than a linear regression model and include,
among others, measures of banks' performance and measures of capital adequacy.
Among the statistically significant relationships, one of the most interesting found by
Mester (1993 and 1996) and Altunbas et al. (1999) is the negative relationship between
inefficiency and the capital-to-assets ratio and bank performance indicators. Altunbas et
al. (1999) also found that the level of non-performing loans is positively related to bank
inefficiency.
4.6
	 Conclusions
In recent years, greater research attention has been paid to modelling cost characteristics
in the banking industry. However, the studies have different statistical methodologies
and also use various input and output definitions. As a consequence, many of the results
on bank efficiency are-difficult to compare. Given the importance of these studies for
policy purposes, over the last few years leading researchers in the field have tried to find
solutions to various methodological problems. Among the most important recent
methodological developments have been: the substitution of the translog cost model by
new and more flexible functional forms, such as the Fourier; the inclusion of bank risk
and output quality terms in the cost function; the carrying out of consistency tests;
relating cost efficiency estimates to bank profitability together with other correlates of
bank inefficiencies. Most of these innovations will be undertaken in the empirical
analysis of Italian banking that is presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Methodology,
Variable Definitions
and Data Sources
5.1	 Introduction
The issue of measuring efficiency in banking has been extensively researched over the
past decade, as discussed in the previous chapter. Different econometric methods have
been employed in recent studies, but only a handful of them have focused on the
estimation of managerial X-efficiencies in the Italian banking sector. Moreover, as far
as the researcher is aware, none of previous studies on the Italian system have either
employed a stochastic Fourier-flexible functional form, and/or included risk and output
quality variables as arguments in the cost function specification.
In this thesis, we use the Fourier-flexible functional form to estimate X-
efficiencies and scale economies for the Italian banking system. First, a standard cost
frontier specification using the intermediation approach will be estimated and these
results will then be compared with those derived from a frontier specification that
controls for risk and quality factors. The approach will then proceed with the
identification of Italian banks that are both cost and profit efficient, and with the
evaluation of possible determinants of bank efficiency.
This chapter explains the researcher's methodology used to examine the cost
efficiency of Italian banks over the period 1993-96. Specifically, this chapter illustrates
the characteristics of the stochastic cost frontier (section 5.2.1); the main properties of
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the Fourier-flexible cost function (section 5.2.2); how to calculate X-efficiency and
scale economy indexes once the frontier is estimated (sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4,
respectively); and the modifications to the cost frontier needed in order to be able to
take into account risk and output quality factors in the calculation of cost efficiency
(section 5.2.5).
Section 5.3 describes in detail the variables employed in the empirical analysis,
and Section 5.4 outlines the methodology used for carrying out a profitability test on the
sample banks. This test, suggested by Spong et al. (1995), is included in order to relate
cost X-inefficiency measures to the relative profitability of banks. Section 5.5 focuses
on the calculation of potential correlates with inefficiency and explains the logistic
regression model used for carrying out the analysis. Finally, section 5.6 investigates the
data sample and presents the descriptive statistics (section 5.6.1) of the variables
employed followed by the conclusion in section 5.7.
5.2	 The Methodology: Stochastic Fourier-Flexible Functional
Form and Measures of Cost Efficiency
Researchers investigating bank cost efficiency postulate a relationship between costs,
input prices and output quantity. This relationship is based on the duality concept
between production and cost functions. The production function Q= Q(X) summarises
the technology of a firm: that is the existing relationship between inputs, X, and outputs,
Q. The cost function TC =TC(Q,P) shows the relationship between total production
costs, TC, and the prices of variable inputs, under the assumption of no changes in
technology. The duality condition between the production and the cost function ensures
that they contain the same information about production possibilities and that there is a
unique correspondence between both functions. More precisely, duality requires the cost
function to satisfy certain regularity conditions on TC which are that it be non-negative,
real-valued, non-decreasing, strictly positive for non-zero Q and linearly homogeneous
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and concave in P for each Q [see, for instance, Caves, Christensen and Tretheway
(1979)].
5.2.1	 The Stochastic Cost Frontier
One of the first methodological issues relates to the choice of the statistical approach
used to estimate X-efficiencies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the established
approaches (stochastic or econometric frontier, thick frontier, distribution-free,
mathematical/linear programming approaches) differ primarily in the distributional
assumptions used to disentangle X-efficiency differences from the random error that
temporarily give decision-making units apparently high or low costs.
This study employs a stochastic cost frontier to generate estimates of X-
efficiencies for each bank along the lines suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 1 For the ith firm, the single equation
cost function model is represented in natural logs by:
ln TC;
 = ln TC(Qi ,Pi ;B)+ E	 (5.1)
where TC, is the observed total cost of production for bank i, Qi is the vector of banking
output for bank i, Pris the vector of input prices for bank i, and B is a vector of
parameters. in TC(Q, ,Pi ;B) is the predicted log cost function of a cost-minimising bank
operating at (a ,Pi , B) , and gi is a two-component error term.
The stochastic cost frontier model used in this empirical study implies that a
banking firm's observed total cost will deviate from the cost-efficient frontier because
of random noise, v, and possible inefficiency, u. For the ith firm:
Among other important studies using the stochastic frontier are, for instance, Cebenoyan et al. (1993),
Kaparakis et al. (1994), Allen and Rai (1996), Resti (1997a), Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas et
al. (1999).
Chapter 5 • Methodology, Variable Definitions and Data Sources 147
Si=Vi-1-141
	 (5.2)
where vi is a two-sided error term representing statistical noise which is assumed to be
independently and identically distributed; and ui is a non-negative (or one-sided)
random variable representing inefficiency and assumed to be distributed independently
of the vi. The inefficiency factor ui incorporates both allocative inefficiencies, from
failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs, Pi, and technical inefficiencies,
from employing excessive (or extra) inputs to produce the outputs Qi. It is also assumed
that the v, are normally distributed with mean zero and variance crv2 , and the ui are the
absolute values of a variable that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cr.,
(i.e. a half-normal distribution). These are widely accepted assumptions employed in
this kind of empirical model: see, for example, Cardani et al. (1991); Kaparakis et al.
(1994); Allen and Rai (1996); Mester (1996) and Altunbas eta!. (1999).
In the present study Italian banks' data over the period 1993-96 are organised in a
panel. Specifically, we employ the Battese and Coelli model (1992) of a stochastic
frontier function for panel data with firm effects which are assumed to be distributed as
half-normal random variables (that is, with p=0) 2 and are also permitted to vary
systematically with time. Therefore, it is possible to express this model as
TC= x„fi + v + ti n , [with i = (1,2, ..., N) and t = (1,2, ..., T)], where TCir is the
logarithm of the total costs for the i-th firm in the t-th time period; xi, is a kxl vector of
(transformations of the.) input prices and output quantities of the i-th firm in the t-th time
period; )6 is the vector of unknown parameters; and the v and ui, are defined as above,
with u,,= (exp[ri(t-T)] }, where 77 is an unknown scalar parameter to be estimated. 3 This
latter represents the hypothesis about the evolution or steadiness of individual
inefficiencies over the period under study: 77> 0 when inefficiency decreases,
77<0 when inefficiency increases and 77=0 when inefficiency is steady (non-variable)
over time.
2 There are many variations on this assumption in the literature [for details, see Greene (1993b) and Coelli
et. al (1998)].
3 It follows that when t.T, u„=u, since the exponential function will take the value 1.
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Moreover, the parameterisation of Battese and Corra (1977) is employed. They
replaced c)- 2, and au2 with c2 =	 + 0- 2. and y = cr2u1(a2u + a2u ) .4 As recently
emphasised by Coelli et al. (1998), the y-parameterisation has an advantage in seeking
to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates because the parameter space for y can be
searched for a suitable starting value for the iterative maximisation algorithm involved.
In particular, a value of y of zero indicates that the deviations from the frontier are due
entirely to statistical noise, while a value of one would indicate that all deviations are
due to inefficiency.
5.2.2	 Specification of the Functional Form
The second methodological issue concerns the choice of the functional form for the cost
function. In recent years, flexible functional forms have been widely applied to the
empirical analyses of the cost structure of credit institutions in order to calculate cost
efficiencies, including X-efficiencies and scale economies.5
This study employs a Fourier-flexible form because it is a global approximation
that dominates the commonly specified translog form [see, for example, Spong et al.
(1995); Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and Berger et al. (1997)]. Specifically, the Fourier-
flexible functional form augments the translog by including Fourier trigonometric
terms.
4 In the literature, the likelihood function has often been expressed in terms of the two variance
2	 2	 2/ 2parameters 0- 2 = a, + au and 2 au I a, [see, Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Jondrow et
al. (1982)]. Battese and Corra (1977) and Coelli et al. (1998) suggested that the y parameter should be
used because it has a value between 0 and 1 whereas the X can be any non-negative value.
5 Many recent studies by leading researchers also used these functional forms to estimate profit
efficiency. On the US banking system, for example, Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) derived both
input and output inefficiencies, and Berger and Mester (1997), calculated standard and alternative profit
efficiency measures.
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Several studies have discussed the merits associated with using the Fourier-
flexible form [see, for instance, Gallant (1981, 1982 and 1984)] for cost frontier
estimation problems. Given various technical limitations and the advantages associated
with employing this functional form, recent researchers appear to agree with Gallant
(1981) who suggested that a Fourier series representation of an unknown function can
achieve a given level of approximation error with few trigonometric terms (i.e. a
truncated Fourier series) when it includes a second-order polynomial in the explanatory
variables. 6 It follows that if the dependent and explanatory variables are expressed in
natural logarithms, the second-order polynomial is the well-known translog form.
The resulting mixed cost function, including a full translog and all first-, second-
and third- order trigonometric terms as well as X-efficiency and random error terms, can
be written as:
ln TC = ao +Ea, lnQ, +Efl.lnP. +
I	 1
1=1
[+1/2 E E 8 si In a In Q1 ±E E yij In 131 1n Pi +
n =1 j=1	 1=1 j=1
m n	 m
+E E psi In Q, In Pi + E [a. cos z, + 0  sin Zi}±
1.1 j=1	 g=1
m m r
▪
EIA; cos (z i + z 1 )+ sin(zi + z )]+
1=1
m rn m r
▪
ECOS(Z i 	Zk)± uk sin(z i + z j + Z k A+ E;
1=1 j21 k  j
k*t
where TC is a measure of the costs of production, comprising operating costs and
financial costs (interest paid on deposits); the Q, (i=1,2,...,m) are output quantities,
6 0therwise, as pointed out by Mitchell and Onvural (1996), the exact representation of a function should
m m	 n n
(5.3)
require a Fourier series to have an infinite number of trigonometric terms. Thus, the coefficients of these
terms could only be estimated with a dataset having an infinite number of observations.
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the 19 ( j = 1, n ) are input prices; the z i are adjusted values of the natural log of
output ln Q, so that they span the interval [.1
. 27r,.9 27r]; and Ei is as defined in (5.2).
The formula for z i is (.27r — ,u • a + ,u • lnQi
 ) where {a,b} is the range of ln Qi and
F- (9 . 27r —.1 . 24(6 — a) .7
Moreover, standard symmetry has to be imposed on the translog portion of the
function: 8u = gji and	 = yj, , where (i =1, 2) and (j =1, 2,3) , and the following
linear restrictions on (5.3) are necessary and sufficient for linear homogeneity in factor
prices: E fli =1; Er = 0 and Ep li.. = 0.
j=1	 i=1
	 j=1
The Fourier terms are included only for the outputs, leaving the input price effects
to be described solely by the translog term [see, for instance, Berger et al. (1997) and
Altunbas et al. (1999)]. The input prices also show very little variation, thereby
providing greater justification for our methodological approach.
In this research the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost function, defined by
(5.3), are estimated using the Maximum-Likelihood (ML) approach. For instance, the
ML estimates of ,e, (7,2 and y are obtained by finding the maximum of the log-likelihood
function as specified in Coelli et. al (1998). The nature of the log-likelihood function of
the model given the distributional assumptions on v and u can be also found in Battese
and Coelli (1993) and Coelli et al. (1998).
'ow
7 The Fourier-flexible is a global approximation because the terms such as cos z, sin z i , cos 2z1,
sin 2z 1 are mutually orthogonal over the [0,27r] interval, so that each additional term can make the
approximating function closer to the true path wherever it is most needed. Moreover, by restricting the Z,
to span the interval [1 . 27r,.9 27d, the approximation problems arising near the endpoints are reduced
[Gallant (1981)].
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5.2.3	 Prediction of Firm-Level X-efficiency Measures
Once the model is estimated, bank level measures of X-efficiencies can be calculated
using the residuals and are usually given by the mean of the conditional distribution of
u, given e,, which can be written as E =(u i lei ). The mean of the density function for
given e, can be found in Battese and Coelli (1992). For the half-normal stochastic model
this E 
= (u , ) is a consistent estimator for the individual efficiency measure [see also
Jondrow et al. (1982)].
These individual bank X-efficiency measures (netting out the stochastic
disturbance) are generally defined as the estimated cost needed to produce a bank i's
output vector if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample,
divided by the actual cost of bank i, adjusted for random error [for example, Resti
(1997a)]. This ratio between the minimum and the actual cost of bank i can be
expressed in the form:
TC .
Cost EFF . = 	 nun
TC
where TCi is the actual cost of the ith firm, TCrnin is the minimum cost estimated from
••••
the fitted cost frontier, and Cost EFFi is defined as exp(-u1). This expression relies upon
the value of the unobservable u, being predicted and is achieved by deriving expressions
for the conditional expectation of these functions of the u, conditional upon the observed
value of ei (=v1+
The cost efficiency ratio may be thought of as the proportion of costs or resource
that are used efficiently. For example, a bank with Cost EFF of 0.80 is 80 per cent
efficient or equivalently wastes 20 per cent of its costs relative to a best practice firm
facing the same conditions.
(5.4)
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5.2.4	 Calculation of Economies of Scale
A natural way to express the extent of scale economies is the proportional increase in
cost resulting from a small proportional increase in the level of output: that is the
elasticity of total cost with respect to output.
The degree of scale economies (SCALE) used here is given by:8
M
SCALE — Oln TCE
eln Qi
din TC 
where L
	 represents the sum of individual cost elasticities and can be rewritten
1.1 dln Q,
as:
m	 m m
	 m n
SCALE=Ea; +Ea ln Qi
 + EEpu in pi ±	 sin(zi )— t9i
 cos(zi
 +
1=1	 i=1 j=1
	 i=1 j=1	 i=1
171 M
EE	 + zi )—Ou
 cos(zi
 z;	 (5.6)
j=1
m m rn
EEE Rik sin(zi z; +zk )-0,,,, cos (z i +z + Zk)]
i=1 j2i
ki
where there are economies of scale if SCALE <1, constant returns to scale if SCALE = 1,
and diseconomies of scale if SCALE > 1.9
a As pointed out by Greene (1993b), different measures of economies of scale are used in different studies
[see, for instance, Baumol et al. (1982); Mester (1987) and Resti (1997a)]. It is important to point out that
we will always refer to economies of scale for what is the value of point estimates of scale elasticities [see
for more details, Evanoff and Israilevich (1995)].
9 It should be noted that the definition given here is the reciprocal of the definition that was given in the
previous chapter (section 4.3.1).
(5.5)
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5.2.5	 Variations to the Cost Frontier
Following Mester (1996), the cost frontier will be estimated a second time in order to
take into account risk and output quality factors, as discussed before in this chapter.
Both the financial capital (K) and the asset quality (S) variables are specified in first-
and second- order logged terms [lnK and 1/2(lnK) 2] and [inS and 1/2(1nS)2].
The variation to the cost frontier can be seen in (5.7) below [see also (6.2) in the
next chapter]:
ln TCi = ln TC(QoPi , Ki ,S; ;B)+ u i +v ;
	(5.7)
where Ki is the level of financial capital at bank i, and Si is a proxy of quality given by
the non-performing loan to total loan ratio. The degree of economies of scale used here
will be given by:
SCALE= Eai +EEgo lnQi +EEpu lnPj +Eaik ln K +Eais ln S
1=1	 1=1 j=1	 i=1 j=1	 1=1	 i=1
m m
+ER sin(z i )— cos(z i )] + 	sin(zi + 0-194 cos(z i + z; )j+	 (5.8)
1=1	 1=1 j=1
m m mr "
EEE [Auk	 + z j + Zk ) — tik cos(zi + zi + Z k)]
t=1 j2i k
kxi
The inefficiency and scale economy measures derived from the estimation of (5.7)
and (5.8) will be then compared with those derived from the standard cost function, in
order to investigate the impact of risk and quality variables on Italian banks' cost
characteristics. Other variations to the cost frontier are the next two specifications: (1)
include only K; and (2) include only S.
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Structural tests will also be undertaken, in order to identify what model provides
the best data fit. Specifically, the structural test used in this analysis is the likelihood
ratio test, which is calculated as — 2{1n[L(1-1 0 )J — ln[L(H, )JI, where L(1-10 ) and L(H1)
are the values of the likelihood function under the null and the alternative hypotheses,
H0 and H I , respectively.
5.3	 Definition of Variables
As discussed in the previous Chapter 4, choosing the appropriate definition of bank
output is a problem that continues to challenge all bank costs studies. Following leading
researchers like Mester (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997), the approach to output
definition used in this study is the intermediation approach. This approach posits that
total loans and total securities are outputs, whereas deposits are inputs to the production
process of banking firms.
Table 5.1 gives the definitions of all the variables specified in the cost function
estimations and for all model specifications. The variables' input prices, Pi, comprise
the price of labour, interest rates on customer deposits and other non-interest expenses.
Expenditures on these inputs include the majority of all banking costs. On the other
hand, the variable —crutputs Qi cover customer loans and securities, the latter being
measured as other earning assets. Finally, quality is proxied by a variable measuring the
non-performing loans to total loans ratio and the level of financial capital is measured as
the average volume of equity capital (for each of the years considered).
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Table 5.1	 Variables Definition
VARIABLE	 SYMBOL DEFINITION
TOTAL COSTS
	 Personnel expenses
(dependent variable)	 TC	 + Other non-interest expenses
+ Interest paid
OUTPUTS	 01	 Total customer loans
02	 Other earning assets
INPUT PRICES	 P1	 Personnel expenses / Average number of personnel
P2 	 Interest expenses / Total customer deposits
P3	 Other non-interest expenses / Total fixed assets
FINANCIAL CAPITAL	 K	 Volume of equity capital
ASSET QUALITY	 S	 Non-performing loans / Total loans
5.4
	
Profitability Test
One criticism of the above approach [see, for example, Berger, Hunter and Timme
(1993) and Berger and Mester (1997)], however, is that cost X-inefficiency estimates
neglect the revenue earning capacity and/or profitability of banks under study. For
instance, a seemingly cost inefficient bank might be offsetting higher expenses with
higher revenues. In- order to handle this we follow the profitability test methodology
suggested by Spong et al. (1995).
In their study of US banks, Spong et al. (1995) split cost X-efficient and profitable
banks into an "efficient bank category", while banks with low X-efficiency and low
profitability are grouped into "less efficient categories". We follow this same approach
for the Italian banking sector, which is summarised in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2	 Most Efficient and Inefficient Groups
• MOST EFFICIENT GROUP
Banks that rank in the upper quartile of Italian banks on the cost efficiency estimates and
rank in the upper half in term on return on assets
• LEAST EFFICIENT GROUP
Banks that rank in the bottom quartile of Italian banks on the cost efficiency estimates and
rank in the bottom half in term of return on assets
Source: Adapted from Spong et al. (1995).
Efficient and inefficient banks will therefore be analysed by comparing their
major sources of income (i.e. interest received and non-interest income) and expenses
(i.e. personnel expenses and fixed assets) and their balance sheet components (i.e. loans
and deposits).
As Spong et al. (1995) emphasise, the combination of both a cost efficiency and a
profitability test provides a means of rating banks by both their ability to use resources
effectively in producing banking products and services (cost efficiency), and their skill
at generating income from these goods and services (profitability). This profitability test
provides an alternative to some of the consistency conditions suggested recently by
Bauer et al. (1997). Moreover, a number of financial characteristics that separate some
of the most efficient banks from the least efficient banks will be examined in order to
explore the actual factors influencing efficient bank operations (like the level of NPLs,
level of equity and interest margin).
5.5	 Potential Correlates of Inefficiency
The last part of this empirical analysis on the Italian banking industry aims to evaluate
the determinants of Italian bank inefficiencies. The analysis considers both bank- and
industry-specific factors, as well as other exogenous influences that may explain
efficiency differences among banks [Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and
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DeYoung (1997)]. Following the approach suggested by Mester (1996), we use a
logistic regression model with cost inefficiency as the dependent variable and a range of
independent variables that are expected to impact on X-inefficiency. These include
variables such as banks' size, market characteristics, geographic position, capital,
performance and retail activities [see also Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas et al.
(1999)]. The full list is shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3	 Variables Employed as Potential Correlates of Inefficiency'
Factors	 Symbol
	
Definition
Size
Competition in the market
Market concentration
Retail banking business
Organisational form
Territorial location
Ownership
Assets quality
Performance
Capital
ASSETS
QUOTED
MARGIN
BRANCHES
RETAIL
COM
SAV
POP
NORTHWE
NORTHEA
CENT
OWNERS
NONPERF
PERFORM
CAPITAL
Total assets
1 if bank is quoted and 0 if bank is not quoted
Interest margin / total assets
Number of bank offices
(Loans + deposits) / Total assets
Type of bank
(Dummies for commercial,
savings and popular)
Bank location
(Dummies for north-west,
North-east and centre)
1 for private bank and 0 for public bank
Non-performing loans/total loans
Net income / equity
Equity / total assets
a The correlations between the explanatory variables were investigated to identify any likely
multicollinearity. The results did not suggest that multicollinearity would be a problem.
ASSETS and QUOTED control for the overall size of the bank; MARGIN
measures the degree of competition in the market as a proxy of the mark-up;
BRANCHES and OWNERS are included to account for organisational and regulatory
structure; RETAIL is included to measure the influence of retail banking activities and
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is proxied as customer deposits plus customer loans divided by total assets; type of
banks (COM, SAV and POP) and geographical areas (NORTHWE, NORTHEA and
CENT) are included to see if inefficiency differs by bank category and location,
respectively; NONPERF accounts for output quality; PERFORM is a performance
measure (higher efficiency should be correlated with better performance); CAPITAL is
the financial capital ratio and this should be inversely related to inefficiency on the
grounds that banks with low inefficiency will have higher profits.
A logistic functional form rather than a linear regression model is used to estimate
the efficiency correlates because the values of the inefficiency estimates, t =	 ),
range between 0 to 1 [for applications of this technique in the banking system, see, for
example, Mester (1993); Mester (1996) and Altunbas et al. (1999)].
The general form of this regression equation is:
(ui lei ).  exp(riy) 
I	 1+ exp(X:y)
where Xi is a vector of independent variables for the ith firm, y is the parameter vector,
and 4 is a normally distributed error term [see, for more technical details, Greene
(1993b)].1°
It should however be emphasised that logistic regressions provide information on
correlation and not causality [see Mester (1993); Mester (1996) and Altunbas et al.
(1999)]. Finally, it is important to note that in the logistic model we use standard X-
inefficiencies and not those derived from the risk and quality-adjusted model. The
choice of using only the inefficiency scores from the estimation of Model I is justified
by the fact that we want to avoid the problem of including the NFL variable twice in the
analysis presented later in Chapter 6.
(5.9)
10 The computer programming for the estimation of (5.9) is provided in Appendix A5.6 to this chapter.
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5.6	 The Data
The data used to construct the estimates for the cost function parameters are derived
from Bilbank, an Italian database of the Associazione Banche Private Italiane. For the
present study the sample comprises an unbalanced panel of 1,958 bank observations
distributed in the following way: 545 banks in 1993, 523 banks in 1994, 466 in 1995
and 424 banks in 1996. The sample excludes: i) banks that are subsidiaries of foreign
banks; ii) the central institutes for each category of banks; and iii) special credit
institutions (medium- and long- term banks)." The choice of using an unbalanced panel
is important because it allows us to investigate the impact on cost efficiency of the
restructuring process that has taken place in Italy during the years under study.
From a numerical point of view, the degree of coverage of the panel is outlined in
Table 5.4 for each of the years under study. Overall, the panel is representative of the
whole Italian banking system having an average coverage in terms of number of banks
over the four years of nearly 50 per cent.
Table 5.4	 Sample Size Relative to Total Population
(Number of Banks)a
— - Total number of banks Sample size
(number of banks)
1993 1037 52.5% (545)
1994 1002 52.2% (523)
1995 970 48.0% (466)
1996 937 45.3% (424)
'In brackets the number of banks included in the sample.
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, various years and author's calculations.
"It should be pointed out that since the program FRONTIER 4.1 does not tolerate missing values, banks
with incomplete accounting data are also not included in the samples.
20%
a
Very Big
51%
Medium
13%
Big
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In addition, the coverage of our sample in terms of total assets with respect to the
sample used by the Bank of Italy is, as an average for the years 1993-96, more than
90%.
Figure 5.1 shows the total assets share of each bank class for the sample.
Figure 5.1
	
Total Assets Share for Each Bank Size Class (1993-96)
small	Very Small
10%	 6%
Source: Bilbank and author's calculations.
The year-by-year composition of the panel is shown in detail in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5	 Year-by-Year Composition of the Panel"
MEAN ASSETS
(L. bn)
1993 1994 1995 1996
Very big 140,206.2 8 8 8 8
Big 36,397.4 12 12 12 12
Medium 12,583.4 25 25 22 21
Small 3,735.0 67 62 60 58
Very small 365.9 433 416 364 325
'This classification follows the official definitions that the Bank of Italy adopted in 1994.
b See Table 5.6 for the distribution of sample banks by average assets for each of the years under study.
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Table 5.6 shows the size breakdown of banks in our sample and illustrates that the
differences in banks' size among the five classes are notably high. This is especially
true for the group of very big banks: these have approximately 400 times the average
assets of the very small banks, and 40 times the average assets of small banks.
Table 5.6	 Distribution of Sample Banks by Average Assets
(1993-96)a
1993 1994 1995 1996
Very big 141,816.2 140,645.1 142,232.2 136,131.1
Big 35,360.8 34,875.7 37,597.1 37,755.9
Medium 11,717.8 12,000.9 12,770.4 13,844.6
Small 3,849.2 3,528.9 3,708.9 3,853.0
Very small 364.1 342.4 365.0 392.2
'Billions of lire.
Moreover, the average skewness for the four years is 7.42 per cent, thus
confirming what Resti (1997, p. 244) stressed as an important characterisation of the
Italian banking industry that: the presence, beside a limited number of big institutions,
of a wide layer ors"rnall and very small subjects makes the distribution of banks highly
skewed.
It should be noted that for the purposes of the logistic model described in section
5.5, sample banks will be divided into two groups: large banks (which includes very
big, big, medium and small), and very small banks (as previously defined). In this way,
these latter (minor co-operatives, usually covering limited areas with very few branches)
can be examined separately from other institutions.
The following Figure 5.2 illustrates the different macro-areas in which the country
has been divided as well as the specific regions that are included in the different areas.
North-West
North-East
Centre
OSouth
and Island
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Figure 5.2
	
Macro-Regions in Italy
North-West:
North-East:
Centre:
South+Islands:
Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta. 	 .
Emilia-Romagna, Friull-Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto.
Lazio, Marche, Toscana, Umbria.
Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia,
Sardegna, Sicilia.
O..
Table 5.7 shows the number of sample banks by macro area for each of the four
years under study. A bank is assigned to a given region if it has its head office in that
area over the four years under study. From Table 5.7 one can see that most banks in the
sample have their head office in the north-eastern region, whereas the centre has fewer
banks compared with the others. Moreover, it is clear that the number of banks has
fallen in all regions over the period 1993-96 and especially in the south (-31%).
Interestingly, when data are pooled for the four years, the centre appears to have a
higher average size of banks, thus suggesting the high presence of very small banks in
the north-eastern region.
Chapter 5 • Methodology, Variable Definitions and Data Sources 1 63
Table 5.7 Number of Sample Banks by Macro-Areas
Assets size
Macro-area 1993 1994 1995 1996 (mean values and
pooled data)a
North-west 135 129 118 110 7,945.3
North-east 169 164 145 138 2,560.0
Centre 101 96 87 79 6,484.9
South and Islands 140 134 116 97 2,138.3
Billions of lire.
As noted in Chapter 3, the official definition the Bank of Italy uses for short-term
banks includes: joint-stock companies, subsidiaries of foreign banks, popular banks,
credit co-operative banks and central institutes for each category of banks. For the
purposes of the present research we adopt the traditional separation between savings,
popular banks and credit co-operative banks with all remaining institutions falling under
the category commercial banks (Table 5.8). This is done in order to evaluate efficiency
and performance of former commercial and savings banks over the years of major
transformation in the Italian banking system.
Table 5.8
	
Number of Different Bank Types in the Sample
1993 1994 1995 1996
Commercial banks (Banche commercial!) 83 79 67 55
Saving banks (Casse di risparmio) 63 60 56 54
Popular banks (Banche popolan) 81 72 64 58
Credit co-operative banks (Banche di credito cooperativo) 318 312 279 257
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Lastly, Table 5.9 shows the number of commercial, popular, savings and credit
co-operative banks for each geographical area as an average in each of the four years
studied.
In terms of average number of banks over the four years, the sample shows a wide
coverage across regions for each category of bank.
Table 5.9	 Type of Banks in Different Geographical Areas
(Averages 1993-96)
Commercial Savings Popular Credit
Co-op.
North-west 27 11 15 71
North-east 12 21 23 99
Centre 13 20 10 48
South 20 7 21 74
As already observed, the number of credit co-operative banks (i.e. very small
banks) is particularly high in the north-eastern region compared with other regions.
5.6.1	 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.10 provides a selection of descriptive statistics on the variables that will be
included in the cost function estimation as inputs and outputs as an average for the years
1993-96. Year-by-year tables are available in the Appendix to this chapter (Tables
A5.1-A5.4). All monetary aggregates are expressed in 1996 prices.
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Table 5.10
	 Summary Statistics on Cost, Output Quantities, Input
Prices and Risk and Quality Variables (Pooled Data 1993-
96)a,b
MEAN ST.DEV. MIN. MAX
TC 371.45 1528.15 1.30 20,900.45
01 2,125.31 9,356.59 3.78 136,015.68
02 1,957.93 7,980.86 4.13 95,569.43
PI 0.09826 0.01276 0.01039 0.24075
P2 0.07019 0.01338 0.01173 0.16559
P3 1.06819 1.38826 0.08576 21.31176
K 293.85 1,081.28 0.70 11,723.99
S 5.53 5.16 0.05 70.36
a TC = total costs (billions of lire); Q 1 = total loans (billions of lire); Q2 = other earning assets (billions of
lire); P I = personnel expenses/average number of personnel; P2 = interest expenses/total customer
deposits; P3 = other non-interest expenses/total fixed assets; K = level of equity (billion of lire); S(%) =
non-performing loans/total loans.
b Number of observed banks: 1,958.
As shown in the table, the mean bank over the four years under study was
approximately 2,000 billion lire each in both total loans and other earning assets
(mainly securities), nearly 300 billion lire volume of equity capital and around 5.5 per
cent of NPLs as a proportion of total loans.
Ir.
Table 5.11 illustrates the statistics of the variables included in the regression
model carried out in order to check for possible correlates with inefficiencies. It is
important to recall that in order to investigate possible determinants of bank efficiency,
firm-specific measures of inefficiency derived exclusively from Model I will be
regressed on a set of independent variables relevant to the banking business. In this
table the data are pooled together for the four years under study for a total of 1,958
banks.
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Table 5.11	 Summary Statistics on the Variables Employed for the
Correlates with Inefficiency (Pooled Data 1993-96)"
1993-1996 MEAN STDEV MIN MAX
ASSETS 4,536.0 19,306.6 12.7 254,043.9
MARGIN 0.0449 0.0101 0.0067 0.0987
BRANCHES 42 125 1 1276
RETAIL 0.9783 0.1203 0.4704 1.5102
OWNERS° 0 1
NONPERF 5.58 5.58 0.05 70.36
PERFORM 0.0555 0.3168 -8.4122 4.4821
CAPITAL 0.0979 0.0342 0.0266 0.3491
QUOTED° 0 1
NORTHWE° 0 1
NORTHEA° - 0 1
CENT° 0 1
COM° 0 1
SAV° 0 1
POP° 0 1
'ASSETS = total assets; MARGIN = interest margin/total assets; BRANCHES = number of branches;
RETAIL = (customer loans + customer deposits)/total assets; OWNERS = 1 for private bank and 0 for
public; NONPERF = non-performing loans/total loans; PERFORM = net income/equity; CAPITAL =
equity/total assets; QUOTED = 1 for quoted banks and 0 for not quoted; NORTHWE = dummy for north-
western banks; NORTHEA = dummy for north-eastern banks; CENT = banks located in the centre; COM
= commercial banks; SAY = saving banks; POP = popular banks. °indicates dummy variables.
b Number of banks: 1,958.
5.7	 Conclusions
This chapter summarised the methodological approach that will be taken to estimate
cost efficiency in the Italian banking system between 1993 and 1996. It also describes
the variables and the dataset used for the empirical analysis. The Fourier-flexible
functional form will be used to estimate X-efficiencies and scale economies for the
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Italian banking system. First, a standard cost frontier specification using the
intermediation approach will be estimated and these results will then be compared with
those derived from a frontier specification that controls for risk and quality factors. The
approach then goes on to identify Italian banks that are both cost and profit efficient,
evaluates the possible determinants of bank efficiency and then examines how
efficiency varies across various geographical regions and bank sizes. The second part of
this chapter undertook an exploratory data analysis of the sample. The following
Chapter 6 reports the empirical results.
Chapter 6
Cost Efficiency in the
Italian Banking Industry
6.1	 Introduction
In this chapter the cost efficiency of the Italian banking sector is empirically analysed
for the years 1993 to 1996 using the methodology summarised in the preceding chapter.
The chapter is set out as follows: section 6.2 illustrates the functional forms used and
describes the maximum likelihood estimates for both Model I, the standard cost frontier
specification (section 6.2.1); and Model II, the standard cost frontier specification
including variables that control for risk and output quality factors (section 6.2.2);
section 6.3 reports the results of the relevant structural tests.
Cost X-efficiency results are discussed in section 6.4 and those for economies of
scale are reported in section 6.5. Most of these results are grouped according to bank
size classes (i.e. very big, big, medium, small, and very small), types of bank (i.e.
commercial, savings, popular, and credit co-operative), and geographical areas (i.e.
north-west, north-east, centre, and south and islands).
Section 6.6 reports the findings of the profitability test carried out in order to
check for specific financial characteristics of efficient and inefficient banks, and section
6.7 examines potential correlates of the inefficiency measures by using a logistic
regression model. Section 6.8 is the conclusion.
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6.2	 The Cost Function Estimates
6.2.1	 Standard Cost Frontier Specification: Model 1
Maximum-likelihood estimates for Model I are obtained by estimating a multiproduct
Fourier-flexible cost equation in a stochastic context as in (6.1) below:
2	 3
ln TC =	 cro +Ea, lnQi +Efl.lnP1. +
1=1	 j=1
22	 33
2 3	 4
E E )94 ln Q, ln P j + E [Ai cos z 1 + 0, sin z,]+
11 J=1
2 2 r
+EzR, cos (z i + z i )+ o. sin(z i + z i A+
i=1 J=1
2 2 2 r
-FEEEK, cos (z +z + z k )+ Oijk sin(z i
 + z i + z k A+ ei
1=1 J2t k2j
k i
with the following restrictions:
SYMMETRY
	
84 =5 	 YqY ji
3	 3	 3
HOMOGENEITY
	 E fli =1	 En=0 Epu = 0
1 =1	 1=1	 i=1
+1/2[E E5,j ln Q i ln Qi -FEEr, In Pi InPj1+
2.1 1=1	 i=1 j=1
(6.1)
where [ (i= 1,2) and (j = 1, 2,3)] and (see also Chapter 5, Table 5.1):
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TC	 normalised costs of production;
Q1	 total loans;
Q 2	 total securities;
normalised price of labour;
P2 	 normalised price of deposits;
P3	 price of capital;
stochastic error term;
z.
	
values of Ina so that they span the interval
{.1 .	27r]
aq0,8,7 ,p, 2, 0 = parameters to be estimated.
In accordance with the assumed constraint of linear homogeneity in prices, TC, P1
and P, are normalised by the price of capital, P3 [see for example, Greene (1993a);
Kwan and Eisenbais (1994); Berger and Mester (1997)]. It is also important to mention
that consideration of input share equations embodying Shephard's Lemma restrictions is
excluded in order to allow for the possibility of allocative inefficiency [see, for example
Berger and Mester (1997)]. I Moreover, the Fourier terms for the input prices are also
excluded in order to conserve the limited number of Fourier terms for the output
quantities used to measure scale efficiencies [see Berger et al. (1997)]. Also Mitchell
and Onvural (1996) did not impose restrictions on the trigonometric input price
coefficients; howc.NTr, Gallant (1982) has shown that this should not prevent an
estimated Fourier-flexible cost function from closely approximating the true cost
function. (In this way, the input price effect is defined entirely by the translog terms and
the problem of imposing homogeneity restrictions on trigonometric price terms is
avoided).
As pointed out in the previous Chapter 5, in this empirical analysis most computer
routines are carried out using FRONTIER 4.1 and TSP 4.0. The estimated parameters
are shown in Table 6.1.
I Likewise, the Battese and Coelli (1992) model was originally developed without including these
auxiliary demand equations based on Shephard's lemma.
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Table 6.1	 Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates (Model I and
Model 11)"'c
Variables Name Parameters MODEL I MODEL II
Intercept b0 ao 1.4594*** 1.4534***
(.1144) (.120)
InQi b1 al .3874*** .3724***
(.0455) (.0523)
InQ2 b2 a2 .4715*** .4685***
(.0399) (.0456)
InPi b3 01 .1126** .1258**
(.0463) (.0523)
InP2 b4 02 .8448*** .8218***
(.0524) (.0573)
InQiInQi b5 51 i .1678*** .1559***
(.0151) (.0183)
InQ2InQ2 b6 522 .1319*** .1289***
(.0164) (.0211)
InQIInQ2 b7 512 -.1479*** -.1520***
(.0146) (.0162)
InPlInP, b8 Yil .1867***
(.0204)
.1692***
(.0205)
InP2InP2 b9 Y22 .1495*** .1294***
(.0283) (.0287)
InPlInP2 b10 Y12 -.1758*** -.1589***
(.0224) (.0226)
InQiInP, b11 Pi i .0412**
(.0173)
.0326*
(.0202)
InQ21n131 b12 P21 -.0008 -.0358*
(.0185) (.0214)
InQIInP2 b13 P12 -.0566** -.0460**
(.0176) (.0202)
InQ2InP2 b14 P22 .0166 .0477**
(.0189) (.0213)
cos(z1) b15 Xi -.0865** -.1013**
- (.0412) (.0411)
sin(zi) b16 01 .0904** .1064**
(.0397) (.0396)
cos (z2) b17 X2 .0464* .0552**
(.0286) (.0291)
sin(z2) b18 02 -.2039*** -.1639***
(.0362) (.0360)
cos(zi+zi) b19 X, i -.0818** -.0855**
(.0303) (.0307)
sin(zi+z1) b20 011 -.030 -.0183
(.034) (.0338)
sin(z2+z2) b22 022 .1701** .1679**
(.0611) (.0601)
cos (z 1 +z2) b23 X12 -.0362 -.0434*
(.0286) (.0289)
Continued Overleaf
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(continued)
Variables Name Parameters MODEL I MODEL II
sin(z1 +z2) b24 012 -.1472*** -.1422***
(.0344) (.0339)
cos(z1+z1+z2) b25 X112 .0281** .0297**
(.0159) (.0158)
sin(z1+z1+z2) b26 0,12 .1114*** .1189***
(.0181) (.0180)
cos(zi -FZ2+Z2) b27 X122 -.0306*** -.0293**
(.0153) (.0153)
s i n(z1+z2+z2) b28 0122 -.0952*** -.0973***
(.0181) (.0183)
InKInK b29 TKK - -.0452**
(.0239)
InQ i InK b30 aiK - .0217*
(.0156)
InQ2 InK b31 a2K - .0133
(.0180)
InP l InK b32 131K - .0474**
(.0216)
InP2 InK b33 132K - -.0448**
(.0209)
InSInS b34 iss - .0043**
(.0024)
Ingl InS b35 «is - .0152**
(.0049)
InQ 2 InS b36 a2S - -.0055
(.0055)
InP l InS b37 Ris - .0352***
(.0078)
InP2InS b38 132S - -.0351***
(.0075)
InKInS b39 TICS - -.0041
(.0052)
InK b40 TK - .0011
- ... (.0449)
InS b41 Ts - -.0342**
(.0148)
sigma-squared b42 cr2 .0322*** .0299***
(.0023) (.0025)
gamma b43 y .9357*** .9336***
(.0064) (.0071)
eta b44 1 .0318*** .0507***
(.0088) (.0094)
*, **, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
'Asymptotic t-ratios distributed as N(0,1). Model I: Log-likelihood =2492.6. Adjusted R 2 of the pooled
OLS model=99.8%. LR test of the one-sided error= 1323.7. Model II: Log-likelihood =2541.8. Adjusted
R2 of the pooled OLS model=99.9%. LR test of the one-sided error= 1152.1. Estimates based on the
Davidson-Fletcher-Powell algorithm using the FRONTIER 4.1 software [see Coelli (1996) and Coelli et
al. (1998)]. Standard errors in brackets.
b See the Appendix to Chapter 5 for the computer programming.
' Model I = standard cost function estimates; Model II = cost function estimates with risk and output
quality variables.
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From Table 6.1 it is clear that all the elasticities around the means have the
expected sign and are statistically significant. The model has zero it (that is, half-
normal disturbances) since the same model with 1 .1 # 0 (truncated normal) was rejected
by the data at the 10% leve1. 2 Besides, the value of 77 is always positive and
significantly different from zero, therefore inefficiencies tend to decrease with time over
the four years under study. However, if 17 = 0 (time-invariant model), the individual
inefficiencies tend to be very similar to those where 77 # 0 (time-varying efficiencies).
The Spearman correlation coefficient between the average of the inefficiencies
estimated over the four years with the time-varying model and those derived from the
time-invariant model is equal to 99.87%.
Given the stochastic assumptions on the error term, the estimates for (7 2 and y are
also provided. In particular, the estimate y has a value of 0.936 (with a standard error of
0.006). These values suggest that the majority of residual variation is due to the
inefficiency effect u and that the random error is less than 10 per cent. Moreover, the
one-sided generalised likelihood-ratio test, which tests the null hypothesis that there are
no technical inefficiency effects, under the null hypothesis, Ho: = 0 provides a statistic
that considerably exceeds the 5 per cent critical value of 2.71: thus the null hypothesis is
sn••
2 Technically, the truncated model is also known as the Stevenson model [Stevenson (1980) and Coelli et
al. (1998)1 and it has been applied to the Italian banking sector by Cardani et al. (1991), together with the
half-normal model in an attempt to compare the respective results. Cardani et al. (1991) found that the
half-normal model provided a better fit to the Italian data. For other studies on banks' efficiency that use
the half-normal specification to test for inefficiency differences between banking institutions, see also
Kaparakis et al. (1994), Allen and Rai (1996) and Mester (1996). For an extensive review of different
distributions used in the frontier literature, see Bauer (1990) and Greene (1993b).
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rejected. 3 (Table A6.1 in the Appendix reports the other parameters, such as the values
for the last input P3 and the related cross products together with their asymptotic
standard errors, which are computed from the restrictions of homogeneity reported in
equation 6.1).
6.2.2	 Cost Frontier Including Risk and Quality Variables: Model II
Model II relates to the cost frontier model including risk and quality variables. The
description of variables and parameters are essentially the same as in (6.1) plus the
following variables:
K	 =	 level of equity capital;
S	 =	 ratio of non-performing loans to total loans;
r	 =	 parameters to be estimated.
3
Model II is simply Model I, plus the additional restrictions: Efljk = 0 and
i=1
flis = 0 as shown in (6.2) below:
i=1
Wm,
3
3 The generalised likelihood-ratio test requires the estimation of the model under both the null and
alternative hypotheses Ho : y = 0 and H I : 7 > 0. As explained in Coelli et al. (1998), if Ho is true,
this test statistic is usually assumed to be asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random variable with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions involved. Nonetheless, because of difficulties
arising when testing the null hypothesis of y =0, the calculation of the critical value for a test of size a
is Zi2 (2a), so that the critical value for a test of size, a =0.05 is 2.71 rather than 3.84.
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As for Model I, balance sheet data were included in the panel for the four years
under study and, given the stochastic assumptions on the error term, the estimates for 02
and y are provided.
As displayed in Table 6.1, as far as the outputs and input prices are concerned, the
elasticities around—the means have the expected sign and are statistically significant.
With particular reference to the estimates for non-performing loans (S) and equity level
(K), while the former is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, the same cannot
be found for the latter, which according to the two-tailed t-test is insignificantly
different from zero. An explanation could be found from the fact that there is a
multicollinearity problem between total cost and equity, which is possibly influencing
the variance of the equity estimate. Nevertheless, most second order coefficients
involving the equity variable are found to be significant even if multicollinearity among
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variables are likely to inflate their estimated variances (as is common with second order
approximations) [see also Resti (1997a)].4
It is also important to observe that as for Model I, p=0. Moreover, the value of 77
is again positive and significantly different from zero, thus confirming that over the four
years 1993-1996 the inefficiency levels are generally decreasing. As for Model I, when
the restriction 77 = 0 (time-invariant model) is added, the distribution of individual
inefficiencies is virtually unchanged with respect to those where ri # 0 (time-varying
efficiencies). The Spearman correlation coefficient between the average of the
inefficiencies estimated over the four years with the time-varying model and those
derived from the time-invariant model is equal to 99.62%. Furthermore, the estimate y
has a value of 0.934 (with a standard error of 0.071), thereby suggesting again that the
majority of residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect ui.
Finally, the one-sided generalised likelihood-ratio test of y = 0 (no technical
inefficiency effects) provides a statistic that considerably exceeds the 5 per cent critical
value of 2.71, thus rejecting the null hypothesis (see, for details, earlier footnote 3).
6.3	 Structural Tests
Structural tests are undertaken to see if the cost function including the risk and output
quality variables (Model II) differs significantly from the following: (1) the standard
cost frontier specification (Model I); (2) the translog form; (3) the model including the
individual risk variable; and (4) the model including the individual output quality
variable.
4 We also estimated the cost function using different specifications without significantly changing the
results obtained. Among other specifications, we tried: the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, in which
environmental variables explaining various banks characteristics are added directly in the cost function,
and Berger and Mester's (1997) model with fixed netputs specified in the cost function (namely, physical
capital and financial equity capital) and normalisation by equity for all variables.
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The likelihood ratio statistics is calculated as — 2{114(1/ 0 )J— ln[L(H1 )J where
L(H0 ) and 41- 13 are the values of the likelihood function under the null and the
alternative hypotheses, H o and H1 , respectively. The results are reported in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2	 Structural Test Results
Test Performed
[versus Model II]
Test
Statistics
Degrees
of Freedom
Critical
Value	
. 2o1
Outcome
(1) Model I 98.4 k = 13 27.69 Rejected
(2) Translog Forma 120 k = 14 29.14 Rejected
(3) NPUL only (S only) 23 k = 7 18.48 Rejected
(4) Equity only (K only) 83.4 k = 7 18.48 Rejected
'The translog form used here includes risk and quality variables.
Overall, Model II (the cost frontier including risk and quality variables
simultaneously) gives the best fit to the data.
With regard „to.. the choice of the functional form for the cost function, the translog
model (2) was rejected at the 0.01 per cent level, thus supporting the choice of the
Fourier-flexible function. Similarly, the models excluding individual risk (3) and quality
(4) variables were all rejected against Model LE at the 0.01 per cent level.
It is useful to note that for the aims of the present research, some of the results
derived from the two models including individual risk and output quality variables are
reported later on in this chapter for comparison purposes along with those derived from
Model II.
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6.4	 Efficiency Levels
Table 6.3 reports the average values of X-efficiency levels for both Model I (M1) and
Model II (M2), with banks grouped by size classes as defined by the Bank of Italy's
ranking criteria.
Although differences are not very large, the most efficient banks seem to be the
big, medium and very small banks using either model specification. With regards to the
inclusion of risk and quality variables, the efficiency estimates are strikingly similar
across the two specifications and there does not seem to be any significant differences
among the values derived from the estimations [for similar findings, see Berger and
Mester (1997) for a US bank study, and Altunbas et al. (1999) for a study on Japanese
banks].
Table 6.3
	
Average Values of X-Efficiencies Grouped by Bank Size
Classes",
1993 1994 1995 1996
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Very big 81.2% 83.2% 81.8% 84.0% 82.3% 84.7% 82.8% 85.4%
Big 85.2% 85.1% 85.6% 85.8% 86.1% 86.4% 86.5% 87.1%
Medium 85.9% 85.6% 86.3% 86.2% 87.0% 87.2% 87.0% 87.5%
Small 81.6% 81.1% 82.3% 82.0% 82.8% 82.8% 83.3% 83.5%
Very small 85.4% 85.2% 86.1% 86.2% 86.7% 87.0% 87.1% 87.6%
MI = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
b The non-parametric ICruskal-Wallis test was carried out to check for the hypothesis Ho of equality of
mean X-efficiencies across bank size. The null hypothesis has always been rejected at the 5% level.
Results from the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test show that the null hypothesis Ho of equality of
medians between the efficiency scores derived from MI and M2 for each bank size group can never be
rejected at the 5% level.
The results are confirmed in Table 6.4 that summarises the descriptive statistics of
the results of year-by-year X-inefficiency levels. Average inefficiency levels range
between approximately 13 and 15 per cent. Similar figures can be found in several
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recent studies of Italian banks [see, for instance, European Commission (1997), and
Resti (1997a)]. It is also possible to observe that even in terms of mean and median
values, the effects on the inefficiency levels derived from the inclusion of risk and
quality variables in the cost function do not seem to be materially important.
Table 6.4	 Statistics for Inefficiency Levels'
MEAN MEDIAN STD EV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
M1 M2 M1	 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
1993 15.1% 15.3% 14.7% 15.2% 0.077 0.075 0.45% 0.43% 51.2% 51.5%
1994 14.4% 14.4% 14.0% 14.1% 0.073 0.070 0.43% 0.41% 35.1% 33.4%
1995 13.9% 13.6% 13.5% 13.4% 0.071 0.067 0.42% 0.39% 34.2% 32.0%
1996 13.5% 13.0% 13.1% 12.8% 0.066 0.062 0.41% 0.42% 32.2% 30.7%
a MI = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
The efficiency scores were further analysed in order to test the null hypothesis that
the means of the populations obtained from the estimation of Model I and II are the
same against the alternative hypothesis that they are different. According to the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90 per cent
confidence interval for each of the four years under study. Moreover, the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test was used for testing the null hypothesis that the central
locations of the two populations were the same against the one sided alternative
hypothesis that the central location of Model I is higher than that of the results derived
from Model II. Again, the results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a
95 per cent confidence interval for all the years under study.
In Table 6.5 below, the findings on productive efficiency have been grouped
according to banks operating in different geographical areas. It should be noted that a
bank is assigned to a given region (north-west, north-east, centre, south and islands) if it
has its head office in that area over the years under study (see, for details on the macro-
areas in Italy, Table 5.7 and Figure 5.2 in the previous chapter).
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Table 6.5	 Average Values of X-Efficiencies Grouped by Geographical
Regions"
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
North-west 87.2% 86.4% 88.1% 87.6% 88.3% 88.0% 88.4% 88.4%
North-east 85.7% 84.9% 86.3% 85.8% 87.2% 87.0% 87.4% 87.4%
Centre 83.2% 83.6% 84.0% 84.5% 84.2% 85.0% 84.2% 85.3%
South and Islands 82.9% 83.5 % 83.6% 84.4% 84.1% 85.2% 85.0% 86.1%
a MI = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
b The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out to check for the hypothesis Ho of equality of
mean X-efficiencies across bank regions. The null hypothesis has always been rejected at the 5% level.
a Results from the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test show that the null hypothesis Ho of equality of
medians between the efficiency scores derived from Ml and M2 for each bank region can never be
rejected at the 5% level.
The X-efficiency measures are always higher for banks located in the northern
part of the country, whereas the lowest efficiency scores are found for banks from the
centre and the south, thus confirming the existence of significant disparities between
banks operating in different macro-regions in Italy.
Table 6.6 illustrates the average efficiencies according to different type of banks
(commercial, popular, savings and credit co-operative). It is possible to observe that on
average the better performing banks are the credit co-operatives together with popular
banks, possibly reflecting the greater homogeneity of the co-operative banking sector.
Table 6.6	 -Average Values of X-Efficiencies Grouped by Type of
Banks"
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Commercial 80.7% 80.5% 81.8% 81.8% 82.2% 82.6% 82.6% 83.2%
Savings 82.4% 82.3% 83.0% 83.2% 83.6% 84.1% 84.3% 85.0%
Popular 83.9% 84.1% 85.3% 85.6% 86.1% 86.6% 86.6% 87.1%
Credit co-op 86.7% 86.4% 87.2% 87.1% 87.6% 87.7% 87.8% 88.2%
a MI = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
b The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out to check for the hypothesis Ho of equality of
mean X-efficiencies across bank types. The null hypothesis has always been rejected at the 5% level.
a Results from the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test show that the null hypothesis Ho of equality of
medians between the efficiency scores derived from MI and M2 for each bank type can never be rejected
at the 5% level.
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Tables 6.7 and 6.8 provide the pooled efficiency scores from the estimation of the
two models in relation to each asset-based quartile in order to check whether size can
effectively be considered as a determinant of potential cost reductions for Italian banks.
Table 6.7 Bank Size and Efficiency Scores (Model I)
ASSETS RANGE" MEAN MEDIAN STDEV MIN MAX
QUARTILE 1 12.7-106.8 (58.8) 87.8% 88.0% 0.066 65.4% 99.0%
QUARTILE 2 106.9-290 (188.9) 85.4% 85.5% 0.070 64.0% 99.5%
QUARTILE 3 290.1-1410.2 (653.9) 86.0% 86.6% 0.077 64.0% 99.6%
QUARTILE 4 1410.3-254043.9 (17226.5) 83.6% 82.9% 0.071 66.7% 99.6%
'Mean values in brackets.
b Values in billions of lire.
Table 6.8 Bank Size and Efficiency Scores (Model II)
ASSETS RANGE" MEAN MEDIAN STDEV MIN MAX
QUARTILE 1 12.7-106.8 (58.8) 87.7% 87.7% 0.065 65.5% 99.2%
QUARTILE 2 106.9-290 (188.9) 85.7% 85.6% 0.069 65.2% 99.5%
QUARTILE 3 290.1-1410.2 (653.9) 86.2% 86.5% 0.073 65.2% 99.6%
QUARTILE 4 1410.3-254043.9 (17226.5) 83.7% 83.0% 0.066 69.7% 99.6%
a Mean values in brackets.b Values in billions of lire.
From the tables above it appears that both the mean and the median of firm-
specific X-efficiency estimates tend to decrease from Quartile 1 to Quartile 4. 5 This
suggests that, on average, larger banks deviate more from their respective cost-efficient
frontier than do smaller banks. Relatively speaking, the smallest banks appear to be less
inefficient than their larger counterparts. Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (1999) found
similar results for German banks and they argued that credit co-operative banks seem to
As shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, Quartile 1 (4) contains the smallest (largest) firms.
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have a lower cost of funds than other types of banks due, for instance, to their (possible)
local monopolies.
The same data (assets in logarithms) are reported in the scatter diagrams below
(Figure 6.1). The charts show similar patterns and they both suggest that the dispersion
of the efficiency scores for the two panels and for each model is very high, thus
implying that in many cases similar-sized banks have different efficiency levels and,
supposedly, different costs.
Figure 6.1	 Efficiency and Size
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From a general viewpoint, a slight inverse trend between total assets and
productive efficiencies seems to prevail (that is, the higher the efficiency the lower the
amount of assets). The factual statistical significance of the relationship between assets
and inefficiency measures is tested later in this chapter with the application of a logistic
functional form (in section 6.7 of this chapter).
For comparison purposes, Table 6.9 shows the influence on X-inefficiencies of the
levels of equity and the NPLs to total loans ratio calculated using different cost function
specification. The related maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table A6.2 in
the Appendix.
Table 6.9 X-Inefficiency Measures. Cost Function Estimates
Including Equity (K) Only and Non-Performing Loans/total
loans (S) Only a'p'c
1993 1994 1995 1996
K only S only K only S only K only S only K only S only
Very big 18.5% 14.5% 17.9% 13.7% 17.3% 12.9% 16.7% 12.2%
Big 14.9% 14.2% 14.4% 13.4% 14.0% 12.6% 13.5% 11.9%
Medium 14.2% 13.7% 13.7% 13.0% 13.0% 11.9% 12.9% 11.5%
Small 18.4% 18.1% 17.6% 17.0% 17.1% 16.1% 16.5% 15.3%
Very small 14.7% 14.4% 13.8% 13.3% 13.2% 12.4% 12.6% 11.8%
All banks 15.1% 14.8% 14.4% 13.7% 13.8% 12.9% 13.3% 12.2%
a K only = including equity only; S only = including non-performing loans/total loans only.
b The non-parametric-Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out to check for the hypothesis Ho of equality of
mean X-efficiencies across bank size. The null hypothesis has always been rejected at the 5 % level.
Results from the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test show that the null hypothesis Ho of equality of
medians between the efficiency scores derived from the cost function including K and the efficiency
scores derived from the cost function including S for each bank size group can always be rejected at the
5% level.
If one excludes the ratio of NPLs over total loans from the cost function, there
appears to be a tangible effect on the X-inefficiency results (although, as discussed
above, this effect appears not to be relevant when both S and K are included in the cost
frontier estimation simultaneously). In fact, the inefficiency levels are always higher on
average for any bank size over the four years under study, and these differences seem to
Chapter 6 • Cost Efficiency in the Italian Banking Industry 184
be especially important for very big banks. This suggests that capitalisation (K) has the
most noticeable influence on the X-inefficiency results. To summarise:
• Model II that includes risk and output quality variables in the cost function
specification, fits better the data sample according to the Likelihood Ratio Test.
Moreover, with regard to the choice of the functional form for the cost function,
the rejection of the translog model supports the choice of the Fourier-flexible
function.
• Between 1993 and 1996, average X-inefficiency levels range between 13 and 15
per cent of total costs and they tend to decrease over time for all bank sizes. The
most X-efficient banks appear to be big, medium and very small institutions
located in the north of the country. Co-operative banks seem to be less inefficient
than other bank types.
• There does not appear to be any significant difference between the results derived
from Model I and Model II. This is in line with recent studies on the US and
Japanese banking [Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas et al. (1999),
respectively] who found efficiency estimates strikingly similar across the different
specifications. Nonetheless, when risk and output quality variables are included in
the cost function estimation individually (that is, in the two cases where only K is
included and only S is included, respectively), there appears to be a larger impact
on the results. The average X-inefficiency range changes to 12-19 per cent, being
especially high when only the level of capitalisation (K) is incorporated
individually in the cost function.
• Firm-specific X-efficiency estimates show quite a high degree of dispersion in
terms of individual institutions' total assets. This means that in many cases
similar-sized banks have different efficiency levels and different costs. Lastly, a
slight inverse trend between total assets and X-efficiencies seems to prevail (that
is, the smaller the bank, the higher the level of efficiency).
Chapter 6 • Cost Efficiency in the Italian Banking Industry 185
6.5	 Economies of Scale
Economies of scale are calculated for each year to examine the relative change in total
costs associated with an incremental change from a particular output level and to see if
there were significant differences between the results derived from the two models. As
discussed in the methodological chapter, we will always refer to scale economies for
what is the value of point estimates of scale elasticities. The degree of scale economies
is computed by using the mean values of output and input prices for Model I, and using
the mean values of output, input prices and risk and output quality variables for Model
II [see section 5.2 for the formula used to calculate scale economies given equations
(5.3) and (5.7) and Table A5.8 in the Appendix for details of how the standard errors
were calculated]. Table 6.10 shows the degree of scale economies for each year and for
both models together with their significance levels.
Table 6.10	 Scale Economies (by Bank Size)c
1993 1994 1995 1996
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Very big 1.039 1.078 1.049 1.078 1.011 1.057 1.029 1.062
(.087) (.087) (.085) (.085) (.090) (.090) (.088) (.088)
Big .756** .823* .785** .849* .745** .805** .814* .874
(.104) (.102) (.105) (.104) (.106) (.104) (.105) (.103)
Medium ":762** .821** .751** .806** .767** .818** .744** .800**
(.086) (.084) (.088) (.087) (.087) (.085) (.090) (.088)
Small .925 .980 .917 .967 .951 1.002 .866** .913
(.072) (.072) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.072) (.072)
Very small .754*** .767*** .761*** .771*** .779*** .784*** .844*** .847***
(.045) (.045) (.044) (.045) (.044) (.045) (.044) (.045)
All banks .779*** .801*** .784*** .802*** .803*** .819*** .844*** .859***
(.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.036) (.036) (.036)
*,**, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
'If SCALE >, < or = 1 then there are diseconomies, economies of scale or constant returns to scale
respectively.
b In this case the standard error in brackets refers to the hypothesis 1-10=1.
° M1 = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
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The results above suggest that very big banks did not have potentially realisable
scale economies in the years under consideration and appear to exhibit constant returns
to scale. Big and medium banks show high and significant economies of scale over the
four years in the majority of cases. In contrast, small banks show significant scale
economies only in 1996, whereas very small show substantial scale economies over the
whole period under study.
Overall, the results suggest that over the 1993-96 period economies of scale are
present and significant in the Italian banking system considered as a whole.
Nonetheless, if we look at the change in output required to produce at the most efficient
scale (i.e. the minimum average cost, where elasticity equals one), the findings also
suggest that, with the exception of very big and small banks, most institutions are still
not operating at optimal scale size since they are in the area surrounding the increasing
returns portion of the cost frontier. 6 These are quite important results if we consider that
over 1993-96 the process of consolidation and restructuring of the system was aimed at
gradually increasing Italian banks' size and in many cases inefficient banks
experiencing crises had to leave the market.
Our results, in line with the findings of Altunbas eta!. (1999), also show that scale
economy estimates appear to be more sensitive when risk and quality factors are
included in the cost function specification.
Table 6.11 reports the results on scale economies according to the different bank
types. The category of banks showing the greatest degree of scale inefficiency is credit
co-operative banks; whereas the saving banks show the closest values to unity, that is
constant returns to scale. Scale elasticity measures are also significantly different from
unity for popular and commercial banks over all the years under study, although the
estimated scale inefficiencies are less than those for the credit co-operative banks.
6 It should be noted that here we assume that scale inefficiency is linearly related to the scale elasticity
measure, i.e. equal to one minus the elasticity measure.
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Table 6.11	 Scale Economies (by Bank Type)"
1993 1994 1995 1996
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Commercial .864** .908** .871** .911** .880** .920* .891** .928*
(.047) (.046) (.047) (.046) (.049) (.048) (.054) (.053)
Savings .907* .963 .914* .964 .932 .981 .901* •945
(.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.064) (.064)
Popular .864** .915** .854** .901** .857** .905** .857** .904**
(.050) (.049) (.050) (.050) (.051) (.050) (.053) (.053)
Credit co-op .710*** .712*** .721*** .721*** .747*** .743*** .820*** .815***
(.052) (.052) (.050) (.050) (.049) (.049) (.048) (.049)
*, **, *" means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
a If SCALE >, < or = 1 then there are diseconomies, economies of scale or constant returns to scale
respectively.	 •
b In this case the standard error in brackets refers to the hypothesis H0=1.
MI = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
With regard to scale economies according to different geographical areas, Table
6.12 shows the related findings for each category of banks. It partly confirms the results
presented before in this section and it also reveals some other interesting patterns. The
group of commercial banks appears to show high and significant scale economies
everywhere in the-cOuntry, and especially in the north.
Savings banks are on average the bank category that seems to be the least able to
exploit significant reductions in average costs associated with increase in output in
virtually all regions. However, savings banks traditionally pursue objectives such as: i)
encouraging savings among the public; ii) promoting developments in the local
economy; iii) supporting social works; and iv) operating in the best interests of their
members [Revell (1989)].
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Table 6.12
	 Scale Economies (by Bank Type and Geographical
Region)b'c
1993 1994 1995 1996
M1 M2 M1
Commercial banks
M2	 M1 M2 M1 M2
North-west 0.821"* 0.859*** 0.829*** 0.864*** 0.835*** 0.872** 0.832** 0.878**
North-east
(0.040)
0.846**
(0.040)
0.891**
(0.040)
0.845**
(0.040)
0.889**
(0.042)
0.877**
(0.042)
0.922*
(0.050)
0.870**
(0.050)
0.906**
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Centre 0.895** 0.944 0.910** 0.952 0.886** 0.925* 0.926* 0.962
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.055)
South 0.895** 0.940 0.901** 0.941 0.915* 0.955 0.910* 0.944
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
M1 M2 M1
Savings banks
M2	 M1 M2 M1 M2
North-west 0.915* 0.970 0.922* 0.972 0.930 0.980 0.939 0.983
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
North-east 0.887* 0.943 0.892* 0.943 0.915 0.966 0.868** 0.914
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Centre 0.926 0.979 0.938 0.985 0.951 0.997 0.923 0.964
(0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064)
South 0.898* 0.966 0.895* 0.957 0.929 0.981 0.879** 0.933
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068)
M1 M2 M1
Popular banks
M2	 M1 M2 M1 M2
North-west 0.830** 0.890* 0.830** 0.882* 0.844** 0.897* 0.805** 0.856**
North-east
(0.075)
0.871**
(0.074)
0.928*
(0.075)
0.867**
(0.074)
0.917*
(0.074)
0.876**
(0.073)
0.926*
(0.075)
0.893**
(0.074)
0.937
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054)
Centre 0.880** 0.928* 0.826*** 0.870** 0.820*** 0.865** 0.834*** 0.882**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
South 0.869** 0.914** 0.867** 0.910** 0.861** 0.905** 0.876** 0.920*
(0.047) - (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
M1 M2
Credit co-operative banks
M1	 M2	 M1	 M2 M1 M2
North-west 0.798*** 0.828*** 0.754*** 0.765*** 0.776*** 0.783*** 0.874*** 0.882**
North-east
(0.037)
0.712***
(0.036)
0.712***
(0.045)
0.737***
(0.046)
0.736***
(0.045)
0.755***
(0.045)
0.752***
(0.046)
0.847**
(0.046)
0.844**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
Centre 0.672*** 0.676*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.709*** 0.706*** 0.775*** 0.775***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052)
South 0.710*** 0.700*** 0.698*** 0.686*** 0.733*** 0.716*** 0.760*** 0.740***
0.061
	 0.061
	 0.060
	 0.061	 0.062	 0.063
*, **, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
a If SCALE >, < or = 1 then there are diseconomies, economies of scale or constant returns to scale
respectively.
b1  this case the standard error in brackets refers to the hypothesis H0=1.
a Ml = Model I (standard cost function estimates); M2 = Model II (cost function estimates with risk and
output quality variables).
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As a matter of fact, savings banks have become more demand-oriented only in
recent years. It has been argued [IEF (1998)] that with the increased competition all
over the EU banking markets, savings banks are gradually changing their objectives,
and they are becoming increasingly cost and profit efficiency orientated. Nonetheless, in
the case of Italy, public-owned foundations still prevail and savings bank legal status is
still unclear from a regulatory point of view.
Finally, from Table 6.12 it appears that popular and credit co-operative banks
having their head office in any region of the country have higher potential savings in
average costs. Table 6.12 also reveals that in many cases the inclusion of risk and output
quality factors in the cost function seems to reduce the level and/or the significance of
the scale elasticity estimates.
Table 6.13 illustrates the influence that individual risk and output quality variables
have on scale economies when estimating separate frontiers (the related maximum
likelihood estimates are in Table A6.2 in the Appendix to this chapter). These results
show that the inclusion of either individual K or S always has an impact on the
estimated scale elasticity levels. In general, including the quality variable (the ratio of
NPLs to total loans) results in estimates of scale elasticities which are higher than the
estimates obtained by including financial capital in the cost function. For all categories
of banks except very big banks, this has the effect of reducing estimated scale
inefficiencies (since the scale elasticities are closer to 1.0). This is similar to the results
in Table 6.9 where mean X-inefficiencies are generally lower when the output quality
variable is included in the cost function, than when financial capital is included.
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Table 6.13 Scale Economies - Cost Function Estimates Including
Equity (K) Only and Non-Performing Loans/total loans (S)
Onle'
1993 1994 1995 1996
K only S only K only S only K only S only K only S only
Very big 1.017 1.056 1.027 1.065 .997 1.035 1.014 1.050
(.087) (.088) (.086) (.086) (.091) (.092) (.089) (.089)
Big .785** .818** .816** .847* .778** .809** .849* .880
(.104) (.105) (.106) (.105) (.107) (.108) (.105) (.106)
Medium .821** .848** .809** .836** .828** .855* .805** .832**
(.088) (.087) (.088) (.089) (.087) (.087) (.090) (.091)
Small .995 1.017 .988 1.001 1.023 1.045 .940 .961
(.073) (.073) (.071) (.072) (.071) (.072) (.073) (.074)
Very small .784*** .791*** .794*** .802*** .809*** .818*** .876** .885**
(.045) (.046) (.045) .045) (.045) (.045) (.045) (.045)
All banks .815*** .826*** .822*** .833*** .840*** .852*** .883** .896**
(.038) (.035) (.038) (.039) (.038) (.038) (.037) (.038)
*, **, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
a If SCALE >, < or = 1 then there are diseconomies, economies of scale or constant returns to scale
respectively.
b In this case the standard error in brackets refers to the hypothesis H0=1.
' K only = equity only; S only = non-performing loans/total loans only.
Overall, the results on X-efficiencies and economies of scale in Italian banking
seem to suggest that our sample of very small banks, usually in the form of co-
operatives, are the most cost efficient in the system and they have a high potential for
savings in average costs. These bank types still benefit from the advantages of operating
in niche markets where they usually enjoy local monopolies. Other important elements
that have often been put forward to explain the specialness of these banks include their
localisation, reputation, and the special (long-term) relationships they tend to have with
their retail and small and medium enterprises (SME) customers. Moreover, within co-
operative banks members have more incentives to control one another (so-called peer
monitoring) and managers have less opportunity to overspend to maximise their own
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utility (expense-preference theory). These factors may also explain why co-operative
banks (i.e. popular and credit co-operatives) are more profitable than other bank types
(see Chapter 3), despite the comparatively higher operating expenses in relation to total
assets. However, in contrast to the results on X-efficiencies, the scale economies
findings suggest that despite their high potential, these very small-sized banks are still
not operating at optimal scale size, since they are in the area surrounding the increasing
returns portion of the cost frontier.
Cost efficiency levels, both in terms of X-efficiencies and economies of scale,
increased over the 1993-96 period for all bank types, very big banks included, although
for the latter the potential benefits deriving from economies of scale appear to be soon
exhausted. Moreover, the fact that we use an unbalanced panel allows us to conclude
that most probably the increase of M&A activities and the privatisation process that
characterised the years under study have had positive effects on the overall efficiency of
the system (see for example the results on X-efficiencies for big and medium banks),
although these institutions seem to be operating at a non-optimal scale size. As for the
group of very big banks the positive effects of the new deregulated and competitive
environment will probably be felt more over the longer term, because these banks had to
bear high operating and fixed costs related to the acquisition of banks in crises and the
formation (through acquisitions) of big banking groups. Also, large investments in new
banking technologies represented important costs, the benefits of which will not feed
through until a later date.
6.6	 Profitability Test Results
Following Spong et al. (1995), we subject our cost efficiency measures derived from the
Fourier model to a profitability test. This is undertaken in order to identify banks that
are both cost — and profit — efficient and it provides an alternative to some of the
consistency conditions suggested recently by Bauer et al. (1997).
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This approach is taken because the cost side may provide inaccurate rankings of
efficiency; a seemingly cost inefficient bank, for example, might be offsetting higher
expenses with higher revenues. It follows that bank's which do well on both cost
efficiency and profitability tests will comprise the most efficient bank category; banks
that fare poorly on the two tests will be grouped in the least efficient category.
In this way, a broader concept of efficiency is used, because the combined tests
identify the ability of banks to use their resources efficiently both in producing banking
products and services and in generating profits. Moreover, a number of financial
characteristics (concerning cost and revenue composition and general balance sheet
structure) that separate some of the most efficient banks from the least efficient banks
are discussed in order to provide an insight into the factors behind efficient bank
operations.
This test was applied to the results derived from the estimates of both Model I
(standard cost frontier specification) and Model II (cost frontier including risk and
output quality variables). The results are reported in Tables 6.14 for Model I and 6.15
for Model II.
Table 6.14 Profitability Test: Model la
v.+
Number
of banks
Cost efficiency
(averages) %
ROA
(averages) .%
1993 Most efficient banks 82 94.7 1.61
Least efficient banks 87 74.4 -0.10
1994 Most efficient banks 86 94.4 1.32
Least efficient banks 100 75.7 -0.05
1995 Most efficient banks 76 95.0 1.83
Least efficient banks 91 76.6 0.07
1996 Most efficient banks 64 95.0 1.82
Least efficient banks 81 77.5 0.26
' The two groups of the most efficient and the least efficient banks is created in the following way: 1)
most efficient group: banks that rank in the upper quartile of Italian banks on the cost efficiency test and
in the upper half on ROA; and 2) least efficient group: banks that rank in the bottom quartile on the cost
efficiency measure and in the bottom half on ROA.
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Table 6.15	 Profitability Test: Model ha
Number
of
banks
Cost efficiency
(averages)
%
ROA
(averages)
%
1993 Most efficient banks 79 94.4 1.65
Least efficient banks 79 74.4 -0.05
1994 Most efficient banks 82 94.6 1.35
Least efficient banks 96 76.1 -0.02
1995 Most efficient banks 72 94.9 1.85
Least efficient banks 84 77.3 0.12
1996 Most efficient banks 68 94.8 1.79
Least efficient banks 75 78.5 0.33
' See note to Table 6.14.
As an average for the four years under study, a total of 77 banks for Model I and
75 banks for Model H satisfy the selection criteria for the most efficient group. On the
other hand, an average of 90 banks for Model I and 84 banks for Model II meet the
standards for the least efficient group.
The average bank in the least efficient group has a cost efficiency of only 0.76 in
both Models, which indicates that an average bank in this group could have produced
the same amount of output with only 76% of their cost if they operated as efficiently as
the best practice banks. On the other hand, the average cost efficiency level for the most
efficient banks is approximately 0.94, thus indicating much less of a disparity with the
"best" bank in the sample. Moreover, as an average for the four years, the ROA for the
most efficient banks was equal to 1.64% for Model I and 1.66% for Model H.
Table 6.16 shows a comparison between the major sources of income and
expenses, as well as several other financial ratios, for the most recent available year
using the results derived from Model II. It reveals how efficient and inefficient banks
differ, and also, to what extent they show similar features. The table shows the main
financial characteristics for the two samples "all banks" and "large banks only". This
latter group includes the following bank size: very big, big, medium and small (see, for
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the distribution of sample banks by average assets, Table 5.6 in the previous chapter).
This choice of such a sub-sample is motivated by the fact that the interpretation of some
of the results could be affected by the inclusion of a large number of very small banks in
the sample "all banks".7
Table 6.16
	
Sample Bank Information
(Group Averages -1996 Data and Model II)a
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS ONLY
MOST
EFFICIENT
LEAST
EFFICIENT
MOST
EFFICIENT
LEAST
EFFICIENT
Number of banks 68 75 31 29
Cost X-efficiency 0.95 0.79 93.1 76.9
Roa 1.79 0.33 0.72 0.18
Interest received 9.63 9.11 8.90 9.01
Non-interest income 0.19 0.71 0.78 0.76
Interest paid 5.26 5.04 4.94 5.02
Operating costs 2.98 4.0 2.98 4.1
Staff expenses/operating costs 56.7 61.9 61.45 62.51
Staff expensesb 1.69 2.46 1.84 2.54
Other non-interest expenses 1.13 0.81 1.14 1.53
Loans 40.7 43.6 46.29 41.0
Deposits 54.7 54.2 44.48 52.3
Securities 13.4 11.8 14.5 13.5
Equity 11.3 8.50 11.0 8.16
Fixed assets 1.44 2.62 2.32 2.51
Interest margin	 - . 4.40 4.10 3.99 4.01
Npls/total loans 4.42 6.70 4.41 7.98
a Unless otherwise stated, values are expressed as percentage of total assets.
b Staff expenses includes the following: salaries and benefits; social security contributions; severance
indemnities and pensions.
7 As discussed in Chapter 5, since the Italian banking industry is characterised by the presence besides a
limited number of big institutions, of a wide layer of small and very small banks, the distribution of banks
is highly skewed. On the liabilities side a small bank operating successfully in local markets can enjoy a
wide funding basis (and more generally speaking, a broad retail banking basis) at a low price; on the other
hand, a better knowledge of the productive system of their regions can make small banks more effective
in collecting information on the potential borrowers thereby enabling them to serve some regions of the
risk/return curve that would be too risky for big "outside" banks [Resti (1997a)].
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On the earnings side, the advantages held by the most efficient banks seem to be
usually in terms of income generating capacity and, as expected, expenses control.
Focusing on the sample "all banks" the most efficient group has, for instance, an
advantage over inefficient banks in terms of higher interest received on assets. On the
other hand, the most inefficient banks have relatively high non-interest revenues
compared with the most efficient banks, thus suggesting that there might be some
differences in the way the two groups generate income. However, these results are
different if the very small banks are excluded from the sample, thereby suggesting a
higher importance of non-interest income for the most efficient group. As concerns the
expense side, the most efficient and least efficient banks show similar interest expenses.
This means that the most efficient banks do not have important advantages in funding
costs, and therefore they are achieving their performance by other means, other factors
being equal. Furthermore, it seems apparent that efficient banks are more effective in
controlling operating costs, and particularly staff expenses.
With regard to their balance sheet structure, in 1996 the most efficient banks hold
more securities and had higher levels of equity than their inefficient counterparts, thus
suggesting a higher level of protection to their customers. Moreover, the most efficient
banks have better asset quality, thus implying that they are assigning more attention and
resources to loan origination, monitoring and other credit judgement activities.
Overall, from _these findings it is possible to infer that, at least in 1996, the main
differences between the most efficient and least efficient banks operating in Italy relate
to the efforts of bank management to control their staff expenses and to ensure thorough
credit risk management practices.
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6.7
	 Correlates with Inefficiency
In order to investigate possible determinants of bank efficiency, firm-specific measures
of inefficiency derived exclusively from Model I are regressed on a set of independent
variables relevant to the banking business. The choice of using only the inefficiency
scores from the estimation of Model I is justified by the fact that we want to avoid the
problem of including the output quality and capital variables twice in the analysis
presented later in this section.
As discussed in the methodological section, logistic regression provides
information on correlation and not causality [see Mester (1993)]. As stressed also by
Mester (1996), the findings are intended mainly to indicate where banks might look for
clues toward increasing their efficiency.
The results derived from the estimation of the logistic model are displayed in
Table 6.17. The data have been pooled over the four years and calculations have been
undertaken for all banks, large banks and very small banks (Table 6.17). In this way, the
determinants of very small banks' efficiency can be tested separately from the other
institutions. Since the results for all banks suggest several differences between macro-
regions and type of banks, separate logistic regressions by geographical areas and bank
types were run (see-Table 6.18 and 6.19, respectively, below).
With reference to the classifications employed earlier in this chapter, here large
banks include the following asset size: very big, big, medium and small. For details on
the variables used and for the specification of the functional form employed for this
analysis see Table 5.3 and the Appendix to Chapter 5.
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Table 6.17 Correlates with Inefficiencies - Logistic Regressions
(All Banks, Large Banks and Very Small Banks)"
PARAMETER ALL LARGE VERY SMALL
INTERC -3.002*** -2.9196*** -2.9505***
(.1344) (.2752) (.1826)
ASSETS .0004 .0019 -.2884***
(.0017) (.0016) (.0648)
MARGIN 7.6265*** 12.6647** 5.1413**
(1.4751) (3.7472) (1.7116)
BRANCH ES .0446* .0319 2.0613***
(.0282) (.0280) (.2512)
RETAIL .9974*** 1.5393*** .7914***
(.1133) (.2281) (.1297)
OWNERS * -.0721 -.1558** .0855
(.0557) (.0681) (.0944)
NONPERF .0093*** .0011 .0132***
(.0019) (.0031) (.0025)
PERFORM -.0072 -.0193 -.0206
(.0337) (.0427) (.0467)
CAPITAL -1.5664** -1.6798* -1.2127**
(.4301) (1.0626) (.4706)
QUOTED * -.1835** -.2691*** -
a
NORTHWE
(.0594)
-.2158'
(.0611)
-.1027* -.2430***
a (.0415) (.0722) (.0509)
NORTH EA -.1568*** -.2887*** -.0709*
a (.0368) (.0736) (.0422)
CENT -.0041 -.0476 .0467
a
COM
(.0362)
.4331***
(.0676)
-.2029
(.0420)
.3662***
...., .	 (.0381) (.1653) (.0487)
SAV .2832*** -.3682** .1728*
(.0637) (.1706) (.1141)
POP * .2128*** -.4417** .1431**
(.0359) (.1610) (.0510)
a ASSETS = total assets; MARGIN = interest margin/total assets; BRANCHES = number of branches;
RETAIL = (customer loans + customer deposits)/total assets; OWNERS = 1 for private bank and 0 for
public; NONPERF = non-performing loans/total loans; PERFORM = net income / equity; CAPITAL =
equity / total assets; QUOTED = 1 for quoted banks and 0 for not quoted; NORTHWE = dummy for
north-western banks; NORTHEA = dummy for north-eastern banks; CENT = banks located in the centre;
COM = commercial banks; SAY = saving banks; POP = popular banks. ° indicates dummy variables.
b All banks: number of obs. 1,958- log-likelihood function 2,606.08.
Large banks: number of obs. 420- log-likelihood function 627.16.
Very small banks: number of obs 1,538 - log-likelihood function 2,057.24.
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Table 6.18	 Correlates with Inefficiencies - Logistic Regressions
(North-West, North-East, Centre and South)"
PARAMETER NW NE CE SO
INTERC -4.1861*** -3.1918*** -2.1251*** -2.8880***
(.2817) (.3107) (.2994) (.2200)
ASSETS -2.71E-05 -.0495** .0024 -.0121
(.0030) (.0183) (.0029) (.0108)
MARGIN 14.2369** 16.1254*** 4.9961* 1.4201
(4.3364) (3.1688) (3.5254) (2.3092)
BRANCHES .0801 .5164** .0066 .1479
(.0608) (.1674) (.0411) (.1314)
RETAIL 1.2623*** .7282** .6070** .9819***
(.2563) (.2298) (.2580) (.2047)
OWNERS ' -.0523 .0870 -.3849** .1704
(.0853) (.1510) (.1351) (.1279)
NONPERF •0530*** .0024 .0185** .0104**
(.0070) (.0032) (.0053) (.0041)
PERFORM -.0179 -.2288 .0037 -.0044
(.0857) (.2161) (.1082) (.0523)
CAPITAL -1.0305 -2.7996** -1.8961** -.9042
(.9996) (.8289) (.9525) (.8034)
QUOTED -.2932** -.0361 -.2467* -.4066**
(.0821) (.2336) (.1480) (.1874)
COM .7961*** .270** .0295 .5231***
(.0691) (.0957) (.0976) (.0729)
SAV .5669*** .293* -.1436 .4826***
(.1121) (.1691) (.1450) (.1046)
POP'
... •	
.6370*** -.1736** .1396* .4332***
(.1062) (.0733) (.078) (.0626)
a See note to Table 6.17.
b NW banks: number of obs. 492- log-likelihood function 711.5.
NE banks: number of obs. 616- log-likelihood function 885.7.
CE banks: number of obs. 363- log-likelihood function 517.4.
SO banks: number of obs. 487 - log-likelihood function 602.2.
Table 6.19	 Correlates with Inefficiencies - Logistic Regressions
Popular and Credit Co-operative(Commercial, Savings,
Banks)"
PARAMETER	 COM SAV	 POP	 CC
INTERC -2.933*** -2.5953'	 -3.9186***	 -2.8836***
(.2719) (.3286)	 (.3716)	 (.1712)
ASSETS .0018 -.006	 -.0559**	 -.4350**
(.0020) (.0048)	 (.0210)	 (.1241)
MARGIN .593 15.4948**
	 13.4078***	 7.3878**
(3.3253) (4.9997)	 (3.2427)	 (2.2089)
BRANCHES .0287 .1233*	 .6069**	 5.8736***
(.0348) (.0793)
	 (.1755)	 (1.0284)
RETAIL 1.2661' .1395
	
2.1769***	 .6110***
(.2644) (.3168)
	
(.3661)	 (.1448)
OWNERS' .0017 -	 -	 -
(.065)
NONP ER F .0388*** .0309**
	
-.0021	 .0099**
(.0066) (.0076)	 (.0040)	 (.0028)
PERFORM .0635 .0127	 .4267	 -.0757
(.0512) (.0640)	 (.5478)	 (.0558)
CAPITAL -.1226 .1608
	
-4.3320**	 -1.3229**
(.9503) (1.1733)
	
(1.0874)	 (.6352)
QUOTED° -.1474** -	 -.5104**	 -
a
NORTHWE
(.0791)
-.0159
(.1531)
-.0215
	
-.0101	 -.3700***
a (.0982) (.1192)	 (.1448)	 (.0610)
NORTH EA -.1492* -.1134	 -.5290***	 -.0547
(.1098) (.1242)
	 (.0944)	 (.0486)
CENT' -.1258 .0494	 -.2038**	 .1378**
(.0989) (.0925)	 (.0909)	 (.0486)
'See note to Table 6.17.
b COM banks: numSdi of obs. 284
SAY banks: number of obs. 233 -
POP banks: number of obs. 275 -
CC banks: number of obs. 1,166
- log-likelihood function 367.1.
log-likelihood function 355.5.
log-likelihood function 375.6.
- log-likelihood function 1,641.7.
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The estimates suggest that different variables significantly correlate with
inefficiencies in the Italian banking sector. First of all, in accordance with Mester's
findings (1993 and 1996), inefficiencies are always inversely correlated with financial
capital (CAPITAL). This is quite predictable since banks with low inefficiency will tend
to have more profits as they will be able (holding dividends constant) to retain more
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earnings as capital. However, this result should not be interpreted as saying that if a
bank increases its capital-to-asset ratio, then its inefficiency will decrease. As Mester
(1996, p. 1043) points out, this could also be explained as an indication that higher
capital ratios may prevent moral hazard because: "as an institution's capital level
decreases it has an increasing incentive to take on excessive risk, since it keeps any
upside gain and loses only the amount of capital it has invested in the bank if the risk
does not pay off'. Moreover, inefficiencies are usually inversely correlated with bank
performance (PERFORM) variables, although in most cases the relationship is
insignificantly different from zero.
With regard to the coefficient for the level of NPLs, when significant it is always
positively related to bank inefficiency. In fact, higher efficiency is expected to be
correlated with better credit risk evaluation [see also Mester (1996); Altunbas et al.
(1999); Berger and DeYoung (1997)]. Inefficient banks also tend to have on average a
higher number of branches, a higher interest margin-to-assets ratios and a higher
intensity of retail banking business than efficient banks. This latter variable has been
found significant even when only the subgroup of the largest banks has been tested.
The results concerning the relationship between total assets size and bank
efficiency are mixed. The coefficient is not significantly different from zero for all,
large, north-west, commercial and savings banks. These findings are quite important
because they essentially show that there is no statistical evidence that larger banks are
more or less X-efficient than smaller banks. In fact, from the results it is possible to see
that an inverse relationship between assets size and inefficiency appears only to hold
within a specific bank category (i.e. popular and credit co-operative), and bank size
group (i.e. very small banks).
There are few other statistically significant relationships concerning, where
available, the dummy variables for private and quoted banks. The significance and
negative sign of the dummy for private banks suggests that, at least large private banks
tend to have lower levels of inefficiency. From the results, it is also possible to infer that
quoted banks seem to be on average more efficient than non-quoted banks.
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6.8	 Conclusions
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the cost efficiency of the Italian banking
system over the 1993-96 period. We found that mean X-inefficiency levels range
between 13 and 15 per cent of their total costs and they tend to decrease over time and
for all sizes of banks. Similarly, economies of scale (the value of point estimates of
scale elasticities) appear present and significant in the Italian banking system when
considered as a whole. Nonetheless, if we look at the change in output required to
produce at the minimum efficient scale (e.g. the minimum average cost, where elasticity
equals one), the findings also suggest that most institutions are still not operating at
optimal scale size since they are in the area surrounding the increasing returns portion of
the cost frontier. These are quite important results if we consider that during 1993-96
the process of consolidation and restructuring of the system has aimed at gradually
increasing banks' size.
In line with recent findings by Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas et al.
(1999), the results also show that X-efficiency estimates appear insensitive to different
cost function specifications. In contrast, the level and significance of scale economy
estimates seem to be affected by the inclusion of risk and output quality factors in the
cost function.
The data sample has also been subject to a profitability test (in order to check for
specific financial_ characteristics of efficient and inefficient banks), and potential
correlates of the inefficiency measures were calculated by using a logistic regression
model. Following the profitability test as suggested by Spong et al. (1995), the main
differences between the "most efficient" and "least efficient" bank seem to be mainly
related to staff expenses. In the context of important technological improvements in
banks' productive processes, this suggests an urgent need for greater labour market
flexibility and the consequent substitution of labour for capital. Moreover, inefficient
banks always appear to have lower levels of equity/assets, and higher levels of non-
performing loans.
Finally, the data were pooled to carry out a logistic regression model in order to
examine bank- and market-specific factors that influence banks' efficiency. Confirming
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Mester (1993 and 1996), inefficiencies appear to be inversely correlated with capital
and positively related to the level of non-performing loans. This latter finding suggests
that efficient banks are assigning more attention and resources to loan origination,
monitoring and other credit judgement activities. Interestingly, over the period under
study inefficient banks also tended to have (on average) higher interest margins, more
branches and a greater retail banking orientation compared with their efficient
counterparts. The analysis also shows that there is no clear relationship between assets
size and bank efficiency. However, from the results it is possible to infer that quoted
banks, on average, appear to be more efficient than their non-quoted counterparts.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
and Limitations
of the Research
7.1	 Introduction
Banking has experienced dramatic changes over the last fifteen years. Deregulation,
financial innovation and automation have been major forces impacting on the
performance of the banking sectors of most Western European countries. In such a
context, banks are more concerned about controlling and analysing their costs and
revenues, as well as measuring the risks taken to produce acceptable returns. Therefore,
the issues of bank efficiency and optimal dimension (size, business mix and respective
strategies) have become increasingly important for modern banking firms.
This thesis/provides an overview of the recent developments in the Italian banking
system and investigates banks' performance, profitability and efficiency. The empirical
analysis focuses on the 1993-96 period, which is deemed to be interesting because many
environmental transformations — especially those induced by the EU's and national
government's commitment to deregulate — had a strong impact on the Italian banking
system.
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7.2
	 Liberalisation and Performance of the Italian Banking
System
The issuing of important Banking Directives and Laws at the EU level has encouraged
the processes of structural deregulation and supervisory re-regulation in virtually all EU
Member States. In Italy, the departure from the principles laid down in the 1936
Banking Law (banks' specialisation; separateness between bank and industry; structural
controls; and the state dominance within the banking sector) represented a fundamental
change in the regulation of the Italian banking system.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the reforms undertaken since the late 1980s have
liberalised significantly the banking system thanks to progressive deregulation on the
bank branching restrictions, the liberalisation of foreign bank establishment and the
abolition of specialisation requirements. Moreover, the introduction of the universal
bank model and the possibility given to public sector banks to convert into joint-stock
companies has represented key factors in the modernisation of the system.
Despite these developments, however, during the 1990s the Italian banking sector
has experienced a dramatic fall in profitability brought about by a fall in interest margins
and persistently high levels of staffing costs. In addition, the same period witnessed a
decline in the comparative importance of traditional intermediation activity, while low
inflation and high-competition gradually reduced the differential between lending and
borrowing rates (Chapter 3).
Italian banks have found it difficult to adjust to the new environment not least
because of the relative inflexibility in the factors of production, in particular labour
costs. Italian banks appear to have too high a proportion of staff costs-to-income
compared with their European peers. High staff costs, together with the significant
increase in the number of branches, have affected overall bank costs.
From a macroeconomic point of view, adverse conditions have also led to a
substantial increase in NPLs, especially for banks located in specific geographical areas
of the country. Chapter 3 examines the increase in the level of NPLs, which in the south
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reached a dramatic 24.2% of total loans in 1996 (21.8% in 1997), a ratio that is more
than twice the national average [Bank of Italy (1998)]. On the other hand, the level of
capital does not seem to have been affected by the deterioration in quality of bank loan
portfolios.
The achievement of more competitive conditions in the output market has brought
about situations of crisis for various banking firms. During the 1993 to 1996 period, the
main banks in the south of Italy experienced a substantial fall in their net interest income
and were no longer able to cover the excessively high operating expenses and loan
losses. As a consequence, these banks had to reduce their size and/or were acquired by
healthier banks.
A major response of the system to these pressures has been a substantial
consolidation movement resulting in a reduction in the total number of banks, an
increase in the number of banking groups, and a widespread privatisation programme.
Meanwhile, the fall in banks' interest margin has been partially offset by the growing
importance of non-interest income derived from securities trading and other services.
7.3	 What are the Main Determinants of Italian Banks'
Efficiency?
Bearing the aforementioned developments in mind a primary aim of this research was to
provide an empirical analysis of the cost efficiency of the Italian banking sector over the
period 1993-96 taking into account the risks associated with banks' operations. Chapter
4 explains the most important theoretical and empirical issues in efficiency analysis, and
discusses the various methodologies used for cost efficiency measurement. The chapter
also reports select findings on the efficiency of US and European banking systems.
Details of the methodological approach used for the present empirical research are
provided in Chapter 5, which also describes the variables and data used.
The most recent research criticises the use of the translog cost function, mainly on
the grounds that it is insufficiently flexible to describe the cost characteristics of the
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banking industry. As a result, we chose the stochastic Fourier-flexible functional form.
As far as we are aware, this latter model has not been applied before to analyse the cost
efficiency of the Italian banking system. Moreover, the choice of testing an unbalanced
panel of banks is quite important because it allows us to make inferences on the impact
on cost efficiency of the restructuring process that has taken place in Italy during the
years under study. The data used to construct the estimates for the cost function
parameters are derived from Bilbank, an Italian database of the Associazione Banche
Private Italiane. For the present study the sample comprises 1,958 bank observations
distributed in the following way: 545 banks in 1993, 523 in 1994, 466 in 1995 and 424
in 1996.
The main inferences that can be drawn from the results of the empirical research
carried out in this thesis can be summarised as follows. Over the 1993-96 period cost
efficiency levels, both in terms of X-efficiencies and economies of scale, increased for
all bank types, very big banks included, although for the latter potential benefits
deriving from economies of scale seem to be soon exhausted. Therefore, the increase of
M&A activities and the privatisation process during the 1993-96 period had a relatively
strong impact on the overall efficiency of the system which proved to be especially
beneficial for small- and medium-sized banks. Nonetheless, for the largest banks of the
Italian banking system, the positive effects of the new deregulated and competitive
environment will probably be felt more over the longer term. During the period under
study, many large banks have had to bear high operating and/or fixed costs relating, for
example, to the —aCquisition of banks in crises and to the formation of big banking
groups. In addition, large investments in new banking technologies have represented
considerable costs, the benefits of which will not feed through until a later date. These
new investments in TT are expected to bring about significant reductions in the costs of
processing various banking transactions and will lower overall operating costs.
Another important finding is related to the efficiency levels of very small banks,
particularly co-operative and mutual banks. It appears that these bank types still benefit
largely from the advantages of being small or very small and of operating in niche
markets where they usually enjoy local monopolies. Various elements have often been
put forward to explain their specialness, like: their localisation, their reputation, as well
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as the special relationship (usually long-term) that these banks often (and typically)
establish with retail and small business customers. Other theories demonstrate that the
corporate governance of these banks has a fundamental role in explaining their better
performance as opposed to banks with national branch networks. All of these factors
help to explain why the co-operatives tend to be more profitable and better capitalised
than other bank types.
The empirical analysis carried out in this thesis also investigates the influence
different cost function specifications have on the efficiency results. In particular, we
introduce two additional variables to the standard cost function: the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans and the level of equity capital. This is done because, as
pointed out for example by Mester (1996, p. 1026): "Unless quality and risk are
controlled for, one might easily miscalculate a bank's level of inefficiency; e.g. banks
scrimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be labelled
as efficient when compared to banks spending resources to ensure their loans are of
higher quality". In addition, the results on X-efficiencies and economies of scale derived
from the model including risk and quality factors are then compared with those derived
from the standard cost function.
In line with recent findings by Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas et al.
(1999), the X-efficiency estimates appear similar across the two different cost function
specifications. In contrast, the level and significance of scale economy estimates seem to
be affected by the inclusion of risk and output quality factors in the cost function.
The findings from the profitability test [Spong et al. (1995)] confirm that the main
differences between the most efficient and least efficient banks operating in Italy relate
to the efforts of bank management to control their staff expenses. With regard to the
balance sheet structure, the most efficient banks appear to hold more securities and have
higher levels of equity than their inefficient counterparts, thus providing a potentially
higher level of protection to their customers. The most efficient banks also have a much
better asset quality, thereby implying that they are assigning more attention and
resources to loan origination, monitoring and other credit judgement activities.
Finally, we find that the level of NPLs, the number of branches and an over-
emphasis on retail banking activities seem to be major factors explaining overall
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inefficiency in the Italian banking market. On the other hand, and confirming Mester's
(1993 and 1996) results for US banks, Italian banks' inefficiencies appear to be
correlated inversely with financial capital and usually with bank performance variables
(although in this case this latter is insignificantly different from zero). Moreover, the
significance and negative sign on the dummy variable for private banks suggest that at
least large privately quoted banks tend to have lower levels of inefficiency. From the
results it is also possible to infer that quoted banks seem to be, on average, more
efficient than their non-quoted counterparts.
Overall, during the period 1993-96 the general trend seems quite positive for
Italian banks, because not only has there been a reduction in their average level of X-
inefficiency, but also there is evidence of high potential savings in average costs for the
banking system. This means that the structural evolution of the banking sector in Italy
has gradually set forth the necessary conditions for a competitive environment so as to
facilitate domestic banks competing effectively at an international level. Nonetheless,
several problems remain. These include a high rigidity of the labour factor, a too slow
privatisation process, a and the persistence of poor profitability and efficiency especially
for banks located in specific geographical areas of the country. Such problems seem to
hinder the process of modernisation and restructuring of the system and need to be
solved rapidly if domestic banks want to survive the challenges of a future of profit-
maximising banks operating in highly technological and globalised markets.
sr.
7.4
	
Limitations of the Study
Although this study employs the most up-to-date methodology in the field of parametric
frontier efficiency analysis, different techniques such as Distribution Free Approach
[Allen and Rai (1996); Berger and Mester (1997); Berger et al. (1997)] and Thick
Frontier Approach [Berger and Humphrey (1991 and 1992a); Bauer et al. (1993); Berger
(1993)] could be included in the study. A comparison of the results would provide a
stronger support to our findings while suggesting some insights on the advantages and
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drawbacks of the different models. Likewise, and in line with several international and
Italian studies [see Eisenbeis et al. (1996); Resti (1997a) and Casu and Girardone
(1998)], it could be of interest to employ the non-parametric Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) to the same data set of Italian banks. Such a comparative analysis
would help overcoming one of the typical drawbacks of the parametric models, that is
the assumptions concerning the shape of the frontier for the cost function.
Furthermore, other recent international studies [see for example Berger and
Mester (1997); Maudos et al. (1999)] point to the importance of estimating an
alternative profit function along with a cost function to the same set of data. In this
study, instead of estimating a profit function, we considered it more appropriate to carry
out a profitability test [see Spong et al. (1995)], which also provides an alternative to
some of the consistency conditions suggested recently by Bauer et al. (1997).
Various efficiency studies also include measures of economies of scope to
calculate whether there are cost synergies in the banking systems. This research does not
include such calculations because of the limitations associated with scope estimates. For
instance, the main problem in estimating economies of scope concerns the complexity
of the estimation techniques used, insufficient data on firms that specialise, and the risk
of using data that are not on the efficient frontier, thus confusing scope economies and
X-efficiencies [see for example, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993].
Another shortcoming of the present study may relate to the time period considered
for the empirical analysis. The early 1990s was characterised by substantial
environmental transformations that were expected to have a relatively immediate effect
on the Italian banking system. It might be interesting to carry out the same research over
the second half of the 1990s to verify whether the increase in productive efficiency over
the period 1993-96 has endured over the following years.
In addition, bank efficiency studies are also subject to limitations related to the
number of observations included in the data sample. Although our sample does not
cover the whole universe of the Italian banking system, the percentage coverage is
reasonably high and thus fairly reliable, accounting for approximately 50% in terms of
number of banks and more than 90% in terms of total assets.
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While the cost efficiency model has advantages over traditional measures of
efficiency, it must also be regarded as an imperfect measure. Because of data
limitations, some of the variables in the model specification are only proxies or
incomplete measures of bank inputs and outputs. In fact, it is not possible to include
every item or dimension of a bank's output in the model, and banks that are producing a
wide range of outputs or providing specialised services could, therefore, be judged less
efficient than they really are. In fact, while the multi-product nature of the banking firm
is widely recognised, there is still no agreement as to the explicit definition and
measurement of banking inputs and outputs. Usually, each definition carries with it a
particular set of banking concepts, relating to the production characteristics of the
industry and in bank efficiency studies, the way output is defined and measured may
influence considerably the results obtained [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. Following
leading researchers like Mester (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997), the approach to
output definition used in this study is the intermediation approach that posits that total
loans and total securities are outputs, whereas deposits are inputs to the production
process of banking firms. Berger et al. (1997) maintain that under most circumstances,
the intermediation approach is to be preferred for bank analyses because it is more
inclusive and it captures the essence of a bank as a financial intermediary. However,
other approaches to input and output definition, such as the well-known production
approach, could have been used for comparison purposes.
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Table A3.3	 European and US Banks: Sample Information'
Countries	 NUMBER OF	 NUMBER OF BANKS
BANKS	 (OBS ITEMS)
Austria	 34	 34
Belgium	 35	 34
Denmark	 13	 12
Finland	 3	 3
France	 167	 165
Germany	 468	 465
Greece	 9	 8
Ireland	 9	 2
Italy	 117	 117
Luxembourg	 54	 53
Netherlands	 19	 17
Portugal	 10	 10
Spain
	 92	 91
Sweden	 10	 10
United Kingdom	 44	 37
United States	 395	 290
a The sample includes banks with unconsolidated total assets > $1,000 billions (that is, "large banks",
according to BankScope definitions).
Source: BankScope and author's calculations.
<
co
0 3	 6
w
1- 2
z	 z s±,
w 7 2
o
w w
cC
<
M CC
Z
2 r.
- i
CO <
00
Z 3	
, Z
cc/-	
a . <I 0
	
0 0-
I a	 0 cn•
w
coI-	 Mcu
ae at at e ae e az e e
8 5),	 0co	 I.	 CO	 sr	 CI	 CM
N° 8 8 ° 8
.-dóôododôoo8 8 8
3
•
•U)
6
•
Appendix to Chapter 3 240
0
(1")
•7
0
0
ci
0 0 0 0
o cr) co N co to •st
• o
I
0 0 0
• CV
0
5 ;z
•
a
Cl,
a** 	 0	 Lc,
Z	 2
• 5
c,. P 8 LI,
0	 zw	 2 (9
	
z z	 •0	 Id
ii
(t'' 8000d
s	 8 c9, 0 8
d dcicid
5
•
Appendix to Chapter 4
2CL • •	 • • •
LT.
I-
D
a.
I-
D
0
Ui
_J
o_
2
CO
CC
0
I-
D
Appendix to Chapter 4 242
:.- a)17 1.--• a)	 TJ C tj 1:5	 LC)	 cl)(7) _c c) c c.)	 cD CD =	 CV	 CL0 •-• •,- 7 C	
'5 a) -o -o	 69	 0CL n_ , I	 a)	 0
a) o ., = :0	 = 2 2
ro 0 a_ a
	
0	 C 0
-o	 N ca-	 5	 _Y	 CD
_ 4E. dr/ " 0	
.0 . . 0._	 '..7: CD	 0>
a) cvs0 0 ,-,0 ... ..- ....-•s_O Z., Z 0.3	 -0	 .08 E 0. a, Z	 *mE •cr9 E .G	 -0	 09
	
CO	 CD	 a)	 -a
c m ii 6	 - 0	 .N	 • CD7, . 10) 0 0 C).> c7) .Y co c7).	 "-- c	 ='E) co n- ca	 (T)	 _c cs .CnO g 4_ 8.	 2 E 3 E	 .„„ (Ti
	
.§. ;M: 8
= 76 .0 o 0	 0 cD 0	 E	 E e)(0	 as
O c.) ,.- Cn 13
..;:	 .0 c	 ca 0- ui a	 o>.-c E 0 caC	 0	
c ..-
c 0 CD
cc)	 _C
ES u)	 E. •	 ..... 0 .:= -C	 cl)	 _0 b3. 0
.0 "Ws 0 0 c	 o c-) .>	 >
o 1-6 8 c .2 	 -(9 .C.	 fi	 -- LI0 c CO78 Ts; cz .0 
"C• .6 (1) 8	 E 0° CO :,.2-.	 2	
o ,.--(/) 7, 7.
lii c "a 2 	 a) 0
a) ca 'a o	 oiii .- o	 c‘l	 -.- ..., c -0 (I) ci.
- )7 al •E m• - to	 cn	 a) 0	 rl)	 c .0 .-
CD	 o›.. -	
0 0-0	
.)7C	 0 E m o
a)	 .NI C	 '-' 0	 a)
co .c c c7 ca cii	 E c 8
0 
	
. 0
-,.,, - o	 -c o	 o (1) = It	 CD	 c „
-	 0 ::-...•	 .-	 c 70 '''' 0	 M	 CD 0 -EL) V W CO 0 E	 0 5 o E	 0	 715 8 cz0 c c, 40	 0 w	 0	 0 (/) XICIS ,2 0_ 0 a	 0	 MI	 CO b
o ea a) E 0	 c 0
0 	O a) c -0 _c 0	 o) aS a a0 a	 . 0 0	 (c.3	 0 -0 0 ujC -C a)a) 0 co ,_ .... a)
•- 0 .0 ..z. *- a)	o o 0 E .-	 .-	 CD 0 -.-- ...
O 0Co0	 -o	
=
E CD .....	 0.	 0 1.-_, VI m S	 E	 0 ET)C	 a) 0 _y 0	 Ø (61) 	 o, :--5 :-.5 	,	 c
a.,9 
o
e
c
-0 o.
o 0 cr) c 0	 .c - -	 0	 -cm)	 :0 . , 0O N n-• .-	
"
	
0	 0 C ° 92. 2 0	 5 = o 0
W • c7) A E _c6
 
u_ co E 0 0 w
	
w E u_ a)
CO
cif'	 07	 0)	 co .-'	 iii -giri 'E 0) 2	 a) -o (,..,
	o •,.=	 "8
	
CD MI c cD :c5 0 0	 c
- fn..- > •	 0 .,....	 co _c -a,.	 C.) ••-•	 -C10 V	 0	 C.) -...
2 77'	 f10 E ' m 2	 ...= 6	 . c. ,- ...-0 0	 .-	 0 ti ._	 .0)0	 Ca 0Wcn	 •- u)	 ., C:c.i.) 0 co CD	 1.= cr)	 *.C. 0.(/) 0
E °•- 0	-.0c	 >	 >.	
CCI 0
E °	 > 0")	 x E To' •
	 E uc	 co 0 cz C (I)  
•F cl) a > co ... as -a-	 • o) c >, •-• c	 •- a) a	 a)	 to n- CC	 *- CO CCOO clam,	 E o 'o E a) cc;	 EooIcf)-c 000.0 COO
	
.-6 8 , 0 = 0	 8 rn E  a-•.-- C ° 	 ZE	 8 77, t ..a. 2	 . cc) .7 --,	 :FD- (7) fil' as c 	 76 '0-	 a) CaE2 C 7 0 0	 r(1C012	 0<c7,10EC IBEC0 .... .2 5 _c 15 17) co	 0 .... .2 0 .c 0	 0	 = o _0 co b- -C = a 1- =
co
c
co	 =
co 0	 0
_C 0C00
	
co	 0	 0 co	 -a-)	 :.-•	 00) CA	 (I)	 c	 MI	 X	 0	 co	 0
= ._ 0)	 c U) CO	 a) E _C U)	 C O. 0 0C
	 ca c o	 2 0	 4,- CD	 0 CO	 00.	 ,...,C0 0 -5	 0 CD _I
	
0_ C	 .= . 1-	 co
a. _as (I) n, 5	 o Er)
	
Ca a,	
_,...p -0 v0 0- 0	 0 _ 0 %... c .;._- 1
 cr	 .•-•.- a.) u)	 0	 .C15O. -0	 a _	 ..._.0. 0	 00. 73	 0 C 1.7 5	 Ca, ,-,m; cs 2 ._ cas 'Fs leca -ci c 0 73 CI	 0 0) •-•a)•- ca	 E a)	 0 . c,)-	 aS iF13 ..a. 8
cg m -u) 0 E E	 Ili cy)
 .- 7,	 c	 c_ _a = _o
o E Co 0 rti CD  
	 CD 0 4) .2 Ta ca	 ...,EoE
co E ca a) 7/ .) o-..=-0	 coo -c > co	 7-3 -6 a)	 ..;.-..	 c.)0 = 0 =
= a iz -o CC	 (..)10	 zE 2 8 2 al- 0 as8	 -o	
c	 z
2	 2
-o
o
a. -6 a_ • •	 a. •	 •• •	 • • •	 - • • •
>-
Z - W
0 In= Lu° mCC
zcczMco
ww<Dcr)
oocom=7-
a)
	
N.	 U)	 E
	C 1 ,-	 0
	
c0 01	 -c ..._ 8	 _Y
	
0 LE, ..--	 cl 0 c	 c
	
E ra .c	 c... Ja .= -	 c_o
	
° 2 2 co Nj‘i Lig 8 cd 	 .4- <
	
c..1 o ca	 co ,- 0 :e-..
	
r... a 12, - .°	 co '- CC c	 N. N' L.L- C
	
01 •,„. `... 0 C	 ,--. •ai .. .2	 01 iii .ai cq
•- %=•-' ca > =
	u °- 43 a) . 	 ,u2 °- 2 '6	 u 0. 2 '-
	
caEca lo	orsE=c(13E= g,0 0 , 2 a) 0 0 0 a) 0 0 -
	>- u) o) co o	 > u) u) C..)	 >- u) u) o-
.s.2 •c-n•
o
'c
E- o o
8 7) .77)c
a) 0
O .70
.c	 Wc	 Dca	 •E'
-0	 a)	 ro
cf) ii.)
 a)	 0,--
cc," 6 co '5
D.E..= cg
co	
_a/221 Ici g
0. i' 67) Ea- c..9	 6<a)	 ..o. co in	 03 CUor) =aN. 0 al''' _.) o
	 c) U_ 1-
	
cO '1-- CO	 0 CC0)	 0 .0	 Cr) • • ai	
- -
.-- .0 os -o
	
7. 6 c% a) --..
	 0 a)
a.s;,i a = . w	 ;2 E. 6
	 ;.L.	 E2..
ca E "5 •E'l 2.)
	co = 0
	
6 E c .2 = 2occi alE
 0 Ea,o3o
°	 >- W	 >- ci) _a _0 ci)
a	 o
z co<
0	
< cr)z 0	 rr
< 	 W w0
• cr a:6
=1 2 a)	 2
O cn	 =
•
0
c.)
0
a)
.(7)
.—
E
0
0
0
LU
0
a.
0
as
0
20
"6
C)
cc
>-
0
0
0
a
0
2
CL
0
a
- 
_
Appendix to Chapter 4 243
C 13. 0 0) .0 'Ecu -Cd
ca
c‘3" co—
	66.
— a- o . 0) ct
0 oo
— O.00C-13w-DOc	 mc 6 o
-C	 C 6.•
•
.0C a, .- C
o •- 0 6 oco	 ca Cco	 -c	 u)
-o a)
	 •E 0 0a.)	 C	 0.-EO w0c0-,3 o	
-10 0a_	 CD 17;	 c	 CD
E >, 3 6 =0
	
•-• a) C.)
	 et)(1) aa	 To	 .
°	 ° (&)—	 E
Z giti .0= :". 2 5 1 8
(1)=7) 6=
	6CL 2"' ps,	 17	 -0c c
	 0Mc.CM•7),_C00
	
CalM c g .= ..C2EE .F.2	 1)
"C-1) sa,
 2,
 a,	  	 cS
eL co CD > E
0—	 cp '8.G.--	
—CD	 0	 17 w
	 •	 E
-c
 "8 5 0 0.
	 0
Lac0 _c	 ocu.ca) 
c	 a)	 C	 cY) ."
„,0 E
o	 • C ° 0 V, 0	 0
	
0°C3.0
	 — a)o _0 Ts
	 o 0-
	 0 6c.)	 c.) ...-	 a) 1-5	 0(1)<	 u) u) co o 73 _0 W
a)
E 6	 as:.•=•	
-C	 _d a)C-0-
	
_c as c ai	 28	 co	 0	 0
--d.
	 00	 ca	 ua) 4; azs 70 	 .
. :..e.	 as a.
-
aQ) U)
	
2	 2	 a) 8 CD CD	 0300	 -	 CL	 C C • C2 ti C 0	 00	 0-	 co	 cc	 o.	 u)
	
a)	 cm_	 ow	 o_,	 CD CI) 8_	 c	 0	 _CD03	 -00 E7-0-=CD11)c o w -m-J m 	 03 CO ,--C .
	 CC1	 (/) •C	 c u) %.- 01
0	 t°-J w 0	
— a_ 0 a) C c CD
0,?:	 0° —m5
olocw.am n-	
',5=3
8 0.8(cti —0.E
 —00 .0 g a 5.
ts.
 o a) 0
0= EG)-23
=o..7)01-71)--)W
	
E -J u)
1:1	 -ci	
0 0 _I . Z o	 0.
-o
	
26E
	
a)0 °- o	 o	 2	 2	 re li-a o6:62••2••	 a_•••	 a...•••1-‘-c.)	 ..E. • •
.c
co
a
CO	 . CD 0
-5
'Cu .c
>-
3
2
0-
0
Appendix to Chapter 4 244
-C CD T5	 11,-	 a) .- -	 a)O ..c
C -	 - c . 2= 02 .20
ill - CD	 a)
.0 o • E	 ,_,	 .c 0 ,,,	 0, — — 0.
a) TD 0 g 	 0 r E
c_ > E, ,	 ,.	 00	 a)	 c)
	
2 c.)	 5	 0, >
	a) 	 a)	 c as ca
	
CD cn	 ca	 a-),„ .c •_
. •	 a .
.-a. „.. a)	 as	 c 1-o• C	 o w
" CU 0)
0	 "	 a) 0 .0 	 ° CD0 •-	 C
Ca, (11	 C.) ...
O 2 0 0 (D
	
.—	 ....
. ,..s. -0	 2	 0 cc) '-	 —0 •-• CD	 a)	 2Jo a"z	 al
	
u/ 3 _c	 3 > 	 ECD	 0 •-• 6
	 02D-0	 CO
ca 0	 C	 c/5	 0	 0 '-,,,0	 0)	 ..-- ......u) 0	 1-‘i .2	 0 CD >
	
(1) u1	 = C •-• o0 .c 21	 o co
. 52) o co	 co :-= 0	 c ..
To c -a -13 •g•	 E.o. 3	 ui	 c
_ o o	 a) • .,L., 0 —	 -0 a
	°> ..` ') _ccD Cl)°) 02 -cas
w ° ' j = O''	 co s	 („9	 a)
-, c -	 c:nol6....,c,u)	 c Jo 0 c.)	 n.-
_c	 -,._- as 0 .._	 (1) asO a) - .o 0 0	 - v .= CD a, -a) c cn 0c.o ,_	 a)	 to	 C. 1 a 5 ,.- TO. E °Y 0 ,..: Cr)	 a)
c- c n- ›...-	 C ••-• •••	 020 20co 7150)22 ctsa
 cogc c1/4)co 4'- a' -0 E= = o
.c as—	 0
	
c Cm 8 17') c	 ---	 -0 - al
O .-	 .5 (1)	 u)	 "E
	0 	 a) co CO ..., asa) _c cD (2. 0 >ca
•
 wccama)
,., cc,c..) _c ,„
	
._.-	 .c .2) E 0 o-o
c0 „,--..• la u) i-- -a	 I- .c :a co 0 a
.S "6
 •C
u!). 	 081
CI)	 0 co 5 a)
C
"es o
-c)	 o La) c
c
• o
-0	 5
c
wocas
cp>,11 2
as _o
ai
o
as
• 0
.)c
• o_ •
.9-F0
0	 Q) Cr)
•
C 	-
ca	 o	 c
•oEc0CI) w 0 •
a) T.	 u•
6
_Ne
>	 o	 C
a 7 Ts	 a) .E ca
1C)5 :a)' .4 CD OC
-0 a) :.=	 Cl) 0 .c)
2--E g_ 8_ c
E _c cr) a) 0 8 alco iT) V -o co
-0 tila)	 o
a) 0	 c
ca	 o
	
o • as	 .2 17;
a)	 a) -5	 0	 V)
.N 1:11	 tn.•E o0
75 7) 0 as 70- o	 •-
73 co 	 c	 COO
cr	 1-2 ') '17)	 8 7.6
co-o 0 wcoca	 IF•D gC	 cf)	 1- 7CO
• 
.c co .c 7cc- cc TD	 0
yi
co
(I)0(1)	 CL	 -C
	
. --	
• —	 a)	 0
_ E	 CD	 -"C-	 73	 a
V) . 6	 E	 0 —	 2
o ,	 ...=	 U	 CD
...6
0-0 e‘.
	-V	 a) C.0	 4-•	 C)-
c 0C	 aCDo E
	
10 -0	 C	 0c c
-0 u)	 as	 0
..	 ',.
o 0
.2- „scu (T)	 c :t-. 	 =
a) v•	 03 U)	 (I)	 0	 as u) s.0.
 
WCc	 E 8. _ g = c73	 5 C 0co ° 0	
° 0 a)a) 0 — 0 — 00	 -0 a) -I a) -I
	
E _1 c(I)
'--0	 075 0 a)
	
lo	 m)	 7)	 80 = .N	 0	 0 0	
-E0 '6 (7)	 2 • 2 • 2 •	 - • •
0
LU
a_
2
co Nr	 d.	 15 coC `".	 c0 Yi
.- CM	 a)-.., .:	 t la
-C	 •,- '-0 C	
-
	
a	 c..a 	 0
CO‘i g 75, cc4)
 :95	
co
:(1$
• 
"0 ca	 (1)	 co
.c) c	 co Lo --	 co	 co
.- 0, 0 73 C:I
co as (73 a	 0_ .	 6 <	 cr <	 00 <(N-) ....— 1., .0 54..) ,a)	 ci co- a) ca 2	 0,1"- 2 Ea)	 cnr"	 Li.° c)	 rc-i2- u_C) cidco -4 , a) Ta u_C	 00 ,'" CC c co
CY) " MI —	 E cm -	 o
,- a) .0 aS ES 45 0	 *- CD iii ..-..-- a)	 7 ai (El	 ,--	6 g	 ,c2 ai (E3
• • cl- a) in- as 2 '-	 • • eL 2 "Es- E	 ;2 2 8,	 Li (Ni 2 6-,	 2 '-r.,,Cei E .t.• — eL 0 ,-,°'	 'crs E 0 c0
cucam'c a)c):-	 oalooL)	 a9 o= 2	 0a3 (79 c9 2	 0`' 2, ‘a:
>- u) Tii m.Y....,cna.	 >-cncoo_G	 >- u) 0-	 >- ,-- Cf) 0-	 >- (/) c).
a
z
a >_	 >-a r,--
w	 z 5
cE o cc	 cc	 < 0
111 I-1-1 I	 I	 Fr	 „....
0	 CL R.'	 a. 1.7.•
CC Z 2 co	 2 co	 n 2 N06
w < 0 a)	 0 a)	 o< er),_
co2 = Z,	 I.	 N .....
U-
>-
0
0
0
n_
I-
D
0
Ui
a_
2
CI)
cc
0
Appendix to Chapter 4 245
2 "a
c
C c7Ca > .41 5,
cr•0 Ca	 C
> c,.;) CV .0 El
=•.' 0 5
 >,ca	 c	 o
1-1)	 as	 c
o ---
	 •CL)
• C	 a)O >
Ci t..cti
'f-c-0 2 8 Tricp
E o c
o_	 u) .s.-d -5
Ca .9)..	 ca
c>	 8 .8
C) a 3 5 )
co '5	 a)
• c
E	 1:1
c>
o co	 •c3,O c .8-0 
ui 
0 0 0
To e
co al c‘i ° 2
.0	 C
a) a) c
_c
,_°) 2- ou 0 c
2 0 co 17)
0
c cts
• - >s
-C 0
•-
-o
•- n•n a) E
o	 ui
c
a) o- ° a)
(1)	 ci)
_o
(110CC).0
1.
•
 1
E ss 0 t.-)
-5 7, :0,. g
.› ct)
-C73>.	 >.
2 >	 E
.-°	 -o Li) CC CD 5 0
• o c 
• 
ci)
C	 •=
*- 0
ca	 C
O t.,° cu-3
co	 CD
a) a) caa)  _ c> .c c .c
O as on •- F
0 M c
_c 73o• 0. 
co 0:1 H .9.
in	 0 a)
co 0	 >
-	 1.7.:
71:1
 (1;C:Lc 1- 20.
 77:10a  cm>11)
TA	 o
CD-	 ....,.•
•,.5 -0 -C)C c .9 .0
.°	 c'd
° > o
,_-c	 -0 cp
 X
.c Cl,.-
co 5 .9
 2
5„ -a ,5 o
E
c	 co..°,.
o	 ••-•
4='	 -
03	 °C .72 
• 0 -
0- 0	 Ca Ø
-c	 .c (1)
c.)	 0	 V)0 a)	 CD c
••-• •-• °I- ca
"F, -0 0
oc  
aE
5 5 8 . r)	 (1)
O (.)	 (a) c
ca 2	 a)Ca .c.6(..) To. o .c	 _c
0	 "C1
▪ '-' C.)	 C
"-
E C Z:n- "° a) 0
cT)
C- - -
co L-• co c To
co 8	 mU)
ci
ti 5c -0 ©6 _I 0
o .0 0) 06U) cn > I • -
as 0 Tz• 	 . ,... 0 _C
.0)	 a)	 C CL)
▪ - 1:7)	 cD
.cC)
•
 O E a)
O (1)	 0 0
"5c	 °)
:5 Em` .cs 17: 8E
7:L.00..- •
›. 0	 >,. 0
ci,E2 ›..u)	 o	 18
2 0>
•	
.5° 0T.D
E _c 47-- 2	 
a)	 a)	 C
"Es. j) • 0 a	 Cu
ca ct2 Q0	
„
C	 E cuE
o ,
C .E E 17)	 0 CT)
0
.0	 '..7.
	
I.)	 Th.cl)
co	 ••=.	 0
_c	 0 c
	
.c
O -..= o	 0	 ,...
o ,_ ,.,(1) •:,--	 0 ,- c)
IA . a) _E c	 Ta .2 *-2
o) 5 8 .2	 on 5 o -5
O 2 ...,
	_ 	
0 2 „L.- 0
co - ••••	 V) .- _Ne 0C.8... c "0
	
C ..-. 0 "
O co .- CLvi; 8 o 2	 .._ 0 _c o.1-- c.) Z o.	 I-- 0 I-- a
0	 5C	 *.E	 (j)0 0	 0	
-0
	
CD	 z	 a)	 2o	 c
	
-o	
_c	 _c	 ED)o =	
.5	 cizs	 ca.0 0	 c	 0	 0 0.1
O U) 0 C 0 0
	C.) CI) -0	 Ca C	 a3C	 s-c_ c(I) aj cc9
	0a3 012
	g-Cri ICI .C)CT)	 -.1:::•CD :;5-61)co0 ci., CTS cci 0	 00 c	 0 ca	 a)
o	 0	 U) Ca 0 *-	 as	 0
	
c) 0 0 c _c := 0	 c 1:3	 0 o
	
0 Ti	 C	 0
E 5 =	 .:E
ca 0 ,_ al 	 a) f	 MCI- OC 
'-C	 -9 8 2 52 a ...=,,, 2- 2 7...,	 2 8- co	 7,	
o	 o- as o
o- -o ,-,. a) - .".	 a- -o a)	 --=• •c°
	
a 2	 5	 c 0 a) E-2 --=-• co c	 C=. a)	 CD CO 03 0
co -0 CL 0 a) - CO
• 
13 E U) ..-.	 a)	 .2 CV E co .5 17) a)
	
2Cc on _c o ,a)
c ° 5 E °	 c ...= :- 0 °
° 0 .0 a) - E	 cco-00E	 E0 -ct- To' 2 (7) E	 (1)sf;	 E fa tr; al	 g 0) 7 ‘-2 E a)
 _ .5 E .2 E 5. ° - E c -
	
a. 0	 15 IT, c E c "7-a --(13	 'CT) C E 2 :C... OM _ca) _CD7.3 a) E as U) 0	 13 CD E 0 a) o al u)	 a) c o 0 13 a) CO	 (1.) 0 0 co o ..- - ...
c 0 ...= 2 . a o =
•
 0C1)-01100 c Eaac.)0.	 cc m	 E 0 o_ 2 	 0 0
82	 2	 8
a_ 	 	 a_ • •
	 • •	 •	 - • •	 • •	 • •	 • •
To	 To 0
.0=	 =
-5 Ea) U)	
=	 0
(3) E 2	 o	 E i 73
00 E co	 o_
	
a)	 u) (1) TZ 0
	
0) 0 0- ,-... Cr	 D -I ‘- 0,-.
 -	 u) -	 ceS CI) ina) ,,, -0
"•r' ,
a)
Cf) 2 0, c Tt
c0 D	 0, o 0	 co La '-') a) _,co)	 -c	 -	 CO 11-) _,c u_ a0 • • 0	 0
	
'.- a• 1- In 7,.C‘3 'ai
	
,- 0 o 6 co
	
.c/i Ta. 6 •=' C E	 a 75 0
	co E a ,.,.., 0 7	 E	 s- c0 -0 Z ca0 (a 0 0 0a) al mi _,--• 13 0
	
>- U) _cm : • o U)	 )- CI) 0 C.1) -1
a	 a
a	 z	 - z zz _, <
z )-	 < >_	 < --- 0)< w	
_ Lu	 >. m cr ,
. cc cc (1 0(1
	
(1
	 Occi-u=
cr Lii 1	 11.1 0 =	 Z 1-I-1 ,nl- 0
W CD a- Fe3%	 CD 0 a- rj	 Lij a- `.' CD F.-;
D CC 2 cn	 ci z 2 o)	 co 0 (.5 0 a)
<LUD a) 	CU < D C)	 LU 0 LU D CT)
cocoM7...-	 CD 2 2 Z.	 0 0 (2 2 Z----
_c
-0 = >
ou)g E	 _c
•	
c C.)
CD	 Ca	 Ci3
C-C	 67) -C)	 .E
• 
a) 0›,
c	 a)
coo—	
•	
a) 0 RI
-0 .u.;	 a)	 - 0-•a)no. oEOa)	 > E oD E.2	 L.L.looE c.)
Tol u) 2
C cC)ccicci ci)xw -13 a) 2
gi• 8 E
▪ N IL.>
c
.0 .c
O (/)
C/)
	 C
0 " a, (13a .c
a)
c a o
E oO _c =
	 .cr)
_c
CciC
•
 c— al 0 co
.5 . C2 te •c	 c
Cci	 C w• 03 .5CD 03 71)-	 7,1-3
• Ca In (c)	 .cCD Ca te.	 n- ••-•
- (.3 2
	
ccioc c
• a) 0
 .0
• E >a) , •S
• 8 z 0 -L2
a) a) a)	 =
.c _0 Jo :5	 8
O o 01
—	 •-• -Cr)	 C	 0
• +-
a) _a .„
CD C
	 01)>a,> =
< 0)2 o.9 ca
CD C	 CD CD .'"' CI C
7 a)	 c o) Et5 c .-o ca 2. al .c LE3- 0
c.9 2 C a, 0 C
CD	 JO 03(a > E -C ti
.0
,_ 2	 a)
t. "
0
2	 ..c .... 4—... 09 -00
•!!). 2	 -	 1
=1-6	
.1 -0 I-
.t...) ..-	
-(6) Ui 0 •.- „,a1
8 u) E g =r ,o 0	 o c- -O 0
	
u) o a) Ca
= CD	 a)	 a)
c 0	 *0- M .75,. o
o-....3.	 c o -'' ID ci)
.,... CD73 17 C 0on	 a)
as a.
	
E o 0) -C fn -05"
0) 7,-)
	a) •., a) ---	 =
.a) 6	 a oc! •- ‘...
.7 o a a) raOn 	 CV0 *- cX	 0. -e". (a cy,
oo...00) •••••• 0-••• C 0 c 0
.0 a) crs	 al	 (7) a) a) -0
c - o17 fg c.c;	 Et) , :5 4=*c-) E • c-
a)5 T.) iti Z0 ca.-0 (i) Tii	 Ua o'D 	I) 
>-(.0
0
0
0
0
0
I-
<0
L.1.1
CL
2
cn
cc
0
Appendix to Chapter 4 246
O .0	 0	 0
Tr)	 fl,	 TA	 -.=u)
co	 ca	 as	 cz
O 0	 0	 0O _	 0s_	 0_	 0s
iii ..=.0 	 in- .a)	 to .0 	75 .a>
a) c	 cn -C	 C7) -0	 CT) C
O 2
	
00	 00	 00
U)-	 U)- 	 0 4-	 0 ...-C •-• 	C ••••	 C ...	 C •-•O 0	 al 0	 0 0	 El ig•.- o	 o	 ,- oH o	 I- c.)	 Ho	 Ho
.-Cil.
	03 Ca
=	 a) c
-.= f,
ca	 DA	 •._ ca
_c 2
	 '0	 m n-
- o -8 ,..,	 .g.	 13 CD c
o u) •o.0
	 13 	 co	 -0
Cl. m 0a)	 cts	 0o. ,..	
_
ca c a CU)
c cep'	 .5	 Cli "-%.-
	 CD co
9 u)	 8 _ 03 wEc_J "Z' CO cIc-i u)o E	 m =cc) (1) . 5 --13 03 Ca E C013 0 13 0
'.g 3 1 )
 8 8 o 0 a 0LL (a al al
CT)
	
...-
...E. •	
•	 •
To
..-=
0
0 =
-C CI)	
-C a)	 "0CO 0.)	 0C —Ca U)	 CO ,- (1) as0U)
	
o a a -0 a)
..- C..) 03 CCI. CD 0 Ca
	
-C0_	 u)0. a)	 c). in
as .G ,	 as ..,.. a.) .0	 a)c.)
c a c	 c	 cu P.CD	 cO 'ti _ca	 o c -t-,'  0	 a)
•c-- ,,, •...,	
•= c a) E , CO03 -
	
.5- ti)
-0 a) gra E c -918 ca as CD > a) o 0 .1--
E i- i- E mCCC.)00
45
c • •
	
E • • •
	
•_
-o X
	 DC!)U) Z D
<.< u j	 Z in
ZCQ W Z	 <z z 1.3
D D _.1 0, < LIJ cn
I:: .:( 0 cn	 0) CD
< :E 2 Z. 	ED ..7-
0-
-Y 0
c
w
-0 a)
c.r)
• o
a)	 u)
a)
Cl) 0-S 2
E
a) ca '3 o
>-	 U)
cn
>-
0a0
2
I-
D
0
a
- 10_
2
Cl)
cc
.7t
cC	 <X w LuCCM
Lu 
• 
Zco
z z Wz	 >- 0 aW	 CC cna)	 0 <
- (3)
< 0Z.;
a
z
< z
> D
Z 7.1 0 Co-
° >-
a_ D W
cp co a
Appendix to Chapter 4 247
-0 0 -a .. '5 22 76.,c _c
	
0 ca _a a) a
o_ c 0	 0 a) CD .0 Ca= -- 0 (n c o - „ n- c o -o ..-Q)	 • .0
 ..__ ..
	 c) 0	
_ao.5c...-	 oc	 aj c°-°) .->.	 a as o ncr) ()
 ca	 o (/) z °a)
 c a) .c)
	 . (i- .
	 0 a) 2
-c
 .2 .5
	 2 c
	
0
_	 (1.3 a) _c _c E_ Ta-	 a)
 , o ,-
0	 ,-.T3	 ...... ....
	
8 . 0 2 2 
..a-=
 "6 E
	 .2 ° .5 ›... (n
	
0..= 0 0 - 03 co	 o a) -0 .= 2O 0. 0 E "-: a) " 46 '2 = 0
- 0) 0 0 "-,_ as 	 U) ,. 0	 0	 0 E c
	
o ••-• a) -o cs) at _a c
	
_a 5 1._ = .oCU DCc L.. 217)• .2 f 2 "- (al ° a) 2 0 a) a) 00	 > c a- ..-. ..-. 0
	
0 z 0 , 0 0 c „._	 > 0 -
..., 12 2
 o .,0) E
in-
	a	 0 0 0 ) 'Ft )	 (6. ) 0 . 0 00	 0 a)
 -C
 ...9 0 o	
--,	 0Q-.0	 • 0 ,... ... o- • ET) 0
	 0) 0 ._ -a Ca
: f°3 "-a>>" : -mu) cvul .--c "6u) •c 
-6 
-8 ill b 
.2c
_ C
0	
-..S .2 TD
	 0 0
	 a) a) °- a) as	o - •
	 (,)	 ca	 ..c)N.,.. F. o _ E	 ..... as c
	 a) as .
 . ..	 .(7) a)rn >
	
._. , a)
 o u) .....
 a,
 0	 0 c -,,Ts
 (8)
	_,0 a) -cs F) 0 .Ga .5 0 0	
-a.
 >	 (2
	
, o	 2 0a .c5 c0
 -5o c 2 a) Cal 0 2 8 0 = 0 as 2 0•il • 2 a)
 -E.) - c. 0 0 0	 :.= •-. 0 CO 0 N
	0 .2 a) 10 -E E .5 10	 1:s cts Cn .•-• > .7)
	
= Ca = ..-.
	 n 13 4,0 03°- 0 -
 a) C0
	 a)CDL 'C
 OC 150 ° 0()...-C(1) cti:") 
-C12
 09 : C.), 3 5a) a) t- co "E a)
	 cctos a)
	 ..) 0 0)
	
a2 .( 7) 0 0	 CCcr 0 a 0 2 °	_, ._ = .,c..?: 0 L.= > in'	
-.c. ‘_ 0 , 0 2
'•--  cri>a) ,517) ow° 't .ca) 2 0° z° wm
 "6 E .-c
 -c.-
O CD17;	 EL)
	 oo -
C.)	 c	 2 g
.0 0
	 2 t
- c
as "_.. .0 _	 10 =
..,C '-' • - CD
	 c_-c.) ..= " 13	
-0 -17)o g -6 0
	
,.. 0
u) .:_- 6 E
	 2 c.)
co
	Ta 	 a)>.
C U'
O 0	
_a as
--rac=ou)
'6 0 as .2 1.7., as	 a)	 L) 01	 (,)
• Z	 Ca C
-C 1 0 03	 -CI 0	 >	 o
c	 CO C	 CU 0- 0 0CZ	 c	 c0 0- _02 Ta	 c °	 ^ co
o_ (Ts 2	 0 - (I) -o 0	 Ta
0-	 " o	 *-=	 •	 E	 c	 a)0 a) a L.) Ts „,0 g) 	 R	 o	 E
c E	 -	 o	 .o	 *-=	 7) 2	 ;8;8c.
'0	 CI- 0 a) a,	 a, as	 >
C.)	 C n- a) D C
▪ 
0 ca	 as I- o o o. Li.
2	 a)
a_ •	 •	 •	 -
▪ 
•	 •
•_
LL
>-
0
0
0
0
0
I-
D
0
0
Q_
2
U)
CC
0
I-
Appendix to Chapter 4 248
--
 .,-= 0)	 "E
° 2 '5 --'' Ta ,: 3 -6o	 0 a --•	
...- E)	 as .-	 c	 o .c 	as
...;.., 0	 as o (3) 0	
'- '- "- a) a) c>,o CD 0 I_ ..c 0
co as e	 c .a)	 a)	 - _Nd	 -c0.. c 0
=	 ..	 ..,T.	 o	 73 _ a) a) .- 5 .	 Ta„ 	 0 a.  ;.= a)	 =	 0	 a.-1:3 cn	 a) .... "-- ,-
	 72 .0	 E
	
o,_ a) ,...° ._° ......0 1.3 0 2)
	
ro. 0 >s ° Y 4-,,, CV	 5	 ._cocif, ° .E Co c	 a	 -	 c co as .c .._,	 Eo • .-	 „I 7 0	 a)
	
....: ca ...o. a)	
.,_, .1-nc al r_- .- v,	 ° =	 co 0 a, "E,	 X 	 .(-	 -C3
	
CD ()	 ala) •-• a E c
	 in a)	 5	 o •-
	
2 .5, as	 .-' 2 	 -'.0 d hcq ..,	 0 0	 EE 2 a) a) E 0 E
	 E
	
---- 2 "0
 ° o To	 o u_ E • r- to ,_. >cg -0 (1) g ,c8i ..—f:	 Fr'	
a) 5,a)	 a,	 ....a) al _co (.)
	 Z E
	
.0 5 'a = 2 0 co	
.0	 CD 0	 CD CZ
	
0 CO .8 ..a. C. 0 cp	 °CO C	 ti,' Q	 -c E
	
5 2 (0) a) a) °- id	 0 as -- o -a	 a
	,_ c.) c ma) A	 ....	 0 0)a)	 a) = cti 0 c 13 ›, (Ts U..i CD ar'; ao	 a)	 0)0)	 ..- a
>:(7)	 C	 C
	
r E-	 0 0 - • c co co	 ctS
	
5 -d .° a) ci) o c o
	 E 2
..
	
c o a - - .- a) -0
	 ,-() E '3' i' m 0 ,-.to_ c •	 a)	 a) ,,)o co 4= 0 1E Ira -0 	 8 8 co 0 co (_.) c	 a.	 D. c
	
° 2 5 CA 2 :a E ,t'
	 P 0 0 E - I-U cal	 2	 °	 (00- .2
	
>., ss__ c co 2 a) cis _c	 5	 =., ci, e	 ,	 c) . ....,= ,_	 i.).
	
73 as a:s co _2 E >.< ,	 a) .5. -a as 0	 1)E I g =Ts	 o =
co -a
	
c -.F. 2 0 5 . c	 .co >.(/) 0 E02)
5	 c..) > 5 2 °
	 co .0 5 -2 r) 0 a)	 c )-co -0	 co 25 T.5 0 °- a) al	 c	 en to
	
0 co	 ,
• 
a) 0 0	 ..-Ea_	 _a "a' CD 'a-)	 (1) 0•.:-.  Ta .- ou,ca _a	 woo
	
-.r. (3_0 -- z D a,
	 =	 >	 2 0ice 0 0 0o cn 0
	
-- E - - " 0
	 us (cf; E ' 0 C.) >-5 "0 (0 )., en (n eL 0,
	
C Lij al	 0 ."'
	
0 0 c 00 0-,	 0 --- o a,
•,=„,c„,,._
	 c	 ,. ,- XI	 6 -,-L w›. 0 7 CA -=	 C0 7.5 CL CD 0,
	 o
a) g >, its 0 (-) as ._
	
a) To E 0	 a f)	 -E ... 0 - u- a)CD o((I	 -C Cr) 0 c
	
= C 0	 ,_ —
	
7:1 -C' 8 co I- a *1-. ..) a:,	 ocaa)>•oaT)
	
>, a)	 tmo_mr-;11
-0 c.)0 ac _Eat 6- .c)
	
•2 ' 17 (t1 • .-E 7 .0	 0-0 ...... 0 .- CCI---	 s
.7,	 6 a) (r) 2 -a	 0 •— 0 03 ...E. -C i=
'" -0 C .° 0 co 2 al
	
Ecoco(-0.0
	
_ w > -c ,- 0,
CO a/	 .71.3 -9 a) a)	 > _a > > c 0 4E.
_ E 0 -„,
 „- cst >,,,	 .(7- = .(7- -to 00 0
	
LLI 0 0 .p. c.) _C) ---• -	 '- 0 .C2 C. 	 Tfl ‘,	 0- 0_ a. CO 0 I- 0
aa)	
...-_-.Ta	 coO alO _C	 a) 17)
O 0	
_0 0
•-.=.	 t).	 ---,,, 9- ;.,7	 •)7( c.)
.0	 = a) .6 0 .=
.2 .9E -0 0_.- 0) "*E- 	.«- ..,7;
'ff op) 2 8 E o 20_ m 0 ro ..- 0 0 a)%.-= -c •.,7:
= 0 c000
II- to .,t_-
s_D. C 0 g (71 17).
a)	 - C	 0E al a) I-
c	 Eo
....7:	 5C	 co	 c.)0
	
= 0C	 0MS	 -C0 "r3	 = '...=	 c	 0	 00 0 co 
2 2	 2	 02 _c •F28 c, c	 .
▪ 
0 0
	
en w	 2
o_ a s	 o co	 cc	 .	 „3 c O V)	 al	 a) -0	 a.0_ •-	 c 0 al	 0	 0 8	 c,_ o	 2 CO E (7,	 a.asas -	 o a
,,	
a_ 0	 ,_
c '5	 5 oc	 a7,, . , ,n 0_ 0	 co co 0_ 0	 c0 0	 0
	
-..7.-. 	 as o a c cm .2	 ;a)
...=.	
CO	 0 •-• al ...°E -EE° c c ._ mcc
- J en	 ..=	 .=( 1 ) D = = co ° c ° c c 0 co -= = =	 c
	
c	 .c	
.o c-T3	 0 C	 0 U) ••-•La C 7 cnf, 2 0 cu ) co . 0- 0 c7) 8 =0 a .0— " Ow 0 cou
	To -z-,5 15a	 ....	 ,00 0 ommuco0w0,-00 r) 7). o c	 a) cc; Q ca0 a)Ec.)00-030030=coc...)<<	 =1-1—oz	 E _, c./) o
-a	 -0a)	 2	 2	 a)5c ,	
_• •	 •	 a_ 	 	 cs_ • • •	 • • •
Appendix to Chapter 5
Appendix .to Chapter 5 250
Table A5.1
	 Summary Statistics on Cost, Output Quantities, Input
Prices and Risk and Quality Variables: 1993"
MEAN ST. D EV. MIN. MAX.
TC 361.36 1,539.63 1.30 19,008.01
01 1,883.52 8,646.58 3.94 113,929.90
02 1,880.34 7,965.81 5.57 80,672.27
P1 0.09132 0.01108 0.01039 0.15375
P2 0.07828 0.01376 0.04147 0.16559
P3 1.11277 1.67697 0.10910 21.31176
K 266.65 1,026.28 0.70 11,723.99
S 5.22 4.73 0.07 33.85
a TC = total costs (billions of lire); Q i = total loans (billions of lire); Q2 = other earning assets (billions of
lire); P 1 = personnel expenses/average number of personnel; P2 = interest expenses/total customer
deposits; P3 = other non-interest expenses/total fixed assets; K = level of equity (billion of lire); S(%) =
non-performing loans/total loans.
b Number of observed banks: 545.
\
Table A5.2	 Summary Statistics on Cost, Output Quantities, Input
Prices and Risk and Quality Variables: 1994"
MEAN ST. D EV. MIN. MAX
TC 325.05 1346.83 1.52 14900.77
-
al 1941.33 8661.88 3.78 95151.18
Q2 1844.66 7845.73 4.13 87789.87
P i 0.09634 0.01130 0.01473 0.15050
P2 0.06673 0.01165 0.01173 0.12314
P3 1.04457 1.24662 0.08576 11.73529
K 280.87 1051.92 0.77 11128.39
S 5.85 5.78 0.06 70.36
a See note to Table A5.1.
b Number of observed banks: 523.
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Table A5.3
	
Summary Statistics on Cost, Output Quantities, Input
Prices and Risk and Quality Variables: 1995"
MEAN ST.DEV. MIN. MAX
TC 401.16 1674.56 1.60 20900.45
01 2325.57 10406.30 4.44 136015.7
0 2 1955.32 7803.92 5.84 89135.46
P 1 0.10181 0.01259 0.05978 0.24075
P2 0.06807 0.01276 0.03898 0.13058
P3 1.03118 1.15507 0.14428 12.85294
K 306.44 1113.10 1.13 10899.43
S 5.57 5.02 0.05 41.79
' See note to Table A5.1.
b Number of observed banks: 466.
Table A5.4	 Summary Statistics on Cost, Output Quantities Input Prices
and Risk and Quality Variables: 1996"
MEAN ST.DEV. MIN. MAX
TC 408.98 1558.60 1.63 17101.42
0 1 2442.95 9848.10 3.85 99176.93
02	 ..-, 2200.26 8371.45 9.32 95569.43
PI 0.10565 0.01134 0.04863 0.13969
P2 0.06639 0.01093 0.0474 0.11427
P3 1.08069 1.38220 0.15306 9.93902
K 331.00 1150.83 1.77 10400.78
S 5.49 5.02 0.12 25.54
a See note to Table A5.1.
b Number of observed banks: 424.
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Table A5.5	 TSP 4.0 Program for Transformation of Banks' Data
SET N0BS=545;
SMPL 1 NOBS;
? READ MICROSOFT EXCEL 4.0 FILE WITH BANKS DATA
READ (FILE='DATA.XLW');
? VARIABLES TRANSFORMATION
GENR LTC=LOG(TC/P3); LQ1=LOG(Q1); LQ2=LOG(Q2);
LP1=LOG(P1/P3);LP2=LOG(P2/P3);
LK=LOG(K); LS=LOG(S);
? CREATE CROSS PRODUCTS
GENR LQ1Q1=LQ1*LQ1/2; LQ2Q2= LQ2*LQ2/2; LQ1Q2= LQ1*LQ2;
LP1P1=LP1*LP1/2; LP2P2=LP2*LP2/2; LP1P2=LP1*LP2;
LQ1P1=LQ1*LP1;LQ1P2=LQ1*LP2; LQ2P2=LQ2*LP2; LQ2P1=LQ2*LP1;
LKK=LK*LK/2; LQ1K=LQ1*LK; LQ2K=LQ2*LK;
LP1K=LP1*LK; LP2K=LP2*LK;
LSS=LS*LS/2;LQ1S=LQ1*LS;LQ2S=LQ2*LS;
LP1S=LP1*LS;LP2S=LP2*LS;LKS=LK*LS;
? TRANSFORMATION OF LQ1 AND LQ2 FOR FOURIER TERMS
MSD(ALL)LQ1;
SET B1=@MAX;
SET Al=@MIN; ....
GENR 3A1=(B1-A1);
SET PI=3.141592654;
GENR M1= 0.2*PI+(LQ1-A1)*((0.8*2*PI)/(BA1));
MSD(ALL)LQ2;
SET B2=@MAX;
SET A2=@MIN;
GENR 3A2=(B2-A2);
SET PI=3.141592654;
GENR M2= 0.2*PI+(LQ2-A2)*((0.8*2*PI)/(BA2));
Continued Overleaf
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(continued)
? CREATE FOURIER TERMS
GENR CM1=COS(M1);SM1=SIN(M1);
CM2=COS(M2);SM2=SIN(M2);
GENR CM1M1=COS(M1+M1);SM1M1=SIN(M1+M1);
CM1M2=COS(M1+M2);SM1M2=SIN(M1+M2);
CM2M2=COS(M2+M2);SM2M2=SIN(M2+M2);
GENR CM1M1M2=COS(M1+M1+M2);SM1M1M2=SIN(M1+M1+M2);
CM1M2M2=COS(M1+M2+M2);SM1M2M2=SIN(M1+M2+M2);
? CREATE A FILE WITH NEW VARIABLES IN EXCEL 4.0
WRITE (FILE='VARS.XLW')
LTC LQ1 LQ2 LP1 LP2
LQ1Q1 LQ2Q2 LQ1Q2 LP1P1 LP2P2 LP1P2 LQ1P1 LQ2P1 LQ1P2 LQ2P2
CM1 SM1 CM2 SM2 CM1M1 SM1M1 CM1M2 SM1M2
CM2M2 SM2M2 CM1M1M2 SM1M1M2 CM1M2M2 SM1M2M2
LKK LQ1K LQ2K LP1K LP2K LSS LQ1S LQ2S LP1S LP2S LKS
LK LS;
STOP;
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Table A5.6	 Estimation of Cost Function (FRONTIER 4.1 Input file)a
1	 1=ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL, 2=TE EFFECTS MODEL
vars.txt	 DATA FILE NAME
vars.out	 OUTPUT FILE NAME
2	 1=PRODUCTION FUNCTION, 2=COST FUNCTION
LOGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE (YIN)
545	 NUMBER OF CROSS-SECTIONS
4	 NUMBER OF TIME PERIODS
1958	 NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN TOTAL
41	 NUMBER OF REGRESSOR VARIABLES (Xs)
MU (YIN) [OR DELTA() (YIN) IF USING TE EFFECTS MODEL]
ETA (YIN) [OR NUMBER OF TE EFFECTS REGRESSORS(Zs)]
STARTING VALUES (YIN)
IF YES THEN BETAO
BETA1 TO
BETAK
SIGMA SQUARED
GAMMA
MU	 [OR DELTAO
ETA	 DELTA1 TO
DELTAP]
NOTE: IF YOU ARE SUPPLYING STARTING VALUES
AND YOU HAVE RESTRICTED MU [OR DELTAO] TO BE
ZERO THEN YOU SHOULD NOT SUPPLY A STARTING
VALUE FOR THIS PARAMETER.
a See Coelli (1996) and Coelli et al. (1998) for details on the FRONTIER 4.1 Program.
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Table A5.7	 Loading Output File from FRONTIER 4.1 to TSP 4.0 a
SMPL 1 45;
? COEFFICIENT VALUES [FRONTIER 4.1 PROGRAM]
READ BETA;
1.4534 .3724 .4685 .1258 .8218 .1559 .1289 -.1520
? VARIANCE/COVARIANCE MATRIX [FRONTIER 4.1 PROGRAM]
READ (NROW=45,TYPE=SYM) VARB;
.01440
-.00323 .00273
-.00178 -.00706 .00208 L..]:
? PRINT NAMES, COEFFICIENT VALUES + STANDARD ERRORS & T-STATISTICS
TSTATS (NAMES=(B0-B44)) BETA VARB;
? ACTUAL VARIABLES SAVED IN EXCEL 4.0 WORKBOOK [SEE TABLE A5.5]
READ (FILE='VARS.XLW');
SMPL 1 545;
? CREATE SCALARS WITH MEAN VALUES FOR EACH VARIABLE
MSD (NOPRINT) LQ1;
COPY @MEAN LQ1B;
MSD (NOPRINT) LQ2;
COPY @MEAN LQ2B;
MSD (NOPRINT) LP1;
COPY @MEAN LP1B;
[...]:
? END OF PROGRAM
STOP;
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Table A5.8	 Calculation of Economies of Scale in TSP 4.0
? THIS CALCULATIONS FOLLOW TABLE A5.7
? DEFINE EQUATION FOR ECONOMIES OF SCALE
FRML SE B1+(B5*LQ1B)+(B7*LQ2B)+(B11*LP1B)+(B13*LP2B)
+(B15*SM1B)-(B16*CM1B)+(B19*SM1M1B)-(B20*CM1M1B)
+(B23*SM1M2B)-(B24*CM1M2B)+(B25*SM1M1M2B)-(B26*CM1M1M2B)
+(B27*SM1M2M2B)-(B28*CM1M2M2B)+(B30*LKB)+(B35*LSB)
+B2+(B6*LQ2B)+(B7*LQ1B)+(B12*LP1B)+(B14*LP2B)
+(B17*SM2B)-(B18*CM2B)+(B21*SM2M2B)-(B22*CM2M2B)
+(B23*SM1M2B)-(B24*CM1M2B)+(B25*SM1M1M2B)-(B26*CM1M1M2B)
+(B27*SM1M2M2B)-(B28*CM1M2M2B)+(B31*LKB)+(B36*LSB);
? SAMPLE SIZE [BETAS]
SMPL 1 45;
? FIND T-RATIOS OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE [H0=0]
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) SE;
COPY @COEFA SCALE;
? FIND T-RATIOS OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE [H0=1]
SET TRATIO=(@COEFA-1)/@SESA;
PRINT TRATIO;
? TITLE
IF SCALE>1; THEN; TITLE 'SCALE DISECONOMIES FOR SAMPLE 1-545';
ELSE;TITLE 'SCALE ECONOMIES FOR SAMPLE 1-545';
? END THIS SUBROUTINE
STOP;
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Table A5.9	 Calculation of Variance Components and of all Variables
Related to the Last Input P3 in TSP 4.0
? THESE CALCULATIONS FOLLOW TABLE A5.7
? EQUATIONS FOR VARIANCE COMPONENTS (VU) AND (VV)
TO THE LAST INPUT P3
? SAMPLE SIZE
SMPL 1 45;
? SIGNIFICANCE TEST FOR VARIANCE COMPONENTS
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) VU;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) VV;
? SIGNIFICANCE TEST FOR P3 VARIABLE + CROSS-PRODUCTS
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP1P3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP2P3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP3P3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LQ1P3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LQ2P3;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP3LK;
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) LP3LS;
? VARIANCE FOR HALF-NORMAL MODEL
SET PI=3.141592654;
FRML VARU ((PI-2)/PI)*SQRT(B42*B43);
ANALYZ (COEF=BETA,NAMES=(BO-B44), VCOV=VARB) VARU;
? END THIS SUBROUTINE
STOP;
FRML VU	 (342*B43);
FRML VV	 (B42-(B42*B43));
? EQUATIONS FOR VARIABLES RELATED
FRML LP3 1-B3-B4;
FRML LP1P3 -B8-B10;
FRML LP2P3 -B10-B9;
FRML LP3P3 B8+B9+2*B10;
FRML LQ1P3 -B11-B13;
FRML LQ2P3 -B12-B14;
FRML LP3LK -B32-B33;
FRML LP3LS -B37-B38;
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Table A5.10 Logistic Functional Form Estimation in TSP 4.0
? READ FILE IN MICROSOFT EXCEL 4.0
READ (FILE=1VARS.XLW1);
? SAMPLE DEFINITION
SMPL 1 1958;
? DEFINITION OF THE LOGISTIC FUNCTIONAL FORM
FRML LIT INEFF=
(EXP (INTERC+ASSETS*LAST+MARGIN*MUP+BRANCHES*LBRA
+RETAIL*RET+OWNERS*OWN+NONPERF*NPL
+PERFORM*R0E+CAPITAL*CAP
+QUOTED*QUOT+NORDWE*NO+NORDEA*NE+CENT*CE+COMMERC*COM
+SAVIN*SAV+POPUL*POP)) /
(1+EXP (INTERC+ASSETS*LAST+MARGIN*MUP+BRANCHES*LBRA
+OWNERS*OWN+NONPERF*NPL
+RETAIL*RET+PERFORM*R0E+CAPITAL*CAP
+QUOTED*QUOT+NORDWE*NO+NORDEA*NE+CENT*CE+COMMERC*COM
+SAVIN*SAV+POPUL*POP));
? DEFINITION OF PARAMETERS
PARAM INTERC ASSETS MARGIN BRANCHES
OWNERS NONPERF RETAIL PERFORM CAPITAL QUOTED
NORDWE NORDEA CENT COMMERC SAVIN POPUL;
? NON-LINEAR OLS TO ESTIMATE EQUATION "LIT" [MESTER (1993 AND 1996)]
LSQ LIT;
? END OF PROGRAM
STOP;
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Table A6.1 Maximum	 Likelihood
Parameters)a ,b,c
Parameter Estimates	 (Other
Variables Parameters MODEL I MODEL ll
In P3 133 .043* .052**(.028) (.030)
InPlInP3 113 -.011 -.010
(.011) (.011)
InP2InP3 123 .026** .030**(.011) (.011)
InP 3 In P3 133 -.015** -.019**(.007) (.007)
InQiInQ3 P13 .015** .013*(.007) (.009)
InQ2InP3 P23 -.016** -.012*(.008) (.009)
InP3InK I33k - -1E-04(.003)
InP3InS I33s - -.003(.010)
Vu 2 .030*** .010***
CC (.002) (.001)
Vv Ci2v .002***(8.7E-05)
.028***
(.003)
Varu var[u] .011*** .002***
(.001) (8E-05)
*, **, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
a Asymptotic t-ratios distributed as N(0,1). Model I: Log-likelihood =2492.6. Adjusted R 2 of the pooled
OLS model=99.8%. LR test of the one-sided error= 1323.7. Model II: Log-likelihood =2541.8. Adjusted
R2 of the pooled...OLS model=99.9%. LR test of the one-sided error= 1152.1. Estimates based on the
Davidson-Fletcher-Powell algorithm using the FRONTIER 4.1 software [see Coelli (1996) and Coelli et
al. (1998)]. Standard errors in brackets.
b See the Appendix to Chapter 5 for the computer programming.
c For the half-normal model the variance of u is Var[u] = Ka' - 2)/7-47.2
 and not 6.2 , this latter being
the variance of the normal distribution of which u represents a truncation for the sole positive values [see,
for instance, Battese and Coelli (1992) and Greene (1993a)].
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Table A6.2	 Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates [Equity (K) Only
and Non-Performing Loans (S) OnIA"
Variables Parameters K only S only
Intercept ao 1.498*** 1.427***(.120) (.114)
InQi al .374*** .379***(.052) (.045)
In% a2 .463*** .471"*(.046) (.040)
InP, Ri .149**(.052)
.073*
(.047)
In P2 32 .809*** .879***(.057) (.053)
InQiInQl 811 .155*** .167***(.018) (.015)
InQ2InQ2 522 .132*** .132***(.021) (.016)
InQiInQ2 512 -.148*** -.146(.016) (.014)
InPilnPi yll .183*** .176***(.020) (.020)
InP2InP2 122 .150*** .138***(.029) (.028)
InPlInP2 112 -.174*** -.166***(.022) (.022)
InQiInPi P11 .030* .047**(.020) (.017)
InQ2InPi P21 -.026 -.005(.021) (.018)
InQiInP2 P12 -.046** -.060***(.020) (.017)
InQ2InP2 P22 .041** .018(.021) (.019)
cos(z1)
mr.• Xi -.090** -.105**(.042) (.041)
sin(z1) e, .088**(.040)
.112**
(.039)
cos(z2) X2 .044* .068**(.029) (.028)
sin(z2) 02 -.196*** -.173***(.036) (.036)
cos(zi+zi) Xii -.085** -.080**(.031) (.030)
sin(zi+zi) 0 11 -.029 -.023(.034) (.034)
cos(z2+z2) X22 .133** .128**(.056) (.054)
sin(z2+z2) 022 .167** .180**(.060) (.061)
cos(z1+z2) X12 -.042* -.032(.029) (.028)
Continued Overleaf
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(continued)
Variables Parameters K only S only
sin(z1 +Z2) 012 -.1 44*** -.155***(.034) (.034)
cos(z1+z1+z2) X112 .033** .024*(.016) (.016)
sin(z1+z1-1-z2) 0112 .111*** .120***(.018) (.018)
cos(zi -FZ2+Z2) X122 -.036** -.023*(.015) (.015)
sin(zi -FZ2+Z2) 0122 -.095*** -.103***(.018) (.018)
InKInK TKK -.031* -(.024)
InQ i InK aik .020 -(.016)
InQ2InK CC2K .002 -(.018)
InP i lnK I31K .041** -(.022)
InP2InK 132K -.040** -(.021)
InSInS Tss - .005**
(.002)
InQ i InS ais - .012**
(.004)
InQ2InS CC2S - -.007*
(.005)
InP l InS Pis - .035***
(.008)
InP2InS P2S - -.034***
(.007)
InK
-
TK .011(.045)
-
InS Ts - -.023*
(.014)
sigma-squared 0-2 .030*** .025***
(.002) (.002)
gamma r .931*** .920***(.006) (.009)
eta 1 .037*** .063***(.010) (.009)
*, **, *** means statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and .1% respectively.
"Asymptotic t-ratios distributed as N(0,1). Log-likelihood for noequity=2500.1; for nonpls=2530.3 LR
test of the one-sided error for S only=1279.1; K only =1181. Estimates based on the Davidson-Fletcher-
Powell algorithm using the FRONTIER 4.1 software [see Coelli (1996) and Coelli et al. (1998)].
b Model I = standard cost function estimates; Model II Cost function estimates with risk and output
quality variables.
